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ABSTRACT
BOUNDARY-WORK IN UNITED STATES PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY OF 
THREE INTERDISCIPLINARY PROGRAMS
by
Michael J. Root 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2005 
Between 1970 and 2000 scientists from three interdisciplinary 
programs—evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, and chaos theory— 
contributed to changing U.S. psychology’s disciplinary boundaries. These 
interdisciplinary scientists brought about this change through their conceptual, 
material, and social practices. Psychologists used “boundary-work” as a 
means to control the influx of these various practices. Boundary-work 
connotes activities that promote scientists’ epistemic authority in society. 
Boundary-work also serves to demarcate a science’s particular collection of 
knowledge from other collections. Through their boundary-work activities, 
various psychologists resisted some of the practices of these interdisciplinary 
scientists while making accommodations for other types of practices. These 
resistances and accommodations illustrate the ways in which psychologists 
conveyed their epistemic authority and demarcated their discipline’s 
boundaries between these three decades.
xi
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The purpose of my dissertation is to describe psychologists’ boundary- 
work in reaction to the introduction of these interdisciplinary programs’ 
practices between 1970 and 2000. First, I present an overview of 
psychology’s complex disciplinary boundaries. I then use the history of 
psychology and sociology of scientific knowledge literature to describe the 
nature of boundary-work activities. Next, I present the foundational 
components and a brief history of each interdisciplinary program. Fourth, I 
outline each program’s conceptual, material, and social practices. Lastly, I 
discuss psychologists’ resistances and accommodations to each 
interdisciplinary program’s practices with reference to how they affected 
psychology’s disciplinary boundaries.
My results indicate that certain psychologists most often resisted 
evolutionary psychologists’, cognitive scientists’, and chaos theorists’ 
conceptual practices. Psychologists’ resistances seemed ineffective in 
preventing these conceptual practices from entering the discipline and did not 
stop other psychologists from using them. Accommodations occurred for all 
types of practices for all three programs, indicating that psychology’s 
disciplinary boundaries are relatively permeable. I argue that psychologists 
made accommodations for these practices to increase their epistemic 
authority within the scientific community and throughout society. Finally, I 
discuss the advantages of writing psychology’s history through an 
examination of psychologists’ boundary-work.
xii
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INTRODUCTION
Like every discipline in the humanities, natural sciences, and social 
sciences, the discipline of psychology within the United States (U.S.) is an 
expansive and complex field of knowledge production.1 Psychology’s particular 
collection of knowledge represents every dimension of human behavior, 
cognition, and emotion. It includes knowledge of our perceptual capacities to 
view complex external stimuli, our ability to make judgments and decisions given 
complex information, the role of memory in our ability to recall pertinent 
information, our interpersonal communication skills, and the motivations that 
allow us to carry out our daily activities. Essentially, psychological knowledge 
encompasses the “individual,” or the “self,” and prescribes how we relate to, act 
on, and make sense of our social world.
The Dynamic Nature of Psvcholoqical Knowledge 
Psychological knowledge is neither stationary nor inflexible; it does not 
remain immutable after psychological communities generally agree that it 
possesses some pragmatic or truth value for the discipline and the public. 
Instead, this knowledge is dynamic, fluid, and locally contingent upon time and 
place. Such factors as changes in generations, economic adjustments, political
1 I use the terms “U.S. psychology” and “psychology” interchangeably throughout the text 
because I focus on psychological knowledge in the United States. It is important to note that 
psychology’s theories, methods, and concepts vary based on one’s culture (Danziger, 1997). For 
example, there are differences in how individualist and collectivist cultures interact in their social 
environments (Schoeneman, 1994; Trandis, 1994).
1
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upheavals, and new research findings ultimately affect how psychological 
knowledge circumscribes and represents our behaviors, thoughts, and emotions 
(Chaiklin, 2001; Shweder & Levine, 1984). These factors, in turn, affect the ways 
in which we view and understand others and ourselves. In her discussion of 
contemporary psychological knowledge, Lisa Blackman (1994) describes this 
knowledge as a “form of discursive activity which is not only relative to the socio­
cultural, historical and institutional setting of psychology, but also comes to define 
the very ways we understand ourselves as human beings” (p. 487). As 
psychological knowledge changes and is transmitted throughout our cultural 
milieu, our phenomenological experiences of what it is like to act, think, and feel 
also change.
Examples abound of how psychological knowledge changes in pace with 
societal and cultural changes. For instance, in his book, American Cool, the 
historian Peter Stearns (1994) discusses people’s changing emotional behaviors 
between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Stearns, people 
changed their “emotional styles”—the management and presentation of emotions 
to others—between the two centuries. In the nineteenth century, people generally 
acknowledged their emotions but also tried to control and channel their emotions 
appropriately. If people were angry with others, it was common to acknowledge 
this anger while directing it towards others in an acceptable manner. In the early 
to middle twentieth century however, there was a departure from this emotional 
style. In general, people shifted away from channeling their emotions in 
appropriate ways and began to hide their emotions behind a “cool” exterior.
2
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People were controlling their emotions as much as people did in the nineteenth 
century, but they were not as likely to channel them appropriately. Instead, the 
social context of the early to middle twentieth century, especially during and after 
the two world wars, played a role in discouraging the outward expression of 
emotions. It was not that emotionality disappeared altogether. Instead, people 
began to stifle their emotionality. Stearns argues that this change in emotional 
styles affected how people came to understand their emotional lives and how 
they interacted with others socially.
Ideas about the nature of human intelligence also have changed over the 
years (Fancher, 1985; Sokal, 1987). In the early 1900s the English psychologist 
Charles Spearman (1904) believed intelligence was a single intellectual ability 
called the “g” factor. More recently, psychologists such as L. L. Thurstone (1934), 
Robert Sternberg (1985), and Howard Gardner (1983) have challenged 
Spearman’s findings and posited various ideas about multiple intelligences. 
Sternberg, for instance, believes there is evidence to suggest that people 
possess three broad categories of intelligence: analytic, creative, and practical. 
Gardner believes that we have seven different intelligences: verbal, mathematical, 
spatial, musical, interpersonal, intrapersonal, and kinesthetic. This change has 
ramifications for how we behave towards and perceive others. Imagine a 
situation in a high school where a student receives a low intelligence test score 
from the perspective of Spearman’s conception of intelligence. It is likely that 
teachers will think of this student as inadequate in most if not all subjects due to
3
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their low intelligence score.2 When using any of the multiple intelligence theories 
however, teachers may not be as likely to label that same student as inadequate 
in all subjects. Instead, the teacher may believe the student is poor in the 
subjects of mathematics and vocabulary, but believe the student is strong in 
musical or kinesthetic abilities.
Psychologists’ views on how to characterize personality have changed as 
well. Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud believed that adult personalities form 
through psychosexual stages of development (i.e., oral, anal, phallic, latent, 
genital stages) occurring in early childhood. According to Freud, when primary 
caregivers do not meet the needs of the child, the child may become fixated at a 
particular stage. As an adult, when they experience anxiety, they may revert back 
to that particular stage of fixation. On the other hand, contemporary experimental 
personality theorists view personality as comprised of traits, produced mainly 
through heredity, that change relatively little throughout the lifespan (e.g., 
Goldberg, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1987). Each of these ideas about the nature of 
personality has ramifications for how we interact with other people. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, at the height of Freud’s popularity in the U.S., people may have 
viewed a very talkative person as being orally fixated. From the modern trait 
perspective that person would likely be identified as an extrovert.
This profuse and provisional knowledge helps create the extensive nature 
of psychology’s disciplinary structure. Producing knowledge about how we
2 There is some evidence that this scenario would hold true (Rosenthal, 1994; Rosenthal &
Jacobson, 1968). Robert Rosenthal’s research suggests that people tend to treat others in a 
manner that coincides with their beliefs about that individual.
4
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understand ourselves and make sense of the world is a vast undertaking. Many 
times psychological knowledge production leads to heterogeneous and contested 
knowledge product, such as the debate over the factors involved in intelligence. 
Simply expressed, psychological knowledge does not “sit still.” Psychologists 
continually revise this knowledge based on numerous factors including changing 
social contexts, new research, and innovative perspectives by, for example, 
feminist and multicultural psychologists (e.g., Hall & Barongan, 2001; Morawski, 
1994).
Making Psychological Knowledge Public
Psychologists, as the knowledge producers in this multiplicity of fields from 
sensory psychology and neuroscience to counseling and community psychology, 
use a variety of techniques and procedures to create, reproduce, represent, and 
disseminate these knowledge products to their colleagues in psychology, other 
scientific communities, funding agencies, and the public. Irrespective of who 
obtains and uses this knowledge, it represents a public commodity and the 
process of its circulation and distribution is a social activity. This social activity 
consists of a reciprocal relationship between knowledge producers and 
knowledge consumers.
To make their knowledge public, psychologists engage in a number of 
practices. Like other scientists, they present their findings at professional 
conferences around the world. They report their experimental research results by 
publishing in peer-reviewed journals. They write both technical and popular 
books that distill their sometimes abstruse research findings for professionals in
5
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other subdisciplines and the lay public alike. Other psychologists use their 
professional training to prescribe modes of conduct for their clients during 
psychotherapy sessions. These psychologists also perform assessments of 
psychological functioning and make diagnoses on the mentally ill while working in 
mental health clinics, private practices, and hospitals. Still others invent and 
reconfigure instruments (e.g., personality inventories, intelligence tests) that they 
then attempt to bring into and sometimes market to the psychology community 
and the public. Whether psychological knowledge takes the form of a 
professional journal article or advice on a call-in radio show, it exists “out there” 
in the world for anyone to acquire, consume, and evaluate.
The form a particular piece of knowledge takes and its presentation in 
some public domain varies considerably from psychologist to psychologist. 
Psychologists’ specialty areas, their institutional training, the laboratories in which 
they conduct their research, the quality of their mentoring relationships, and 
various other factors all contribute to the presentation format of psychological 
knowledge. The complexity and expansive scope of psychologists’ activities in 
their knowledge production play a pivotal role in creating the field’s expansive 
and complex disciplinary boundaries. In the next section, I explore the concept of 
“discipline” and the role of disciplinary boundaries.
The Nature of Disciplines and Disciplinary Boundaries 
What does the term “discipline” mean and what exactly constitutes a 
discipline like psychology? The word “discipline” is ubiquitous in academic culture 
so it would seem superfluous to define the obvious. Within academe, there are
6
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disciplines for medicine, economics, political science, art history, physics, and 
psychology along with a host of others. But the meaning of discipline goes 
beyond the superficial labeling common in academic institutions. The nature of 
disciplines contains tacit assumptions about the production of knowledge that call 
for explication in order to appreciate the modern discipline of psychology. 
Disciplines
According to Ellen Messer-Davidow and her colleagues (1993), organizing 
knowledge into separate disciplines is of relatively recent origins—occurring 
approximately 200 years ago—and it has been less than 100 years since the 
production of this knowledge took place within the academic settings familiar 
today. David Shumway and Messer-Davidow (1991) assert that the organization 
of knowledge into disciplines began with the formation of scientific societies such 
as the Royal Society of London and the Academie des Sciences of France in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These scientific societies provided 
learned people with the freedom to study in specialized areas of knowledge that 
went beyond the traditional subjects of grammar, rhetoric, and ethics. Between 
the late eighteenth and middle of the nineteenth centuries, this specialization led 
to the division of natural philosophy into independent sciences such as physics, 
chemistry, and biology. With the proliferation of scientific findings during this time, 
the idea and utility of distinct disciplines came into scientific and public 
consciousness. But there is more to the term “discipline” than the formation of the 
now common academic disciplines.
7
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“Discipline” contains a double meaning that is important for my discussion 
of psychology’s disciplinary boundaries and disciplinary boundaries in general. 
French philosopher Michel Foucault (1977) discusses the underlying meaning of 
the term in Discipline and Punish, his poignant exposition on the structure of 
prison systems and schools. First, Foucault tells us that discipline is a method for 
assisting people in mastering a particular subject. It is the regimentation, 
organization, and transmission of information necessary to help individuals 
understand particular forms of knowledge. Secondly, discipline connotes a way 
of controlling or exerting power over other people’s behavior. According to 
Foucault, power over others and people’s compliance with standardized modes 
of conduct dictates the ways in which we interact with each other in the world.
Foucault’s two meanings of discipline have implications for current 
academic disciplines. For instance, the sociologist of science Robert Kohler 
(1981) posits that academic disciplines indicate specialized knowledge and skills 
that individuals pursuing a particular specialization need to master. Secondly, he 
suggests that disciplines are political establishments for obtaining resources and 
“demarcating areas of academic turf” (p. 104). Timothy Lenoir (1993) also uses 
Foucault’s dual meaning of discipline to imply that disciplines are the 
“infrastructure of science...that are institutionalized formations for organizing 
schemes of perception, appreciation, and action, and for inculcating them as 
tools of cognition and communication” (p. 72). Both Kohler and Lenoir suggest 
that traditional academic disciplines connote a form of cognitive authority used 
for internal organization (i.e., keeping its practitioners in line) and for demarcating
8
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one discipline from another (i.e., acknowledging some forms of knowledge as 
germane to the discipline while excluding other forms).
Messer-Davidow and colleagues (1993) suggest four dimensions 
characteristic of disciplines based on Foucault’s framework. First, disciplines 
assist in producing our world. They provide us with theories, concepts, and ideas 
of how the world works. These various knowledge products circumscribe the way 
we perceive the world. Secondly, disciplines develop knowledge producers. 
Disciplines provide training grounds for students interested in producing 
knowledge about some part of the world. The training these students receive 
varies based on their disciplinary specialization. Third, disciplines produce 
prestige and value. Ostensibly, the public views knowledge producers as 
possessing a valuable commodity for society. If the knowledge does prove 
valuable, the public bestows privilege and rewards, usually in the form of 
financial support, to the knowledge producers. Finally, disciplines serve as icons 
for society’s advancement. While one can debate whether knowledge truly does 
progress in some linear fashion, disciplines and their practitioners assist in 
promoting the idea that knowledge progresses in this fashion.
If Messer-Davidow and colleagues (1993) four dimensions are viable 
characterizations of disciplines, then an area worthy of investigation is how 
knowledge producers construct and manage their disciplinary boundaries. But 
what exactly are disciplinary boundaries?
9
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Disciplinary Boundaries
Disciplinary boundaries are the physical, intellectual, and rhetorical spaces 
within which knowledge producers engage in their research and professional 
practices.3 Within these spaces, a discipline’s practitioners make epistemic 
claims about a set of circumscribed phenomena germane to the overall subject 
matter of their discipline. They also serve as spaces within which students 
receive training in prescribed modes of conduct appropriate for their chosen field.
The physicality of disciplinary boundaries is apparent in the separate 
buildings assigned to different academic departments within colleges and 
universities. The physical spaces, whether they are for physics, chemistry, or 
psychology departments, provide demarcations for the types of knowledge 
produced. Physics departments produce knowledge on properties of the universe 
such as gravitational and electromagnetic forces. Similarly, chemistry 
departments are physical spaces arranged for producing knowledge about 
inorganic compounds such as phosphate ions and carbonic acid. Psychology 
departments, of course, are spaces arranged for the production of knowledge 
about human thought, behavior, and emotion.
These physical boundaries may be broken down further into separate
laboratory spaces that signify the knowledge production of distinct subdisciplines.
Cognitive psychologists, for instance, have laboratory spaces configured in ways
3 While it is common to consider disciplines as strictly deriving from higher education systems,
this is a limited conception of the term “discipline.” There are many individuals conducting
research or that have clinical practices that hold no institutional affiliations but are still affiliated
with a particular discipline. For instance, industrial/organizational psychologists work
predominately in businesses and corporations, but they still consider themselves affiliated with
the discipline of psychology. The same thing is true of clinical and counseling psychologists who
choose to work in private practice or hospitals.
10
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that differentiate their spaces from those of physiological and social 
psychologists. But this notion of physical boundaries extends beyond university 
settings. Outside the academic realm, clinical and counseling psychologists 
practice their disciplinary training in physical spaces such as private practices 
and hospital mental wards.
The intellectual components of disciplinary boundaries consist of how 
knowledge producers investigate and think about the subject matter within their 
discipline. For instance, scientists’ training in the classroom, laboratory, and in 
the field play a role in circumscribing a discipline’s boundaries. Other 
components that form this intellectual component include their methodologies, 
concepts, theories, and instruments. For example, while biologists, psychologists, 
and sociologists all study human beings, their training and methods constrains 
them to study human beings in different ways. Biologists may study human 
mating behavior in a qualitatively different way than either psychologists or 
sociologists. Biologists may be interested in only comparing the allele frequency 
of human mate pairs. They may not be concerned with the level of commitment 
each partner shares with the other, or the strategies they used to become a mate 
pair. Psychologists, on the other hand, may not concern themselves with allele 
frequencies, but may instead investigate the motivational underpinning of mate 
choices, or the dominance hierarchies in relationships. Sociologists may ignore 
the approaches of biologists and psychologists and perhaps study the 
ramifications of teenage pregnancy on the welfare system.
11
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Closely related to the intellectual component of disciplinary boundaries is 
how knowledge producers use rhetoric to delineate their discipline’s boundaries. 
This is often a powerful way for them to describe the contours of their disciplinary 
boundaries. The purpose of rhetoric is to persuade an audience of the credibility 
of a particular claim. In their books, presentations, and journal articles, scientists 
use rhetorical devices to persuade audiences of their science’s reliability and 
integrity. One way scientists establish a discipline’s intellectual credibility is by 
writing their discipline’s history. In the words of James Good and Richard Roberts 
(1993) scientists often employ a “rhetoric of legitimation” in these histories. 
Scientists legitimize their science by telling internalist histories of the “great” 
dates, ideas, and scientists of their discipline for the purposes of gaining respect. 
Psychologists, no less than other scientists, employ this strategy frequently in 
writing their disciplinary histories. For instance, the historian of psychology Edwin
G. Boring (1929) virtually ignored the applied and clinical areas of psychology 
when writing his history of the field. Numerous historians of psychology including 
Mitchell Ash (1983), Laurel Furumoto (1989), William Woodward (1995), and 
Benjamin Harris (1997) have critiqued these types of disciplinary histories as 
serving a legitimizing purpose and distorting the past.
Other rhetorical devices scientists use are inscriptions to persuade 
audiences of the validity of their claims (Latour, 1987). Inscriptions are visual 
representations of knowledge such as graphs, figures, and tables within texts. 
These inscriptions augment or reinforce the author’s textual statements.
Scientists especially use inscription practices as a means to reinforce their
12
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knowledge claims. For instance, graphs allow a potentially doubtful reader to 
experience visually the changing nature of a particular phenomenon. Irrespective 
of the branch of science from which a scientist hails, they all engage in these 
types of rhetorical strategies to reassure others and themselves of their 
disciplinary boundaries. While chemists can speak more assuredly on the 
number of protons in each chemical element than psychologists can about the 
structures and functions of the cerebral cortex, both types of scientists employ 
rhetoric in an effort to demarcate their knowledge claims from others’.
In whatever manner these boundaries are fashioned, they are an 
important, though often unexamined, component of many sciences. They provide 
a sense of identity, status, stability, and community for each discipline’s members. 
The sociologist of science Steven Fuller (1991) describes the role of disciplinary 
boundaries as “providing structure needed for a variety of functions, ranging from 
the allocation of cognitive authority and material resources to the establishment 
of reliable access to some extra-social reality” (p. 302). For scientists, disciplinary 
boundaries connote areas of expertise. High energy physicists, for example, 
reputedly possess expert knowledge of subatomic particles like electrons and 
photons, but not expert knowledge on the behavior of galaxies and solar systems. 
In psychology, most consider clinical psychologists experts at identifying and 
treating psychopathological conditions such as depression, anxiety, and 
schizophrenia. But clinical psychologists are not experts in human judgment and 
decision-making.
13
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One of the benefits of this shared expertise among scientists is the 
accumulation of power. This power often manifests itself in scientists’ decisions 
about incorporating knowledge into or excluding knowledge from their discipline’s 
boundaries. This is the process of boundary-work.
Disciplinary Boundary-Work
Protecting, patrolling, and reconfiguring a science’s boundaries is what the 
sociologist of science Thomas Gieryn (1983) identifies as boundary-work. 
Boundary-work usually takes the form of either scientists’ resistances or 
accommodations to new concepts, theories, and technologies. Examining a 
science’s boundaries can answer many useful questions about a science’s 
history. For instance, one can trace how a discipline’s boundaries have changed 
since its inception. Disciplinary boundaries indicate the kinds of knowledge 
deemed useful or inappropriate by scientists during a particular period. Similarly, 
boundaries suggest the types of practices scientists use and how these practices 
change as a result of scientists’ resistances and accommodations to different 
forms of knowledge. Examining disciplinary boundaries can also specify how 
scientists promote, stabilize, and expand their discipline. Finally, these 
boundaries suggest the kinds of changes that occur within a discipline when 
scientists reconfigure their field’s boundaries.
One of the reasons that scientists open their discipline’s boundaries is to 
augment their existing cognitive authority by incorporating some theory, 
technology, or method. For instance, in the decades between 1920 and 1940 
paleontologists and experimental biologists opened their disciplinary boundaries
14
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after they realized the importance of Gregor Mendel’s work on heredity for 
understanding how species evolve (Bowler, 1989). Combining Mendel’s work 
with Darwin’s theory of natural selection resulted in the “modern synthesis” in 
evolutionary biology (e.g., Dobzhansky, 1951; Huxley, 1942). The modern 
synthesis helped promote evolutionary biologists’ cognitive status in the sciences 
by providing a cohesive conceptual framework for the discipline.
Conversely, there are times when scientists attempt to close their 
boundaries and prohibit some theory, concept, opinion, practice, method, object, 
or instrument deemed undesirable from entering the field. Sometimes knowledge 
may threaten the existing authority of scientists and they may take action to 
remove the perceived threat. Before the 1920s, for instance, evolutionary biology 
relied on Lamarckism and orthogenesis to explain the process of species 
evolution.4 At the time, both ideas were popular among the lay public and many 
scientists. This popularity was due, in part, to the implicit suggestion that some 
higher power controlled the evolutionary process. This idea resonated with the 
beliefs of many of the religious-minded public and scientists at the time. But 
relying on teleological explanations was unacceptable for an assumedly rigorous 
science like evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biologists could not substantiate 
either of these ideas in their research. It was threatening to the credibility of their 
science and they eventually eliminated Lamarckism and orthogenesis in favor of 
Mendel’s and Darwin’s ideas (Bowler, 1989).
4 The French naturalist Jean Baptiste de Lamarck developed Lamarckism in 1809. Lamarckism is 
the theory that species evolve through the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Orthogenesis, 
which was espoused by many naturalists in the nineteenth century, is the process of species 
evolving along a predetermined linear path (Mayr, 1991).
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Statement of Purpose
I will explore the modification of U.S. psychology’s disciplinary boundaries 
by systems of knowledge produced by scientists from three interdisciplinary 
programs—evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, chaos theory— between 
1970 and 2000.5 Scientists from each of these interdisciplinary programs 
introduced different forms of knowledge into psychology that somehow affected 
the field and the practices of some of its scientists and practitioners. 
Interdisciplinary programs arise when scientists from disparate fields come 
together because of some common interest in a particular problem or subject. To 
examine these forms of knowledge, I look at the types of practices these 
scientists introduced into the discipline and the types of boundary-work 
psychologists used in reaction to these practices.
Practices under Investigation
Following the emphasis on examining scientific practices from the 
sociology of scientific knowledge literature (e.g., Pickering, 1995; Shapin, 1982; 
Sulloway, 1991), I divided scientific practices into three interrelated categories: 
conceptual, material, and social. Conceptual practices consist of activities 
pertaining to what is commonly associated with the cognitive dimensions of 
science. Conceptual practices include activities such as the use of metaphor for 
introducing new concepts into the field, developing or refining research methods,
5 The term “interdisciplinary” has numerous interpretations and the scientific literature is rife with 
terms that connote different aspect of interdisciplinarity. The humanities scholar Julie Thompson 
Klein (1990) discusses the many terms used to exemplify interdisciplinarity. These terms include 
“multidisciplinarity,” “pluridisciplinarity,” and “transdisciplinarity.” I use the terms “interdisciplinary” 
and “interdisciplinarity” as they appear to be the most recognizable and appropriate for my 
research.
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and constructing and modifying scientific theories. Examples from psychology 
include the refinement of models of human memory systems and introducing new 
statistical techniques for analyzing data.
Material practices are those that deal with the physical manifestations of a 
science. They include the construction of tests and assessment procedures, the 
manipulation of laboratory equipment and space, the creation of new instruments 
and apparatus, and the use of existing instruments and apparatus for new 
purposes. In psychology, material practices would include the development and 
implementation of intelligence tests such as the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test 
and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Material practices also would include 
the development and use of instruments like functional resonance magnetic 
imaging (fMRI) devices and Skinner boxes.
Social practices deal with the interpersonal dimensions of science. Social 
practices entail attending conferences, publishing research, interactions with 
funding agencies, establishing relationships between laboratories, and facilitating 
associations with other academic institutions and departments. In psychology, 
social practices take the form of endeavors such as applying for funding from the 
National Institute for Mental Health or publishing in the journal American 
Psychologist.
These types of practices are interrelated. Scientists who write empirical 
research articles usually publish their findings in scientific journals, book chapters, 
textbooks, or monographs (social practice). Scientists most often derive 
inspiration for their research from some kind of theory and their research findings
17
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contain various concepts, models, methods, and possibly metaphors that support 
their research findings (conceptual practice). It is also feasible to assume that 
scientists who publish their research have developed specific instruments or 
artifacts like particle accelerators or Skinner boxes for investigating a particular 
phenomenon (material practice).
I contend that the conceptual, material, and social practices of 
evolutionary psychologists, cognitive scientists, and chaos theorists spurred 
psychologists to engage in boundary-work. Psychologists either resisted or made 
accommodations for these practices that ultimately restructured the boundaries 
of psychology.
Psychologists resist certain practices because they have their own 
conceptual, material, and social practices that they use in their day-to-day 
professional activities. In his book Academic Tribes and Territories, Tony Becher 
(1989) emphasized that “the attitudes, activities and cognitive styles of groups of 
academics representing a particular discipline are closely bound up with the 
characteristics and structures of the knowledge domains with which such groups 
are professionally concerned” (p. 20). Psychologists train either explicitly or 
implicitly in these types of practices; therefore, they have a professional and 
sometimes emotional attachment to these practices. Conversely, psychologists 
can sometimes make accommodations for a new practice. This usually happens 
when they realize the need for or practicality of employing a new analytic 
technique for their data. Or they may adopt a concept from another discipline that 
more appropriately conveys the meaning of a particular subject. I will
18
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demonstrate instances of these resistances and accommodations in my case 
studies.
Rationale for my Investigation
I have two reasons for investigating psychologists’ boundary-work and 
using these three programs as my case studies. First, my historical research 
interests intersect with these three interdisciplinary programs. Evolutionary 
psychologists investigate adaptations in human behavior, thought, and emotions. 
Cognitive scientists study the computational aspects of human cognition. Chaos 
theorists deal with orderly behavior in seemingly randomly behaving systems. 
Fortunately, these three programs infringed upon psychology’s boundaries at 
approximately the same time. Secondly, the study of boundary-work in 
psychology is relatively uncharted territory. I believe that studying psychologists’ 
boundary-work is essential for developing a deeper understanding and 
appreciation for the history of the discipline. Many authors of history and systems 
of psychology textbook still subscribe to the great man or great idea style of 
writing so they tend to present distorted disciplinary histories (e.g., Hergenhahn, 
2001; Schultz & Schultz, 2000). Many of these textbooks are the work of 
psychologists who are amateur historians. Ever since Robert Young’s (1966) 
criticism of the scholarship in the history of the behavioral sciences, professional 
historians of psychology have responded with revisionist histories of the 
discipline focused on narrower topics in specific contexts (e.g., Blumenthal, 1975; 
Furumoto & Scarborough, 1986; Guthrie, 1998; Harris, 1979). My approach 
complements revisionist histories of psychology in that it focuses on boundary-
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work in specific and narrow contexts, but it also brings to light external factors 
(i.e., other scientists’ practices) that play a role in shaping psychology’s 
boundaries. Employing boundary-work analysis also allows one to move between 
the “micro-histories” common in today’s historiographic approach and the “big 
picture” approach advocated more recently by historian of science Roger Smith 
(1997; 1998).
Structure of my Investigation
In Chapter 1, I discuss the processes involved in scientists’ boundary-work.
I introduce three kinds of threats to scientists’ authority and explain the types of 
boundary-work used in reaction to these threats. Next, I discuss how boundary- 
work encapsulates the different activities in which scientists engage for 
establishing, maintaining, and extending a discipline’s boundaries. Finally, I 
discuss how scientists resist and accommodate different forms of knowledge in 
their boundary-work activities.
In my second chapter, I go deeper than I have in this introduction into the 
complexity and mercurial nature of U.S. psychology’s boundaries. I try to capture 
what these boundaries looked like between 1970 and 2000 and provide historical 
examples of psychology’s changing boundaries. To do this, I provide two 
illustrations of psychology’s changing boundaries during its history as a discipline. 
Secondly, I identify three reasons for psychology’s complex boundaries during 
the 1970s up to the new millennium: (a) the different levels of analysis in 
psychological studies, (b) psychology’s reflexive nature, and (c) the complexity of
20
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its disciplinary structure.6 Lastly, I review the state of psychology’s boundaries 
during this period by discussing psychology’s professional structure as an 
academic discipline, its training of students, and its putative fragmentation into 
specialty areas.
In the next three chapters, I introduce my case studies: evolutionary 
psychology, cognitive science, and chaos theory. I provide a brief history for each 
case study, the program’s theoretical framework, and the conceptual, material, 
and social practices that affected psychology’s boundaries. Finally, I discuss the 
resistances and accommodations psychologists displayed when carrying out 
their boundary-work in response to the practices of these interdisciplinary 
programs.
In my concluding chapter, I argue that despite psychologists’ efforts in the 
thirty years between 1970 and 2000 to establish and maintain psychology’s 
disciplinary boundaries, my investigation indicates that the boundaries of U.S. 
psychology remained fluid, permeable, and dynamic. Psychologists especially 
resisted the introduction of new conceptual practices. They were less likely to 
resist new material and social practices. Despite these resistances, 
accommodations occurred with all three kinds of practices for all three 
interdisciplinary programs. Conversely, psychologists more readily accepted the 
various practices of cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists than they 
did the practices of chaos theorists. Interestingly, today some psychologists are
6 Note that these three reasons for psychology’s complex boundaries are just as applicable today 
as they were thirty years ago. See Stephen Yanchar’s (1997) discussion on the fragmented 
structure of the discipline.
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combining these three interdisciplinary programs in various ways in order to 
conduct their research.
Finally, I discuss the benefits of using the sociology of science and 
boundary-work for understanding and appreciating the historical processes that 
helped shape psychology. Psychology’s boundaries change or shift as 
psychologists carry out their own conceptual, material, and social practices. But it 
is also important to recognize that psychologists’ resistances and 
accommodations to the various practices permeating their field’s boundaries 
produce additional changes and shifts. These boundary-work activities need to 
be explored more fully in order to obtain a more comprehensive account of the 
history of psychology and to appreciate the ways in which psychology dictates 
and is dictated by the social world.
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CHAPTER I
DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARY-WORK AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Boundary-work analysis is a procedure used to understand scientists’ 
activities for protecting the cognitive authority of their field. Boundary-work is an 
idea that came to fruition within the field of sociology of scientific knowledge 
(SSK), which is an area of science studies. “Science studies” is used as an 
umbrella term to represent fields such as science and technology studies, 
sociology of science, sociology of scientific knowledge, philosophy of science, 
gender studies, literary studies, and the history of science (Biagioli, 1999; 
Pickering, 1995). The field of SSK came into prominence in science studies 
within the past thirty years mainly through the efforts of British sociologists and 
philosophers. Recently it has enjoyed growing success among U.S. sociologists, 
philosophers, and historians of science as well as various researchers in France, 
Germany, Israel, and Australia (Shapin, 1995). At present, sociologists of science 
have mainly analyzed the physical and biological sciences (e.g., Barnes &
Shapin, 1979; Jasanoff, Markle, Petersen, & Pinch, 1995; Latour & Woolgar, 
1986; Pickering, 1992; Shapin, 1982). Despite its growing popularity, there has 
been very little work done by historians of psychology from this perspective. This 
is unfortunate because I believe SSK can contribute a complementary dimension 
to previous historical studies in psychology, especially pertaining to
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psychologists’ boundary-work activities. Before exploring the process of 
boundary-work itself, it is important to gain an understanding of SSK. Many 
dimensions of boundary-work analysis stem from the ideas put forth by 
sociologists of scientific knowledge.
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
The sociology of scientific knowledge is a heterogeneous field of study 
because there are many different conceptions of the appropriate objects to study 
in science. These conceptions have changed throughout SSK’s disciplinary 
history. I outline a few of them here. From the 1930s to the 1960s, Robert 
Merton’s (1937; 1938; 1968) ideas on the sociology of science were taken as the 
definitive position in the field. Merton focused on the rewards in science (e.g., 
Nobel Prizes) and the effect these had on how scientists conducted their work. 
Merton (1968) observed that eminent scientists received a disproportionate 
number of rewards for their work, while other scientists, though perhaps just as 
deserving, did not. These rewards, or the lack of them, affected the motivational 
level of the scientists. One of the criticisms of Merton’s approach is that he did 
not take his ideas much further into the social dimensions of science. To Merton, 
the veracity or “truth-value” of scientists’ knowledge products were 
unquestionable and, therefore, untainted by social elements. It was not until the 
1960s that SSK became more social in its focus.
In the late 1960s and into the 1970s a more social component came to the 
forefront in studies of science inspired by some radical ideas about scientists and 
the making of scientific knowledge. Thomas Kuhn’s (1962/1996) widely read
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book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and the philosopher Paul 
Feyerabend’s (1978) Against Method became popular frameworks for 
understanding scientific practice. Kuhn criticized scientists’ beliefs in the 
“scientific method” and their belief that this method would lead to some form of 
absolute truth. Instead, he chose to focus on the social dimensions of science 
that allowed scientists to conduct their work. Kuhn suggested that the use of 
exemplars—problems scientists were trained to see during their indoctrination as 
students—were used as analogies to solve new problems in the course of 
“normal science.” The main point that Kuhn contributed to SSK was not the 
popularly used term “paradigm shift,” but the notion that scientists’ training 
dictates their observations, thus creating scientific facts in particular experimental 
contexts. Like Kuhn, Feyerabend questioned the validity of a single scientific 
method and demonstrated that many scientists do not follow a single scientific 
method—the idea that “anything goes”—using examples from usually 
unquestioned models of progress in science like the Copernican revolution.
Since the 1970s, sociologists of scientific knowledge place even more 
emphasis on the social components of science. For example, they moved 
beyond merely looking at how social components interfere in scientific practice 
and replaced this perspective with a focus on how social components contribute 
to scientific practices. The historian of science Jan Golinski (1990) identified two 
ways sociologists of scientific knowledge are now looking at scientific practices. 
First, there are the ethnomethodologists that study scientists in situ such as 
Bruno Latour’s (1986) study of biochemists, Karin Knorr-Cetina’s (1981) work
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with groups of scientists studying plant proteins, Andrew Pickering’s (1981; 1984) 
investigations of physicists studying quarks, and Harry Collins’ (1974) study of 
laser research. Next, there are studies that look at how science is made public in 
books, journals, and presentations such as Timothy Lenoir’s (1998) work on 
communication and inscription practices. In his book, The Mangle of Practice, 
Pickering (1993) advocates a different version of SSK through an investigation of 
how materials in science, such as machines, have an agency all their own that 
act upon humans. For instance, the weather controls our behavior to a great 
extent in that if it is raining we are apt to pack an umbrella for work. His argument 
is that humans are not the only things in science that possess agency. Materials, 
according to Pickering, also possess agency that can affect scientists’ practices.
The main function of SSK is to develop a comprehensive account of how 
science works, that is, how scientists develop, use, and maintain scientific 
knowledge. But what constitutes knowledge, let alone scientific knowledge?
Barry Barnes (1990) outlines four characteristics of knowledge. First, any body of 
knowledge exists as beliefs inherited from previous generations. In the case of 
scientists, they inherit these bodies of knowledge from their mentors, teachers, 
textbooks, and other members of their discipline. Secondly, one can distinguish 
between inherited knowledge and mere belief in that some kind of authority (e.g., 
credible scientists) creates this knowledge. This characteristic is what 
distinguishes authoritative knowledge from mere belief. Another characteristic of 
knowledge is that various procedures accompany it for the purpose of validating 
this knowledge in particular contexts. There are methods, instruments, and
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various technologies that demonstrate and authenticate this knowledge. Things 
like laboratory equipment, computer simulations, data analysis software, and 
videos validate this knowledge. Lastly, individuals can use and interpret this 
inherited knowledge in different ways; however, this is one of the problematic 
aspects of knowledge. According to Barnes, there are no assurances when it 
comes to the proper use of the inherited knowledge.
While there are currently numerous versions of SSK (e.g., the Edinburgh 
School and the Bath School), sociologists of scientific knowledge generally agree 
that in order to understand the process of knowledge production in science it is 
important not only to study the final product of scientific research, but also to 
consider the social forces that act on scientists and the practices they utilize to 
develop their scientific knowledge.7 Summarizing the impact and importance of 
these types of studies, the historian of science Jan Golinski (1990) stated:
In tackling the practices of scientists at work, these researchers could be 
said to have transcended the limits traditionally regarded as 
circumscribing sociological investigations; they were dealing with the 
‘content’ of science and not just with its institutional ‘context.’ By 
concentrating on the observable features of scientific practice, they had 
exposed the interpretive and contingent nature of experiments, bringing to
7 Both the Edinburgh School and the Bath School are representatives of the “strong 
programme” in science studies. Essentially followers of the strong programme believe in the 
primacy of social factors in the creation of scientific knowledge. This contrasts with weaker 
versions of this position where rational thought and empirical observation supersede the 
social components of scientific knowledge. The Edinburgh School is associated with David 
Bloor and Barry Barnes. The Bath School is associated with Harry Collins.
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light the rich variety of elements that enter into the making of scientific 
facts, (p. 493)
Sociologists of science contend that because scientists are human, they are 
prone to subjective experiences that affect their judgment and their 
interpretations of the knowledge they produce. A founder of the “strong 
programme” in SSK, David Bloor (1991), in addition to numerous other 
sociologists of science (e.g., Barnes, Bloor, & Henry, 1996; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; 
Pickering, 1981) argue that cultural influences, usually presumed to have no 
effect on science, actually affect the creation and development of scientists’ 
theories and findings. Cultural phenomena such as the types of external funding 
programs available and pressures put on scientists by lobbyists and politicians 
play a role in the development of scientific knowledge. Encapsulating this idea, 
Andrew Pickering (1992) stated that “scientific knowledge has to be seen, not as 
the transparent representation of nature, but rather as knowledge relative to a 
particular culture” (p. 5). Undoubtedly, most scientists would acknowledge that 
outside forces do affect the production of their knowledge. They, however, would 
probably argue that this does not affect the “truth value” of the knowledge they 
produce. While not denying that external factors affect their practices, they 
probably would deny that these factors affect the factuality of their knowledge. 
Scientists commonly argue that other laboratories run by different experimenters 
can replicate their findings. Another common argument is that their data fit a 
particularly successful theory. Truth eventually separates from untruth even if 
there are occasional local disagreements. One of the responsibilities of
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sociologists of science is to question this confidence and describe instances 
where replication or theory fails to produce factuality.
Steven Shapin (1982), in his influential article on the benefits of the SSK 
perspective for the history of science, provides some examples. Shapin 
discusses how, in the 1860s, Thomas Henry Huxley, a British biologist and one 
of Charles Darwin’s most passionate supporters, discovered a protoplasmic 
organism he named Bathybius haeckelii in sea-bed mud that had been preserved 
in alcohol for 10 years. A number of American, German, and British biologists 
and geologists replicated these findings. At the time, Huxley’s findings were 
significant because they lent credence to two theories about the origins and 
nature of life on earth: the nebular hypothesis and abiogenesis.8 As time passed, 
many biologists and geologists questioned the factuality of Huxley’s findings. 
They argued that Bathybius haeckelii was not a living organism but, in fact, partly 
constructed by the observers’ imagination and the effect of alcohol on calcium 
sulfate contained in the sea-bed mud. Those scientists who supported either the 
nebular or the abiogenesis hypotheses refused to admit their mistake because 
they were intellectually committed to these beliefs. Bathybius haeckelii supported 
their theories about the process and origins of life on earth. Shapin concluded the 
story with the fate of Bathybius, which “died a gradual death, assisted by the
8 Immanuel Kant and Pierre Simon de LaPlace developed the nebular hypothesis independently 
in the eighteenth century. LaPlace posited that the alignment of the planets around the Sun was 
caused by gas and dust collapsing and spinning due to gravitational forces. The planets, the Sun, 
and their planar alignment were a result of these forces. Evolutionists such as Robert Chambers 
used this hypothesis as a means to explain the configuration of the natural world through 
historical contingency (Bynum, Browne, & Porter, 1981). Abiogenesis, also known as 
spontaneous generation, is the idea that non-living things can produce living organisms (Thain & 
Hickman, 1994).
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writings of scientists who opposed the theories which its existence had been 
used to support” (p. 160).
This is not to say that sociologists of scientific knowledge believe 
everything scientists discover are illusions. This represents an extreme form of 
relativism that inhibits meaningful discourse on any subject. Rather, sociologists 
of science believe it is important to realize that science is inherently a social 
activity between not only scientists, but also between scientists and the rest of 
the world. These social activities are worthy of investigation in order to obtain a 
more comprehensive picture of the nature and history of science.
Instances of external factors that influence scientists are relatively 
abundant. In his history of the life of Francis Galton, the geneticist Nicholas 
Wright Gillham (2001) discussed the influence of the social and political climate 
of Victorian England on Galton’s belief in the hereditary nature of people’s mental 
abilities. Many scientists agreed that social class and profession were the direct 
result of race and proper breeding. Rich white men were successful because, in 
the words of Herbert Spencer, they were more “fit” to survive in the world. 
Conversely, “savages” from Tierra del Fuego, for instance, were savage because 
they were lower on the evolutionary ladder than whites were. During his life, 
Galton observed that many people of eminence—judges, scientists, literary 
figures—also had offspring who were successful. He concluded, albeit 
erroneously, that those mental abilities were inherited from the parents by their 
offspring. It was not conceivable to Galton—and many others in the Victorian 
climate—that environmental factors such as lack of money, social resources, and
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education could play a role in whether or not one would become eminent. In a 
similar vein, the conservative political climate at that time affected research on 
eugenics—a term coined by Galton to connote social changes that could improve 
the human race. In the U.S. during the early nineteenth century, for example, 
many wealthy individuals were concerned about the growing numbers of the poor 
and convinced legislators to pass immigration acts and forced sterilization laws to 
prevent the poor from procreating. The popular opinion at the time was that 
preventing the poor, criminals, and the feebleminded from procreating would lead 
to improvements in society.
In the next section, I move from SSK to discussing boundary-work. I begin 
by discussing two philosophical perspectives on boundary-work, and then I move 
into a definition of boundary-work itself. I then discuss the types of threats that 
may prompt scientists to engage in boundary work. Next, I present three types of 
boundary-work common in the sciences. The last two sections cover the 
distinction between permeable and impermeable boundaries and the types of 
behaviors scientists use while engaging in boundary-work.
Philosophical Perspectives on Boundary-work 
Gieryn (1995) outlined two philosophical perspectives for approaching the 
study of scientific boundaries: essentialism and constructivism. Essentialists 
believe that the boundaries of science are real, not locally contingent, and 
invariable. These boundaries constitute what separates science from other 
human activities. From the essentialists’ standpoint, science and the scientific 
approach to knowledge produce valid and reliable findings. Science produces
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truths and facts. If problems ever arise from scientific findings, the fault lies not in 
science, but with the individual or the method used to produce the knowledge. 
Science is inviolate, while human interpretations of the data are faulty.
Constructivists’ argue that there is no one method of science that 
produces valid and reliable knowledge. Instead, science is locally contingent, 
subject to contextual factors that affect the activities of science in a particular 
place or at a particular time. As Gieryn (1995) stated:
‘Science’ is no single thing: characteristics attributed to science vary 
widely depending upon the specific intellectual or professional activity 
designated as ‘non-science,’ and upon particular goals of the boundary- 
work. The boundaries of science are ambiguous, flexible, historically 
changing, contextually variable, internally inconsistent, and sometimes 
disputed, (p. 792)
I take the perspective of the constructivists in my investigation. Based on 
my research, there is enough evidence to suggest that scientific boundaries are 
subject to the individuals within a scientific discipline and to factors outside the 
discipline affecting its boundaries. The constructivist position I take does not 
entail denying that there is a real world out there that impinges on our senses. 
The issues of the fundamental reality of the world and the possibility that facts 
actually are what they supposedly represent are not at issue here. What is at 
issue here is the contingent nature between sciences’ boundaries and human 
perception, bias, and interpretation in the production of these boundaries. This is 
where the constructivist perspective plays an essential role.
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Outline of Boundary-work
Traditionally, sociologists of scientific knowledge use the term “boundary- 
work” to describe attempts by scientists to raise their field of knowledge 
production to authoritative and expert status.9 Usually this occurs when scientists 
make the distinction between a legitimate science and those disciplines 
considered “non-sciences” or “pseudo-sciences.” According to Gieryn (1999), the 
process of boundary-work is the “discursive attribution of selected qualities to 
scientists, scientific methods, and scientific claims for the purpose of drawing a 
rhetorical boundary between science and some less authoritative residual non­
science” (p. 4-5). Based on Gieryn’s articulation, boundary-work represents the 
action of demarcating one discipline’s intellectual territory from another 
discipline’s intellectual territory or from a group’s collective knowledge generally 
considered outside the scientific arena (e.g., religious organizations). 
Metaphorically, scientists’ boundary-work produces a cartographic illustration of 
disciplinary terrains that function as guideposts for the relationships between 
scientific disciplines or from groups outside of science. These work in much the 
same way as traditional maps portray the boundaries between counties, states, 
and countries. Unlike traditional maps that represent fairly permanent 
demarcations, maps of scientific boundaries change as scientists incorporate or 
expunge material when an individual or group contests this material. Gieryn 
(1995) proclaims:
9 While I use scientists for my examples, other endeavors such as businesses and politicians use 
boundary-work too.
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Whatever ends up as inside science or out is a local and episodic 
accomplishment, a consequence of rhetorical games of inclusion and 
exclusion in which agonistic parties do their best to justify their cultural 
map for audiences whose support, power, or influence they seek to enroll 
(p. 406).
The historian of science and science writer Michael Shermer (1997; 2001) 
exemplifies one strategy that scientists use to expunge the knowledge claims of 
pseudo-scientists.10 Shermer specializes in debunking claims of pseudo­
scientists such as those who claim they have discovered extra-sensory 
perception (ESP) or those who believe in alien abductions. In the case of those 
believing in ESP, Shermer emphasizes the role of controlled experimentation that 
seems to refute any kind of claims of ESP. In the case of alien abductions, 
especially those who believe this happens at night, Shermer and others propose 
this is merely a case of sleep paralysis.
Scientists’ boundary-work leads to a discipline’s cognitive or “epistemic 
authority” whereby scientists gain the “power to define, describe, and explain 
bounded domains of reality” (Gieryn, 1999, p. 1). Boundary-work within and 
between the sciences delineates those social groups that have access to 
“factuality” and “truth” within given knowledge domains and who do not possess 
these truths. Those possessing this knowledge are generally considered experts 
who are granted the authority to guide those ignorant of these truths (i.e., other
10 Many scientists, philosophers, and science writers engage in ousting pseudo-scientific claims 
from scientific orthodoxy to teach students and the public about critical thinking (e.g., Gardner, 
1957; Plait, 2002; Stanovich, 2001).
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scientists and the public). Given the power bequeathed to scientists in their role 
as experts, it is only reasonable to assume that scientists are motivated to keep 
their expert status. Barry Barnes and his colleagues (1996) contend that 
“scientific boundaries are defined and maintained by social groups concerned to 
protect and promote their cognitive authority, intellectual hegemony, professional 
integrity, and whatever political and economic power they might be able to 
command by attaining these things” (p. 16). Despite the epistemic authority 
granted to scientists through their boundary-work and their motivation for keeping 
this authority, there exist threats to the authority of these scientists.
Threats to Scientists’ Authority 
Threats to scientists’ epistemic authority come mainly from three sources 
(Gieryn & Figert, 1986). First, institutions outside scientific circles, such as 
religious organizations, corporations, and engineers, may claim authority over 
specific forms of knowledge. A current exemplar of this kind of threat comes from 
the claims of creationists about “intelligent design.” Intelligent design is the idea 
that living organisms are so complex, yet perfectly designed for their environment, 
that there has to be some form of intelligent designer (usually a deity) that at 
least started the process of evolution (e.g., Behe, 1996; Demski, 2002; Kenyon, 
1989). In the guise of legitimate science, creationists attack evolutionary theory 
as consisting of unfounded speculation.
Another example of this kind of threat comes from Gieryn’s (1983) study of 
the competition between scientists and engineers in the nineteenth century over 
claims of scientific knowledge. Each group tried to establish their profession as
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superior to the other. Gieryn focuses on the Victorian science writer John Tyndall 
and his disputes with engineers on who possessed expert knowledge. Tyndall 
used various rhetorical strategies to make scientists look more appealing and 
have more epistemic authority to the public.
Political factions, such as the military, constitute the second threat to 
scientists’ cognitive authority. The military may dictate the types of projects on 
which scientists work because they contribute a great deal of funding to various 
scientists, including psychologists. Additionally, the military may consider certain 
knowledge as best kept within military domains because of potential threats to 
national security. Unlike the usual production process, scientists working for the 
military may never be able to make their knowledge public.
The final threat comes from within the scientific community. Cases of 
fraudulent practices (e.g., plagiarism, falsifying data, and unethical treatment of 
participants) within scientific disciplines threaten the credibility of scientists. A 
well documented case in the early twentieth century of fraudulent practice within 
psychology stems from the debate between hereditarians and environmentalists 
over the factor most responsible for intellectual ability. Sir Cyril Burt, the British 
educational psychologist, was accused of intentionally falsifying his twin studies 
data on intelligence in an attempt to establish the supremacy of heredity over 
environmental factors (Zenderland, 1990).11
11 While the evidence to suggest that Burt falsified his twin studies data is convincing, the 
historian of psychology, Franz Samelson (1992), questions if this is not a secondary issue to a 
more serious problem. Samelson contends that the bigger issue is the question of how so many 
other psychologists ignored the blatant methodological flaws and still published Burt’s research.
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Another instance of questioning the credibility of scientists is the 
controversy concerning the psychologist Henry H. Goddard and his presumably 
retouched photographs of the Kallikak family. In his book, The Mismeasure of 
Man, paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould (1981) contends that Goddard purposely 
retouched the images to make the Kallikak family look ignorant and sinister to 
validate his claim that one side of the Kallikak family produced feebleminded 
offspring. The historian of psychology Raymond Fancher (1987) rebuffs Gould’s 
claims and provides evidence that photographs taken during Goddard’s time 
were sometimes retouched to bring out the physical features of the people.
Scientists do their best to counter these threats to their disciplinary 
authority. Scientists use discursive and rhetorical strategies to promote their 
theories, methods, practices, technologies, and knowledge claims as effective 
ways of discerning the truth about particular phenomena. Despite these threats, 
there still exists the idea that scientists are authoritative and expert knowledge 
producers. As a result, a discipline gains power over various social dimensions of 
its knowledge. With this power comes the authority to decide who obtains and 
utilizes this knowledge, how to best use the knowledge in the laboratory and in 
society, and who will benefit most from its implementation.
Types of Boundary-Work 
In the following section, I outline three interrelated processes of boundary- 
work: (a) the establishment of a science’s boundaries, (b) the maintenance of a 
science’s boundaries, and (c) the expansion of its boundaries.
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Establishing Boundaries
The establishment of a discipline’s boundaries occurs primarily during the 
initial stages of a science’s development. It is the time when scientists market 
their discipline to other sciences and the rest of society. This marketing strategy 
establishes who “owns” the discipline, demonstrates how it differs from other 
areas of knowledge, and outlines the relationship it has with these areas 
(Shumway & Messer-Davidow, 1991). As with the other stages, the initial stage 
of boundary-work contains struggles for power, expertise, and authority. During 
the establishment process, scientists attempt to provide justification for the 
worthiness of their discipline. Scientists distinguish their discipline from other 
scientific disciplines in addition to other professions outside the scientific 
community that supposedly have similar goals. Scientists validate their 
knowledge claims as “truthful” through the implementation of their various 
technologies and methodologies. Moreover, scientists persuade the public sector 
of their potential contributions to the advancement of knowledge and applications 
to society.
Many boundary-work studies pertain to the establishment of a science’s 
disciplinary boundaries (Klein, 1996). Investigations of how scientists establish 
their discipline are useful for the appreciation of the genesis of a discipline. They 
can outline the successful and unsuccessful strategies scientists use to establish 
their science as legitimate. This is especially beneficial when developing a 
revisionist history of any science because earlier histories may contain 
“Whiggish” interpretations of events that tend to glorify the genesis of a discipline.
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But often overlooked is how scientists maintain and extend their disciplinary 
boundaries.
Maintaining Boundaries
As a discipline matures, scientists focus more on maintaining their 
discipline’s boundaries in order to keep their acquired credibility and material 
resources. As Steven Fuller (1985) suggests, by the time a science reaches this 
stage “its practitioners must define and maintain the ‘normal’ state of objects in 
the domain. This involves experimental and textual techniques for foregrounding 
the problematic claims under study against a background of claims that are 
stipulated to be unproblematic” (p. 5). Through scientists’ continuing efforts to 
legitimize their field, a science becomes professionalized and institutionalized. 
Professionalization and institutionalization are of the utmost importance for 
gaining respect among scientific colleagues and the public because these 
processes demonstrate that the scientific community and the university system 
perceives a science as credible. Professionalization also helps to establish the 
standards, training regimes, and methods that the scientists will use as their daily 
practices. Gieryn and his colleagues (1985) believe that:
‘Professionalization’ appears as a form of occupational control: 
organizational innovations restrict the supply of practitioners (through 
training and licensing programs) and standardize professional practice by 
threat of sanction (through codes of ethics enforced by professional 
associations). The rise of professions to positions of relatively high 
prestige, resources, authority and autonomy results from successful
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struggles to obliterate, absorb, or dominate competing providers of 
‘similar’ services or commodities, (p. 393)
As Gieryn suggests, during this stage scientists form professional organizations, 
create content-specific journals, and develop academic departments. Increases 
in funding opportunities from within educational institutions, governmental 
agencies, and private organizations usually accompany these developments.
The benefits scientists gain from this increased prestige do not just affect the 
scientists. In her discussion of boundary maintenance, Henrika Kuklick (1980) 
suggests that “while the professionalized group enjoys increased wealth and 
prestige, society as a whole presumably also gains, because the achievement of 
professional organizations supposedly depends on an improvement in the quality 
of the services the group provides for the public” (p. 201). It is apparent that 
scientists have a stake in maintaining their boundary structure.
Expanding Boundaries
After a science becomes professionalized and institutionalized, scientists 
sometimes concern themselves with expanding or extending their science’s 
disciplinary boundaries. Scientists undertake expanding their discipline’s 
boundaries in many ways. Scientists sometimes incorporate alternative 
theoretical perspectives from other disciplines. They seek funding from sources 
normally sought from other fields. Scientists borrow technologies from other 
fields and engage in collaborative research with scientists from other disciplines.
This is a somewhat simplified version of the boundary-work process for 
the sake of explanation. The boundary-work process is usually more complex.
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Establishing, maintaining, and extending boundaries do not always occur in a 
stepwise, linear fashion. Scientists constantly engage in these three processes at 
different times and with different emphases throughout a discipline’s history. For 
instance, scientists may focus more on reestablishing their discipline’s 
boundaries when certain funding resources are no longer available or a 
fundamental theory upon which a discipline depends is no longer viable. 
Scientists may be more apt to maintain the structure of their boundaries when 
new technologies created in other disciplines infringe upon their territory. 
Irrespective of the scenario, the particular type of boundary-work in which 
practitioners engage depends on numerous factors such as a discipline’s internal 
coherence, relationships with other disciplines, political and economic changes, 
and a discipline’s relationship to the public.
Impermeable and Permeable Boundaries 
Disciplines differ in terms of their permeability based on the uniformity and 
coherence of their scientists (Shumway & Messer-Davidow, 1991). Viewed on a 
continuum, one can arrange disciplines in terms of their relative permeability or 
impermeability. In his book, Academic Tribes and Territories, Tony Becher (1989) 
distinguishes between these two types of boundaries:
Impermeable boundaries are in general a concomitant of tightly knit, 
convergent disciplinary communities and an indicator of the stability and 
coherence of the intellectual fields they inhabit. Permeable boundaries are 
associated with loosely knit, divergent academic groups and signal a more
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fragmented, less stable and comparatively open-ended epistemological 
structure, (p. 37-38)
Because disciplinary boundaries vary in terms of their permeability, different 
disciplines employ different kinds of boundary-work. Each field has different 
priorities with respect to how their scientists demarcate their discipline’s 
boundaries and the strategies they use to defend them. Some sciences’ 
boundaries change more rapidly than other sciences’ boundaries based on 
advancements in theory, collaborations with other disciplines, and the availability 
of technological innovations and funding opportunities. It appears that 
psychology is a discipline with relative permeable boundaries. Psychology’s 
boundaries change frequently because it is a young discipline, its subject matter 
is immense and certain areas of psychology deal with phenomena that are 
difficult to study empirically and this leads to many disputes of knowledge. 
Similarly, chemistry, physics, and biology are instances of disciplines with 
relatively permeable boundaries. Recently, their boundaries have overlapped in 
such fields as macromolecular studies, biophysics, and biochemistry (Klein, 
1996). Other sciences are on more solid footing and do not engage in as much 
boundary-work. According to Becher (1989), economics is an example of a field 
with relatively impermeable boundaries. He argues that the field’s practitioners 
accept basic economic theory and that very little knowledge from outside the 
discipline affects this basic theory. This is the case even though economics 
interacts with the fields of mathematics and political science. Becher emphasizes 
this point stating, “Within economics, those who question the basic axioms of the
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subject are regarded as deranged if not possibly dangerous, and are liable to find 
themselves cast into a wilderness of their own” (p. 37).
Resistances and Accommodations to Knowledge 
While I have provided a typical definition of boundary-work, I use the term 
boundary-work to represent the dynamic interplay between scientists’ resistances 
and accommodations. Frequently, resistance comes from scientists trying to 
maintain or police their discipline’s boundary structure. Barry Barnes and his 
colleagues (1996) propose that scientists “can be expected to police the existing 
boundaries of science, to avoid the intrusion of whatever may detract from its 
reputation and to seek to expel anything potentially disreputable which arises 
within it (p. 140). Resistances occur when scientists perceive threats to their 
practices and accompanying knowledge domains. Conversely, boundary 
accommodations occur when practitioners—individuals or groups—within a 
discipline realize the potential utility of a particular idea, instrument, or theory 
coming from another discipline. The practitioners incorporate this knowledge into 
their own practices and sometimes fundamentally change areas of the discipline.
In summary, boundary-work analysis is a relatively recent approach to 
studying scientific practices within the sociology of scientific knowledge. 
Sociologists of scientific knowledge use scientists’ boundary-work to analyze how 
scientists make distinctions between their own knowledge production activities 
and the knowledge production activities of other groups. Essentially, boundary- 
work manifests in three forms: establishment, maintenance, and expansion. 
Various scientists may focus on any of these three forms throughout a
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discipline’s history. Irrespective of the form in which boundary-work occurs, 
scientists exhibit either resistances or accommodations to the various conceptual, 
material, and social practices of scientists in other disciplines when these 
practices infringe upon their cognitive authority. With this framework in mind, I 
can now transition into on how psychologists have tried to establish, maintain, 
and extend their field’s disciplinary boundaries.
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CHAPTER II
THE COMPLEX DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARIES OF U.S. PSYCHOLOGY
In his book, The Human Sciences, the historian of science Roger Smith
(1997) issued this caveat: “Psychology has no ‘origin’: its identity in the twentieth 
century is fragmented and its roots diverse. Psychology is a cluster of activities 
with a family resemblance but no common identity” (p. 493). This statement 
would lead one to believe that a comprehensive history of psychology would be 
problematic. As a discipline, psychology is simply too complex to make any 
definitive statements about it as a science. Taken in one way Smith’s caveat is 
true. Ever since psychology’s professionalization and institutionalization as an 
academic discipline in the late nineteenth century, the disciplinary boundaries of 
U.S. psychology have undergone numerous changes. In a sense, psychology 
has had myriad “identities” throughout its history that connote the changing 
conceptions of psychological knowledge. At times viewed as a pseudo-science 
and at other times a natural science, psychology’s multiple identities prove 
difficult to describe. Nevertheless, this complexity proves advantageous for 
studying the boundary-work process. When psychologists establish, maintain, or 
extend their field, these activities provide insight into psychologists’ boundary- 
work activities. To begin outlining the complexity of psychology’s boundaries, I
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present two examples of when psychology’s boundaries changed. My first 
example derives from a time when psychologists were attempting to establish the 
boundaries of the field. My second example comes from how psychologists 
extended their boundaries during World War I and World War II. Lastly, I discuss 
the reasons for psychology’s complex boundaries between 1970 and 2000 in 
addition to how psychologists attempted to manage them.
Psychologists Establish Psychology’s Boundaries 
Before the Civil War, one could consider psychology as having no 
boundaries. The discipline of U.S. psychology did not yet exist. Unquestionably, 
at this time there were many philosophers such as Herbert Spencer, James 
McCosh, and Jonathan Edwards, whose interests were psychological in nature, 
but there was no consensus as to what to study, no common methodology, no 
professional organizations, no scientific journals, and no academic departments 
devoted to psychology. Instead, U.S. colleges and universities in the middle to 
late 1800s offered courses in moral and mental philosophy (Fuchs, 2000; Kosits, 
2004; Maier, 2004). Moral and mental philosophers were mainly Protestant 
ordained ministers (Richards, 1995). In general, they believed that in order to 
comprehend God’s purposes, people must examine their own minds (Fuchs,
2000). The primary purpose of these moral philosophy courses was to train 
students for the seminary or professorships. Once trained, these individuals 
would then educate a new generation of students on the importance of 
examining the mind in order to understand and appreciate the relationship 
between humans and God.
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Laboratories. Quantification, and Experimentation
The transition from moral philosophy to academic psychology came at a 
time when U.S. colleges and universities were in the process of 
departmentalizing in the German academic tradition (Watson & Evans, 1991). 
Many pioneers in psychology such as G. Stanley Hall, James McKeen Cattell, 
Lightner Witmer, and Harry Kirke Wolfe traveled to Europe to train with 
psychologists like Wilhelm Wundt at the University of Leipzig in the 1880s. They 
returned to establish psychological laboratories and clinics in various colleges 
and universities such as Johns Hopkins University, Clark University, the 
University of Pennsylvania, and Columbia Collage (Benjamin, 1992; Camfield, 
1973; Leahey, 1992). Edward B. Titchener, employed at Cornell University after 
his training with Wundt, exemplified this new trend. Titchener’s structuralist 
perspective focused on uncovering the elementary units of the mind through 
experimentation (Tweney, 1987). This was a move away from the more 
subjective introspective inferences about the mind made by the mental 
philosophers. Another instance of boundary-making that assisted in establishing 
psychology’s boundaries was William James’ (1890/1950) textbook, Principles of 
Psychology. James’ Principles helped lay the foundation for an empiricist 
tradition in U.S. psychology that distanced itself from the metaphysics of Scottish 
faculty psychologists and the philosophy of associationists such as David Hume, 
James and John Stuart Mill, and Alexander Bain that were popular at the time. In 
1875, James established the first psychology laboratory at Harvard University 
(Bjork, 1988). James’ version of psychology was a psychology combining the
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work of physiologists, experimental psychologists, and comparative 
psychologists.
The establishment of these laboratories and clinics rapidly placed 
psychology within the academic landscape and helped shape its boundaries as a 
legitimate science. The historian of psychology David Leary (1987) stated that by 
the mid-1890s psychology “had all the trappings of an established scientific 
discipline: laboratories, journals, professorships, graduate programs, a 
professional organization, and at least one clear case of application” (p. 316). By 
1903, psychology produced more doctoral students than all other sciences 
except physics, chemistry, and zoology (O'Donnell, 1985). U.S. intellectuals and 
students alike were coming in droves to the new field of psychology.
The quantification of and experimentation on psychological phenomena 
between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a major factor in 
separating psychology from its philosophical and metaphysical roots (Hornstein, 
1988). Psychologists began defining their field by the phenomena they could 
quantify, while eliminating phenomena not quantifiable. This process helped 
promote psychology as a legitimate and empirical science. Establishing 
psychology as a legitimate science was of the utmost importance for the success 
of psychologists at the time. The psychologist Knight Dunlap (1920) echoed the 
belief of many psychologists at the time when he proclaimed that “there is a great 
need for a scientific psychology, and unless the scientific study of psychology is 
promoted, in laboratories, and in the field: and unless the teaching of scientific 
psychology is fostered in the class room, and in print, culture will be impaired,
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and social progress impeded” (p. 516). Historians of psychology generally agree 
that this was a pivotal time for establishing psychology as a genuine science. For 
instance, in his treatise on the origins of behaviorism, John O’Donnell (1985) 
remarked: “In the last quarter of the nineteenth century...psychology secured 
recognition as a separate academic discipline by promoting its status as an 
experimental laboratory science” (p. 1). The emphasis on instruments and 
instrumentation during the “brass instruments” age in psychology’s history 
fostered a standardization of psychology’s subject matter in addition to 
standardizing their human subjects. Echoing O’Donnell, Deborah Coon (1993) 
suggested that the “laboratory and its apparatus...become pivotal to the process 
of psychology’s professionalization, and its differentiation from philosophy within 
the university” (p. 763). Psychologists’ emphasis on developing laboratories, 
quantifying psychological phenomena, and their subsequent experimentation 
legitimized their field, helped establish its disciplinary boundaries, and putatively 
placed psychology on fairly equal footing with sciences like physics, chemistry, 
and biology. Psychologists such as Cattell also published their work in general 
science journals of the time. Journals such as Science and Popular Science 
Monthly helped legitimize the field (Camfield, 1973).
Psychologists and the World Wars 
During and after World War I and II, U.S. psychologists expanded their 
areas of expertise and boundaries by including more applied areas, while 
continuing their quantitative studies of psychophysiological variables and mental 
testing. Public mental health, assessing national character, and social problems
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were some of the newer topics in which psychologists strove to become 
authorities. Attempting to extend psychologists’ realms of expertise, 
psychologists such as Robert M. Yerkes of Yale University, Henry H. Goddard of 
the Vineland Training Institute in New Jersey, and Lewis M. Terman of Stanford 
University fervently petitioned the military during World War I to include 
psychologists in the war effort. The result of their efforts was the mental testing of 
military personnel. These mental tests served a dual purpose. First, mental tests 
identified those personnel supposedly mentally unfit for military service. Secondly, 
they served to identify soldiers with superior mental abilities for officer selection 
(Carson, 1993; Fancher, 1985; Reed, 1987). The mental testing of soldiers 
afforded psychologists the opportunity to create new instruments (mental tests) 
and employ them on a scale never before thought possible.
Women expanded the boundaries of psychology during this time as well. 
While women had been present in and contributed to psychology since its 
formation, they represented a minority in the field until World War I.12 It was 
during World War I that large numbers of women began to fill the ranks. The 
influx of women was due in part to psychologists focusing on more applied and 
socially relevant problems (Furumoto, 1987). The general attitude of 
psychologists at the time was that the men would continue to invest their time in 
experimentation while the women, seen as being able to fill the “caretaker” role, 
were more skillful at applied problems. Women assisted in expanding
12 See Elizabeth Scarborough and Laurel Furumoto’s (1987) Untold Lives for an examination of 
the first generation of women psychologists such as Margaret Floy Washburn and Mary Whiton 
Calkins and their contributions to and experiences in the field.
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psychology’s boundaries by taking on this role and immersing themselves in the 
care of the mentally ill, the poor, and the family.
World War II saw psychologists again collaborating with the military, 
however in a greater capacity than they did in the first war. This allowed 
psychologists to expand their boundaries even further. Military departments such 
as the Office of Strategic Services (the predecessor of the Central Intelligence 
Agency), the Office of War Information, and the Psychological Warfare Division 
of Supreme Headquarters sought out the expertise of psychologists, even giving 
them a name: sykewarriors. Psychologists, in their role as sykewarriors, 
interpreted and influenced enemy morale, and diagnosed “national character,” 
which were personality profiles of various countries. Psychologists were moving 
beyond their role as mere mental testers and applying their various theories to 
worldwide problems. In her book, The Romance of American Psychology, Ellen 
Herman (1995) summarized the importance of these opportunities for 
psychologists stating, “The reputation of psychological experts had risen from 
one of lowly technician to one of wise consultants and managers whose wartime 
accomplishments...deserved a generous payoff in public appreciation and 
government funds” (p. 19). With the study of U.S. psychology becoming firmly 
embedded within academic institutions, the influx of women psychologists, 
psychologists’ concerns with social issues, and the public coming to recognize 
psychologists as authorities on various aspects of social life, the boundaries of 
psychology expanded at an enormous rate.
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AfterWorld War II, the disciplinary boundaries of psychology continued to 
expand in both the research and clinical areas. Research on cognition began in 
earnest, in part due to research during the war on feedback systems and 
information theory as well as the decline in popularity of behaviorist theories. In 
the clinical field, theorists such as Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers developed 
humanistic theories of psychological functioning that clinicians subsequently 
used in therapeutic interventions. There is no question that psychology’s 
boundaries changed throughout its history. The next question that needs 
addressing is what are the reasons for psychology’s complex boundaries?
Reasons for Psychology’s Complex Boundaries 
There are three interrelated reasons for psychology’s expansiveness and 
complexity. As I mentioned previously, psychologists are both reductive and 
expansive in exploring the “individual” or the “self.” For instance at the 
microscopic level, physiological psychologists investigate subjects like the 
structure of various neurotransmitters (e.g., acetylcholine, serotonin, and 
dopamine), neural communication, and how extraneous substances like 
psychotropic medication, alcohol, and illicit drugs affect neural transmission. At 
another scale of representation, psychologists study various components of 
personality, cognitive development throughout the lifespan, gender differences, 
and a host of other phenomena. At the macroscopic level, psychologists 
investigate the social behavior of groups of people within cities, states, and 
countries.
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Psychologists also study nonhuman species such as rats, pigeons, 
chimpanzees, and dolphins. There are several reasons for using nonhuman 
species in psychological research. Some species’ reproduction rates are more 
rapid, such as the reproduction rates of laboratory rats. Faster reproduction rates 
allow psychologists to study successive generations more briefly. Some species’ 
physiological systems are less complex than human physiological systems so 
experimental manipulations like cortical ablations are easier to perform. 
Laboratory animals are allegedly easier to control and standardize than humans 
during experimental research (Logan, 1999). It is easier to control extraneous 
and confounding variables with many laboratory animals because their 
environments can be controlled and modified based on the experimenter’s 
discretion. Another reason why other species are used in experimental research 
is that ethical considerations regarding the treatment of human subjects prohibit 
carrying out certain investigations with humans but not with other species. While 
knowledge pertaining to other species’ psychological and physiological makeup 
is useful, the primary goal of utilizing other species is for interspecies 
comparisons that produce usable knowledge about human psychological and 
physiological processes.
A second reason for psychology’s disciplinary complexity is its reflexive 
nature. Psychologists interact with their subject matter qua participants. In 
discussing psychology’s reflexivity, Roger Smith (1997) stated that there exists a 
“reciprocal relationship between psychology and the lives of ordinary people: 
people are ultimately both the subject matter of the human sciences and makers
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of psychological knowledge” (p. 57). Psychology differs from the natural sciences 
because of this reflexivity. Scientists such as chemists or physicists usually deal 
with inanimate substances. When chemists or physicists perform experiments on 
these substances, they usually do not have to worry about their substances 
interacting with them. Psychologists, on the other hand, interact with their subject 
matter through their experimentation and clinical interventions. Complications 
about the validity and reliability of their findings arise because participants in 
experiments or clients in therapeutic situations often act in unpredictable ways. 
Prejudice and bias can interfere with psychologists’ establishment and 
interpretation of knowledge (Kirk, 1995; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). Participants 
can be uncooperative and try to sabotage experiments. Participants may try to 
appease experimenters by reporting results they believe will please the 
experimenters.
Participants are not the only source of bias in experiments; experimenters 
can introduce bias into their own experiments. In their data, experimenters can 
often find the results they are expecting to find. Experimenters can exert 
pressure on participants to answer in ways that may be favorable to the desired 
outcome. These complications, and many others, lead to uncertainty about 
psychological knowledge. The uncertainty spurs psychologists to refine 
continually their hypotheses, methods of experimentation, and data interpretation. 
The ambiguity of interpreting data, the refinement of methods, and the myriad 
biases in psychologists’ experimental research contribute to the complexity of the 
discipline.
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A third reason for the complexity of psychology is the complexity of its 
disciplinary structure. Even though colleges and universities place psychology 
under one heading, it is comprised of numerous subdisciplines such as cognitive 
psychology, psychobiology, developmental psychology, personality psychology, 
and social psychology. Each of these subdisciplines has their own specialized 
training regimes for undergraduate and graduate students, esoteric terminology, 
funding resources, conferences, and content-specific journals. While these sub­
disciplines reflect the various content areas of psychology, there is sometimes 
significant overlap between them. For instance, developmental psychologists 
may rely on a cognitive theory to interpret adolescent mental development or a 
personality theory to discern changes in personality through the lifespan. The 
vast array of subdisciplines and the interactions between them contribute to 
psychology’s expansive and complex boundaries.
Changes in Psychology’s Disciplinary Boundaries. 1970-2000 
Throughout its history the internal sharing of conceptual, methodological, 
and technological resources between psychologists, and external factors such as 
collaborations with other scientists, the public sector, and governmental and 
political organizations all have contributed to psychology’s changing boundaries. 
For instance, internal sharing occurs when one subdiscipline borrows 
psychological concepts from another. Some cognitive psychologists, for example, 
are reexamining Freud’s ideas on the unconscious mind because of their 
interests in unconscious perception, memory, and emotion (e.g., Allen & Reber, 
1998; Kihlstrom, 1999). Subdisciplines also borrow methodologies from other
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subdisciplines. The methodology of psychophysical reaction time used by 
Hermann von Helmholtz in the nineteenth century is now used to measure 
reaction times in cognition experiments (e.g., Pashler, 1993). Collaborations 
between psychologists in different specialty areas sometimes produce new 
directions for research. Collaborations between cognitive psychologists and 
cognitive neuroscientists produce mappings of the intersection between brain 
structures and information processing using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (e.g., Hayes, Ryan, & Schnyer, 2004; Ragland, Gur, & Valdez, 2004). 
Newly developed theories foster investigations into subjects traditionally viewed 
as beyond the purview of psychologists. Theories of emotional intelligence are a 
set of newly developed ideas now employed in some school systems to monitor 
students’ behaviors and emotional stability (e.g., Elias, Arnold, & Hussey, 2003; 
Tiwari & Srivastava, 2004).
Externally, governmental funding agencies such as the National Science 
Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health, and private funding 
organizations like the Sloan and Templeton Foundations provide financial 
support for psychological research. These funding resources sometimes control 
the types of investigations that psychologists conduct. Psychologists often 
respond to the needs of various social institutions such as the need for improved 
assessment procedures in secondary education. Political and world events such 
as the September 11th World Trade Center attacks prompt psychologists to 
provide therapeutic assistance for the bombing victims and their families 
(Goodman, Morgan, & Juriga, 2004; Miller, 2002; Stewart, 2004). In a similar vein,
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psychologists have developed research programs for understanding terrorism 
(Ursano, Fullerton, & Norwood, 2003) while others have gotten involved in peace 
psychology and anti-war efforts (Christie, Wagner, & Winter, 2001).
Psychology’s Professional Structure
An indicator of psychology’s complex disciplinary boundaries is how 
psychologists partition the field. One of the ways psychologists partition the field 
is through the organizational structure of its professional organizations. The 
American Psychological Association (APA) is the largest professional 
organization of psychologists in the world. Since the APA’s founding in 1892, the 
organization has burgeoned into fifty-five separate divisions.13 The divisions span 
many diverse categories like military psychology, history of psychology, gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual issues, community psychology, theoretical and 
philosophical psychology, educational psychology, and personality and social 
psychology. These fifty-five divisions each have their own specialized research 
areas, separate informal communication networks (e.g., internet list servers), and 
many of them publish specialty journals. The myriad divisions of the APA indicate 
that the use of psychological knowledge spans many levels of society.
Academic Departments and the Training of Students
Within the institutional structure of higher education, psychology 
departments are often times divided into subdisciplines based on specialized
13 There are no divisions 4 and 11. Between 1945 and 1948, when the American Association of 
Applied Psychology and American Psychological Association formally organized, the 
Psychometric Society (Division 4) chose not to become a division. In 1946 Division 11, Abnormal 
Psychology and Psychotherapy, merged with Division 12, Clinical Psychology. Both divisions 
remain vacant today.
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research areas. It is common to find psychology departments partitioned into 
specialty areas such as cognition, behavioral analysis, clinical or counseling 
psychology, physiological psychology, and developmental psychology. 
Depending on the particular department, there are different modes of 
indoctrinating students into the discipline.
The scientist-practitioner model of training students, also known as the 
Boulder model, was developed at the Conference of Graduate Education in 
Clinical Psychology in Boulder, Colorado between August and September of 
1949 (Benjamin & Baker, 2000). The purpose of creating the Boulder model was 
to establish a standardized method of training graduate students. Psychology 
departments utilizing this model train graduate students in both the research and 
clinical dimensions of the discipline, with more emphasis placed on the research 
dimension.
Another model of training students is the practitioner-scholar model. The 
practitioner-scholar model emphasizes the counseling and clinical dimensions of 
training more than the research aspect. This model originated from 
dissatisfaction with the Boulder model’s lack of emphasis on clinical training 
(Peterson, 2003). Several schools including Adelphi University, the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and the California School of Professional 
Psychology established programs for doctorates in psychology (Psy.D.). 
Psychology as a Fragmented Discipline
The diversity and seemingly fragmented structure of psychology’s subject 
matter makes psychology’s disciplinary boundaries more complex. Voicing his
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concern about this fragmentation, psychologist Amedo Giorgi (1992) observed,
“It is clear to most astute observers of the field that psychology’s disciplinary 
status is ambiguous at best and chaotic at worst...its place among the other 
sciences are still to be determined in a manner acceptable to the majority of 
psychologists” (p. 46). One of the main reasons the discipline appears 
fragmented is due to the increasing number of specialty areas and because of 
the lack of theoretical unity in the field (Bevan, 1991; Gilgen, 1987; Yanchar, 
1997; Yanchar & Slife, 1997). Another difficulty is the apparent disorganization of 
psychology’s experimental literature (Katzko, 2002). For instance, the areas of 
biopsychology, physiological psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and behavioral 
neuroscience are separate specialty areas despite their interrelatedness. Each of 
these specialty areas produces knowledge with their own instruments, methods 
of analysis, and theories with little or no overlap between them. Psychologists 
William Bevan and Frank Kessel (1994) lamented, “Fragmentation fosters a 
mind-set characterized by separateness, but competitiveness that is excessive, 
and by alienation from intellectual and human concerns” (p. 505). With the 
incorporation of new subject matter, psychology’s disciplinary boundaries 
become increasingly fragmented. As a result, it becomes more difficult to discern 
how psychology is a distinct and separate discipline from other disciplines such 
as sociology, biology, economics, and anthropology.
Accompanying concerns about psychology’s fragmentation are concerns 
about the lack of productive communication between subdisciplines or “discourse 
communities” (Slife, 2000). Psychology’s specialized discourse communities
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have their own esoteric terminology for various psychological phenomena. These 
specialized languages make it difficult for subdisciplines to communicate with 
one another.14 For instance, without prior training in personality psychology, it is 
difficult to differentiate between the concepts of “self-concept” and “self-image.” 
Another difficulty with specialized languages occurs when a subdiscipline uses a 
completely different term to connote the same psychological variable. This 
excess of concepts can occur even between opposing camps within the same 
subdiscipline. Murray White’s (1985) study of the status of cognitive psychology 
indicated that there were confusions about the term “icon.” White found icon in 
various guises such as iconic memory, iconic storage, preattentive memory, 
visual sensory memory, and visual sensory store among others, sometimes 
within the same book.
There are several other concerns about psychology’s fragmentation. One 
concern is that psychology lacks a common unit of measurement, unlike the 
measurement units found in disciplines like physics (Tryon, 1996). As the clinical 
psychologist Warren Tryon stated, “Exact replication is only possible with 
equivalent units of measurements because an investigator using a larger unit will 
find fewer of them than will an investigator using a smaller unit when exactly the 
same quantity has been replicated” (p. 214). The lack of measurement 
coherence may cause problems with the replication of research results. A
14 This has been a long-standing problem of the sciences in general, not just in psychology. See 
Harding (1938) for a discussion on the esoteric and often times needless terminology in the 
sciences.
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potential ramification of this is that psychologists may use different measurement 
units as proof against replication.
In response to the concerns of psychology’s lack of cohesion, there have 
been numerous proposals for unifying the discipline of psychology under a 
common theoretical framework (Kimble, 1994; Staats, 1983; Sternberg & 
Grigorenko, 2001; Yanchar & Slife, 2000). For instance, the psychologist Arthur 
Staats (1991) explained that psychology’s fragmentation is a result of numerous, 
unrelated studies and that only by making a conscious effort to tie together these 
unrelated studies will psychology begin to mature as a science similar to that of 
physics. The sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson (1998) suggested subsuming 
psychology under biology to make psychology more coherent with the physical 
and natural sciences. Rather than separate, unrelated disciplines, the discipline 
could be placed in a hierarchy with sciences like physics and chemistry at the 
most basic level and social sciences such as psychology placed under biology.
Robert Sternberg (2001; 2001) proposed that psychology’s unity may 
come from the using a multiparadigmatic, multidisciplinary, and integrative 
approach that facilitates converging operations. Psychologists would accept 
different theoretical, subdisciplinary, and methodological views that would come 
to examine certain psychological phenomena. For instance, psychologists 
studying personality, development, and behavioral genetics could use the 
methods of factor analysis and longitudinal studies for research on intelligence. 
Floward Gardner (1992) asserted that, in the future, many of psychology’s 
subdisciplines could merge with other fields such as cognitive science and
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neuroscience, leaving a “core” of phenomena for the remaining psychologists 
with which to contend. Essentially, Gardner believes that psychology’s 
boundaries will dissipate as other scientific communities subsume psychology’s 
various subdisciplines.
Others disagree that fragmentation in psychology constitutes a problem. 
Irwin Altman (1987) proposed that the dynamic interplay between unifying 
psychology and pursuits in specialized subfields promoted healthy growth within 
the discipline. The more specialized psychology became the more problems 
psychologists could potentially solve. Wayne Viney (1996) believed that 
psychology does not need to unify because the discipline is in no worse shape 
than any other science. Most other sciences display some kind of disunity, 
fragmentation, or specialization; therefore, psychologists are chasing a mythical 
idea of unification.
The complexity of psychology’s boundaries and the disputes psychologists 
have over them indicate that psychology’s boundary-work usually does not affect 
all of psychology. It is rare when something affects the entire field’s boundaries.15 
Instead, these disputes usually occur at a local level between individual 
psychologists, or between competing laboratories, or even between 
subdisciplines. In the next three chapters, I discuss instances of psychologists’ 
local boundary-work when dealing with the introduction of different kinds of
151 should note that one present change taking place in the field of clinical psychology is the turf 
battle between clinical psychologists and psychiatrists over prescription privileges. If clinical 
psychologists are granted prescription privileges—and in some states they now have this 
privilege—this would represent an example of a large scale expansion of boundaries that would 
affect approximately 44% of psychologists (American Psychological Association, 1993).
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material, conceptual, and social practices by evolutionary psychologists, 
cognitive scientists, and chaos theorists. Psychologists reacted to the 
introduction of their practices in different ways. Some psychologists recognized 
the potential value of these scientists’ practices and “opened the door” to their 
knowledge products. Other psychologists vigorously fought against these 
scientists’ practices, believing that they were either irrelevant or potentially 
damaging to the reputation of the field.
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CHAPTER III
ADAPTATIONS OF THE MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
Scientists, philosophers, social theorists, political scientists, psychologists, 
and economists throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have 
possessed a deep fascination with using evolutionary theories as a means of 
comprehending and explaining human thought, behavior, and emotions. In the 
preface to his book, What Evolution Is, the evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr 
(2001) encapsulated this fascination: “The thinking of modern humans, whether 
we realize it or not, is profoundly affected—one is almost tempted to say 
determined—by evolutionary thinking” (p. xii). Several individuals throughout the 
early nineteenth century and continuing to the present exemplified this 
fascination by employing various forms of evolutionary theory to generate their 
theories and inspire their research. A number of these thinkers derived their 
ideas from the French naturalist Jean Baptiste de Lamarck and the English 
naturalist Charles Darwin.
In the next section, I briefly outline some of the ways scientists, 
philosophers used Lamarck’s, and Darwin’s ideas as means of explaining human 
thought, behavior, and emotions. Then, I describe the science of evolutionary 
psychology as practiced today. Third, I provide a history of the rise of
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evolutionary psychology. Fourth, I explain the conceptual, material, and social 
practices of evolutionary psychologists. Finally, I elucidate psychologists’ 
boundary-work strategies in reaction to these practices.
Lamarck and Spencer on Behavior 
Lamarck’s theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics, also called 
Lamarckism, was one of the first evolutionary theories in the nineteenth century 
to suggest how one generation of organisms transmits various traits to the next 
generation. According to Lamarck, the frequent use of a particular trait 
strengthens that trait. Subsequently, the next generation inherits that particular 
trait. Lamarck believed the opposite was also true. Traits not used will atrophy as 
a result of this disuse and will not appear in the next generation. A classic 
example used in many books about evolutionary thought is the giraffe’s neck 
(e.g., Bowler, 1989; Mayr, 2001). According to Lamarck’s theory, a side effect of 
giraffes stretching their necks to obtain succulent leaves at the tops of trees was 
the slight elongation of their necks. The trait of elongated necks passed from one 
generation to the next, as giraffes’ neck proceeded to get longer in each new 
generation. To Lamarck, a species’ behavior and the free will to carry out that 
behavior were the important components for transmitting these traits to 
subsequent generations. It was not a giant leap to focus the idea of inherited 
characteristics to human evolution. The English philosopher Herbert Spencer 
was largely responsible for this move during the nineteenth century.
Spencer used this teleological perspective as a model for how to improve 
civilization (Richards, 1987). Spencer believed that, similar to giraffes passing the
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trait of elongated necks to their young, humans could pass desirable behaviors 
onto their progeny by engaging in desirable behaviors. He was particularly 
interested in the idea of humans passing on mental faculties (e.g., intelligence, 
moral standards) that would ensure justice and fair treatment in a society that 
would become more and more complex as time passed. Those individuals who 
exercised these mental faculties would strengthen them; those faculties not 
exercised would atrophy. As the philosopher and historian Robert J. Richards
(1998) suggests of Spencer’s belief in this process, “It would create both 
organism and societies of organisms that displayed greater specialization of 
parts within an overall integration of functions—more complex organisms and 
societies, that is, more progressive and perfect organisms and societies” (p. 596). 
If each generation utilized their mental faculties to their fullest potential, this 
would improve each successive generation’s society. It is important to note that 
Spencer’s idea of society’s progress was a “laissez-faire” perspective. The 
historian of biology Peter Bowler (1989) points out that Spencer believed 
society’s progress “could not be reached more rapidly through human 
interference—the process of social development was so complex that it was 
better to let nature take its own slow course” (p. 227).
August Weismann’s (1882) germ plasm theory of heredity and 
experiments with rats effectively disproved Lamarckism as a viable explanatory 
process for evolving organisms. Weismann severed rats’ tails and bred them to 
see if this acquired characteristic would appear in future generations. There was 
no such characteristic in the following generations. Subsequently, this led to the
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dismissal of Spencer’s ideas on social progress due to their inherent Lamarckian 
tone. 16
Darwin and His Followers in Psychology
Despite these ideas concerning the nature of humans and their societal 
progress, it really was not until Charles Darwin addressed the issues of human 
psychology that psychologists began using evolution as a viable means of 
understanding the individual and their relationship to the social world. Darwin 
spent little time discussing humans in the Origin o f Species (1859/1964), but in 
the final chapter Darwin argues for a new interpretation of human psychology 
stating, “In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches. 
Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary 
acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light will be 
thrown on the origin of man and his history” (p. 488). It was not until The Descent 
of Man (1871/1981) and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals 
(1872/1998) that Darwin began to explore fully the implications of evolution by 
natural selection on human psychology. In The Descent, Darwin proposes the 
idea that humans descended from other animals. In addition, Darwin argues that 
animals possess mental faculties similar to those found in humans. Dogs, for 
instance, possess a form of intelligence that is not qualitatively, but quantitatively 
different from human intelligence. By doing this, Darwin created a bridge
16 Lamarckism occasionally reappears in one form or another. For instance, the late 
paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould (1998) argues that Lamarckism is an appropriate metaphor for 
cultural change from one generation to the next. Each generation transmits its cultural heritage 
through things such as books, buildings, and tools. On occasion, ideas or lifestyles amalgamate 
and these amalgamations are transmitted to subsequent generations.
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between humans and other species so that studying “lower” forms of life would 
provide some insight into “higher” forms of life. In The Expression, Darwin 
extends the application of natural selection to human emotions by studying the 
facial expressions of humans and other species. He argues that emotional 
qualities were continuous between species and that human emotions were 
inherited adaptations from a common ancestor that had ensured our species’ 
survival. The study of human facial expressions, emotions, and their relationship 
to our evolutionary history continues to this day (e.g., Ekman, 1992; Keltner & 
Buswell, 1996; Neese, 1990). Paul Ekman (2002), for instance, carries on 
Darwin’s work by examining people’s “microexpressions” and how these may 
indicate whether a person is being truthful in a conversation.
Galton’s Hereditarian Theories
During and after Darwin’s life several other figures contributed to the role 
of evolutionary theory in psychology. The English polymath and Darwin’s cousin, 
Francis Galton, used Darwin’s theory as inspiration for his ideas on eminence 
and genius, in addition to his development of eugenics (Gillham, 2001; Sweeney,
2001). Galton conducted research on eminent relatives, twins, and adopted 
children in an attempt to verify his belief in the inheritance of mental 
characteristics (e.g., intellect, swiftness of thought). Furthermore, Galton 
contended that these mental characteristics could be selectively bred within a 
society. Similar to Spencer, Galton believed that the better the mental
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characteristics of the individuals, the more society could improve. This led to his 
advocacy of “positive” eugenics for improving society.17 
The Comparative Psychologists
Many comparative psychologists in the late nineteenth century attempted 
to use natural selection, Lamarckism, or a combination of the two, to contend that 
our species’ intelligence could direct the process of human evolution. For 
instance, the British naturalist and close friend to Darwin, George Romanes, 
continued to extend Darwin’s ideas on the continuity between human and animal 
reasoning abilities (Watson & Evans, 1991). The British psychologist Conway 
Lloyd Morgan believed that humans could use their intelligence—something that 
he believed was a distinctly human quality—to choose adaptations that would 
benefit our survival (Richards, 1987). Those who chose their behaviors correctly 
would survive more often than those who chose their behaviors incorrectly. 
James, Baldwin, and Hall
Psychologists William James, James Mark Baldwin, and G. Stanley Hall 
used various evolutionary ideas to support their own views. Darwin’s materialist 
philosophy inspired James because he believed that by adopting it psychologists 
could move away from metaphysical supposition (Burkhardt & Bowers, 1981). 
Much of the framework for James’ (1890) Principles of Psychology and the 
functionalist perspective James played a part in developing, was inspired by
17 Positive eugenics is the idea of selecting appropriate mates for reproduction for the purpose of 
improving society. This contrasts with “negative” eugenics, which was the idea that unfit 
individuals (e.g., poor, mentally retarded) should be prevented from procreating often through 
such means as forced sterilization.
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Darwin’s work. James argued that consciousness, emotions, and instincts were 
undoubtedly the product of evolution by natural selection and used Darwin’s 
studies as support for this hypothesis.
Baldwin (1901), like Spencer and Morgan before him, believed that the 
transmission of cultural practices—via learning—from generation to generation 
was an important factor in the evolution of humans. Baldwin favored the idea of 
“organic selection,” also called the Baldwin effect. Organic selection indicated 
that the learning process might help protect some of an individual’s physical 
characteristics long enough for them to vary and eventually be selected 
(Richards, 1987). Even though the idea of transmission via cultural practices was 
similar to the ideas of Morgan and Spencer, Baldwin insisted that organic 
selection was random rather than a teleological process.
Hall’s “genetic” psychology was inspired by Ernst Haeckel’s 
recapitulationist theory—ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (Cravens & Burnham, 
1971; Gould, 1977). Haeckel was one of Darwin’s most ardent supporters in 
Germany and Hall used his recapitulation theory of species development as a 
means to explain the mental development of children. Hall believed that, much 
like a child’s physical development from early evolutionary forms, a child’s mental 
development progresses through stages that mimic human evolutionary history 
(Benjamin & Baker, 2004).
The Intelligence Testers
In the spirit of Galton, Robert Yerkes, Lewis Terman, and Henry Goddard 
used natural selection throughout the early twentieth century to support their
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beliefs in eugenics practices. Social Darwinism, the use of evolutionary theory to 
support political and economic practices, was common throughout the early 
1900s (Minton, 1987). These psychologists developed intelligence tests that 
coincided with immigration restrictions, involuntary sterilization, and 
incarcerations of those deemed “unfit” or too dangerous to improve society 
(Kamin, 1974; Sweeney, 2001). As I stated in Chapter 2, the military used these 
intelligence tests during the war to separate candidates based on their scores. 
The intelligence testing movement also fostered racial discrimination practices 
within this country.
Ethology
After the “Modern Synthesis” in evolutionary biology, the biologists Konrad 
Lorenz and Nicholis Tinbergen developed ethology, which is the study of the 
origins and functions of animal behavior. Lorenz (1952) and Tinbergen (1951) 
studied the evolutionary function of fixed action patterns and imprinting of such 
species as ducks, geese, and stickleback fish. In 1973, Lorenz and Tinbergen, 
along with Karl von Frisch shared the Nobel Prize in Physiology for their research 
on animal behavior. The study of ethology fell into disuse as it became apparent 
that few ethologists could make their research relevant for understanding 
humans (Plotkin, 2004). It was not until sociobiology came onto the scene that 
the Modern Synthesis shed light on humans. I will return to sociobiology later in 
the chapter.
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Recent Uses of Darwin’s Theory
There are many other examples of the uses of evolutionary theory for 
understanding some of what psychologists study. For instance, the philosopher 
Susan Blackmore (1999; 2000) recently proposed that the transmission of 
information from one generation to the next can be modeled after Darwin’s theory 
of selection. She calls these pieces of information “memes,” which represent 
ideas, behaviors, instructions, or any other information that is passed on to 
others. The psychologist Donald Campbell (1975) proposed a similar idea with 
his “evolutionary epistemology” for understanding our moral traditions from a 
selectionist perspective. Campbell believed that our current moral structure 
derived from a process of random variation in moral activity and our subsequent 
selection of appropriate moral conduct among these varieties.
The Decline of Evolutionary Thought in Psychology 
In a certain respect then, the idea of an “evolutionary” psychology was not 
shocking to psychologists when the interdisciplinary evolutionary psychologists 
began to publish their ideas in the middle 1980s. There are some who consider 
Darwin the first “evolutionary psychologist,” while others, like the behavioral 
geneticist Henry Plotkin (2004) believe James Mark Baldwin the first. These uses 
of evolutionary theory to explain humans and their interactions in the world 
represent relatively independent and isolated attempts at bringing evolutionary 
theory to bear on psychological phenomena. There was no attempt to organize 
these ideas into a common theoretical framework and language. Similarly, there 
were no professional organizations or content-specific journals for evolutionary
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interpretations of psychological functioning. Evolutionary psychology had not yet 
become “professionalized” or “institutionalized” within the discipline. Plotkin 
typifies this problem by his remarks on Baldwin: “He had no disciples, no 
followers or converts who spread the word and formed a school of thought.
Eighty years were to pass before that was to happen, and then it owed nothing at 
all to Baldwin’s work” (p. 123).
Another factor involved in the general decline of evolutionary perspectives 
in psychology was the rise in popularity of cultural explanations of behavior, 
originating in the work of the cultural anthropologist Franz Boas in the early 
1900s. Boas’s work continued through students such as Ruth Benedict and later 
by Margaret Mead. Studies by these individuals brought into question the 
dominance of evolutionary explanations of human capacities. Instead, Boas and 
others argued that one’s culture plays a significant role in development. 
Accompanying this cultural relativism, the 1950s through the 1970s were a time 
of civil unrest, protests, and the questioning of authority, typified by the Civil 
Rights movement, gay liberation, and feminist movements (Zinn, 1999). All of 
these factors brought into question the validity of genetic determinism.
It was the middle 1970s to the middle 1980s that brought about a revival in 
evolutionary thinking in psychology, first through sociobiology and subsequently 
through evolutionary psychology. But this revival brought with it controversies 
about race, equality, and freedom that had been bubbling under the surface for 
the past thirty years on two fronts: scientific and political. Encapsulating this 
tension, Pascal Boyer and Jutta Heckhausen (2000), suggest that evolutionary
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psychology is “arguably one of the most important new developments in the 
behavioral sciences over the past 20 years. It is also most controversial” (p. 917).
Outline of Evolutionary Psychology 
Evolutionary psychology is an interdisciplinary program fostered on 
understanding the mind from an adaptationist perspective. The adaptationist 
perspective attempts to explain the functional role of human information and 
decision making processes (Daly & Wilson, 1995). The evolutionary psychologist 
David Buss and his colleagues (1998) contend that adaptations are “inherited 
and reliably developing characteristics that came into existence as a feature of a 
species through natural selection because it helped to directly or indirectly 
facilitate reproduction during the period of its evolution” (p. 535). Examples of 
adaptations are ubiquitous in nature. For instance, the hollow bone structure of 
bird wings is an adaptation for thermoregulation. The particular configuration of 
colors on moth’s wings is an adaptation that provides protective camouflage from 
potential predators. The human eye’s response to light and dark—the opening 
and closing of the pupil and the firing of rods and cones—are adaptations for 
perceiving visual stimuli in varying conditions of light.
The adaptationist perspective forms the boundaries of the research 
evolutionary psychologists conduct. This perspective was largely influenced by 
David Marr’s (1982) functional approach to the visual system. Basically, Marr 
asked the question: What problem must be solved for each structure and process 
in the visual system? From there he reasoned that the human eyes’ adaptations 
solved particular spatial and perceptual problems for humans interacting in their
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environment. Evolutionary psychologists believe that all human adaptations 
occurred in what they call the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). 
They identify the EEA as the Pleistocene era in which humans flourished for two 
million years as hunter-gatherers (e.g., Barkow, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). 
Most contend that, due to the great lengths of time needed for adaptations to 
occur, there have been no further human adaptations since this time. Leda 
Cosmides and her colleagues (1992) argue that “our ancestors spent the last two 
million years as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers...and...the few thousand years 
since the scattered appearance of agriculture is only a small stretch in 
evolutionary terms... For that reason, it is unlikely that new complex designs 
could evolve in so few generations” (p. 5). They reason that the problems 
humans had to have solved during this time were those concerned with basic 
needs such as food, shelter, mating, and bartering for goods and services. 
Definitions of Evolutionary Psychology
Various evolutionary psychologists have attempted to define their field’s 
program of research and there is considerable agreement about the purpose of 
evolutionary psychology and the importance of the adaptationist perspective 
between these definitions. Before going into these definitions, there are a few 
issues with terminology that need addressing. First, evolutionary psychologists 
frequently use the term “mind” to mean anything that the brain does, this is, the 
functions of the brain. Secondly, they often use the term “psychological 
mechanism,” which they also refer to as “information-processing mechanism” 
and “Darwinian algorithms.” Psychological mechanisms are units in the brain that
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process specific pieces of information coming from the environment that helped 
humans solve a constrained range of problems that we faced in our ancestral 
environment.18 Most evolutionary psychologists believe humans possess a large 
number of these mechanisms that today assist us, and sometimes impede us, in 
solving specific problems in our modern world. For instance, Cosmides (1989) 
proposed that humans possess a “cheater detection” mechanism that allows us 
to analyze social exchanges of goods and services and to detect those who may 
receive benefits from this exchange without having to pay a cost (i.e., someone 
who is potentially cheating in the social exchange). The idea of psychological 
mechanisms is inspired, in part, by “modular” theories of mind espoused by 
individuals such as the philosopher Jerry Fodor (1983) and the linguist Noam 
Chomsky (1984).19
In terms of the general agreement of evolutionary psychologists at 
defining their field, I present three definitions that I believe are typical of the ones 
found in the evolutionary psychology literature. Louise Barrett, Robin Dunbar, 
and John Lycett (2002) define evolutionary psychology as a science that 
“identifies the selection pressures that have shaped the human psyche over the 
course of evolutionary time, and then tests whether our psychological 
mechanisms actually show the features one would expect if they were designed
18 Evolutionary psychologists are not specific about where these psychological mechanisms exist 
in the brain. Psychological mechanisms are, to a certain extent, spatially ambiguous.
19 Neither Fodor nor Chomsky seem particularly open to the ideas of evolutionary psychologists. 
Fodor (2000; 2000) has brought into question some of the findings of evolutionary psychologists 
who support modularity of mind and Chomsky seems reluctant to attribute evolutionary processes 
to his universal grammar module (Pinker, 1994).
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to solve these particular adaptive problems” (p. 10). Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, 
and Jerome Barkow (1992) define evolutionary psychology as:
Psychology that is informed by the additional knowledge that evolutionary 
biology has to offer, in the expectation that understanding the process that 
designed the human mind will advance the discovery of its 
architecture...and by focusing on the evolved information-processing 
mechanisms that comprise the human mind, supplies the necessary 
connection between evolutionary biology and the complex, irreducible 
social and cultural phenomena studied by anthropologists, sociologists, 
economists, and historians, (p. 3)
Catrin Rode and Xiao Wang (2000) describe evolutionary psychology as a “new 
approach to psychology [that] uses knowledge and principles from modern 
Darwinian theories in research of the human mind. In this view, the mind consists 
of a rich array of information-processing mechanisms that were designed by 
natural selection to solve adaptive problems that were recurrent in hominid 
evolution” (p. 926).
In summary then, evolutionary psychology is an interdisciplinary field that 
searches for a mesh between current function and past adaptations to common 
problems found in our ancestral history. By positing specific adaptive problems 
faced by our ancestors, evolutionary psychologists can test for domain-specific 
functions in our information processing capacities.
In line with these definitions, David Buss (1999) outlines four essential 
questions that evolutionary psychologists attempt to ask as they carry out their
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research. The first question they attempt to answer pertains to identifying the 
causal processes that designed the human mind. What were the types of 
environments humans had to face that fundamentally shaped our brains? The 
second question on which they focus is how the human mind was designed the 
way that it was. How is it that the human mind possesses certain faculties and 
abilities but not others? Another question pertains to the function of the mind. 
What are the major functions of the parts of the brain and how do they work 
together? Finally, they ask questions of a perceptual nature. How does the mind 
interpret stimuli from the environment and use this information to produce 
behavior?
These definitions and the questions evolutionary psychologists attempt to 
answer demonstrate the departure from past research on the relationship 
between evolutionary theory and psychology. The main difference between the 
newer and older versions is that the newer versions of evolutionary psychology 
organize around specific objectives. First, the new definitions point to modern 
Darwinian theories, implying that evolutionary psychologists consider findings 
from modern genetics and evolutionary biology in their own research. Secondly, 
there are explicit statements regarding testing hypotheses about our evolutionary 
history using data from the present. For instance, evolutionary psychologists may 
posit hypotheses about dominance hierarchies in human mating systems that 
occurred in our ancestral environment and use data from modern human 
subjects to test these hypotheses. Finally, these definitions make the human 
mind the focal point for evolutionary psychologists’ investigations.
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History of Evolutionary Psychology
“Evolutionary psychology” is a somewhat misleading title because the 
term “psychology” gives one the impression that it is merely a branch or 
subdiscipline of psychology. Evolutionary psychology is more than a 
subdiscipline. Those scientists considered evolutionary psychologists come from 
an array of disciplines including evolutionary biology, cultural anthropology, 
psychology, sociology, sociobiology, and ethology. Because of evolutionary 
psychology’s recent origins, the usual archival sources for a comprehensive 
history are ill-formed or absent. Nevertheless, I attempt to put the available 
pieces together to form a tentative sketch of how evolutionary psychology came 
to be in order to make my arguments about psychologists’ boundary-work in 
response to this program.
Evolutionary psychology developed as an interdisciplinary program in the 
late 1980s when many scientists broke away from the discipline of sociobiology. 
According to the sociologist Ullica Segerstrale (2000), the break away from 
sociobiology arose mainly for political reasons. The political controversy began 
with the publication of Harvard University entomologist Edward O. Wilson’s 
(1975) Sociobiology. Wilson defined sociobiology as:
...the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior. For the 
present, it focuses on animal societies, their population structure, castes, 
and communication, together with all of the physiology underlying the 
social adaptations. But the discipline is also concerned with the social
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behavior of early man and the adaptive features of organization in the 
more primitive contemporary human societies, (p. 4)
In the book, Wilson argues that genes are essential for the production of 
social behaviors. The main controversy centers on the final chapter where Wilson 
discusses the implications of genes in determining human social behavior. 
Wilson’s “genocentric” perspective of human social behavior in Sociobiology 
caused considerable controversy. By Wilson’s (1994) own account, numerous 
factions found its fundamental framework to be too deterministic. The 
controversy stemmed from the belief that sociobiologists were ostensibly 
justifying acts such as rape, spousal abuse, and numerous other forms of 
aggression through their belief in genetic determinism. A group of students and 
professors calling themselves the Sociobiology Study Group (SSG) formed just 
before the publication of Wilson’s book to respond to his claims (Segerstrale, 
2000). Members included Stephen Jay Gould, Ruth Benedict, and Richard 
Lewontin. For some of these critics, sociobiology heralded a new form of social 
Darwinism. For instance, in a New York Times Review of Books in 1975 the SSG 
(1978) issued this statement:
These theories provided an important basis for the enactment of 
sterilization laws and restrictive immigration laws by the United States 
between 1910 and 1930 and also for the eugenics policies which led to 
the establishment of gas chambers in Nazi Germany. The latest attempts 
to reinvigorate these tired theories comes with the alleged creation of a 
new discipline, sociobiology, (p. 20)
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Perhaps the most well-known, and public, response to sociobiology came on 
February 15th, 1978 in Washington when Wilson was to deliver a talk on 
sociobiology for the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS). Protesters from the International Committee Against Racism showed up 
to protest and one of them ran to the front and poured water on Wilson’s head 
exclaiming that he was “all wet” (Wilson, 1994).20
Scientists interested in the implications of evolutionary thought on human 
mind and behavior moved away from the politically charged sociobiologists and 
created the title “evolutionary psychology” in the early to middle 1980s. Changing 
names seemed to divert some, but not all, of the controversy. Philosopher Val 
Dusek (2000), a major critic of sociobiology, observed that evolutionary 
psychology “arose two decades later as a more muted and explicitly non-racist 
replacement for sociobiology” (p. 556). In the span between the publication of 
Wilson’s book and the beginnings of evolutionary psychology, the political 
tensions seemed to abate, and, in fact, there appeared to be a general shift in 
consciousness towards the acceptance of biologically determined behavior. 
Dusek (1999) outlined five factors that may have contributed to this general shift 
towards biological thinking. First, people were attracted to the potential medical 
and economic benefits genetic research had to offer. Second, Derek Freeman’s 
(1983) critique of Margaret Mead’s analysis of Samoan culture brought cultural 
relativism into question. Another factor was the Minnesota twin studies, which
20 Val Dusek (1999) was present at the 1978 AAAS meeting and retold the story from a different 
perspective. He noted that most of the protesters were African-Americans and after the black 
woman poured water over Wilson’s head, he exclaimed that it felt as if an aborigine had speared 
him. Most accounts of the event have glaringly omitted Wilson’s statement.
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reincarnated the idea that genetics had a much ignored role in people’s 
intelligence and personality. Fourth, brain imaging technology began to 
demonstrate sex differences in the brain. Lastly, the ongoing “discovery” of 
genes for particular characteristics such as bipolar disorder and homosexuality 
was an attractive explanation to many. These factors worked in favor of 
evolutionary psychologists. Society was ready to accept a more deterministic and 
biological view of humans during the 1980s than it was in the 1970s. This shift in 
attitude played a role in the acceptance of evolutionary psychologists’ practices.
Conceptual Practices 
Evolutionary psychologists brought many “new” concepts and theories to 
bear on existing psychological phenomena such as the environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness, long and short term mating strategies, cheater- 
detection algorithms, parental investment theory, the paternity uncertainty 
hypothesis, and reciprocal altruism.21 To do this, they co-opted ideas from 
influential evolutionary biologists such as William Hamilton, George Williams, and 
Robert Trivers to foster their credibility. Hamilton’s (1964) kin selection or 
inclusive fitness theory, Williams’ (1966) requirements for adaptations, and 
Trivers’ (1971) reciprocal altruism theory all were brought into psychology as 
tools for evolutionary psychologists’ investigations. Leda Cosmides, a 
psychologist, and John Tooby, an anthropologist, both from the University of 
California at Santa Barbara, were two of evolutionary psychology’s most ardent
21 While many of these concepts and theories were new to psychologists, they were, to a certain 
extent, old to sciences like evolutionary biology.
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spokespeople. They, along with anthropologist Jerome Barkow, called for a 
“conceptual integration” in psychology whereby the “behavioral and social 
sciences should make themselves mutually consistent and consistent with what 
is known in the natural sciences” (1992, p. A)22 In doing this they critiqued, what 
they called, the “standard social science model” in psychology, believing it 
“suffers from a series of major defects that make it a profoundly misleading 
framework” (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, p. 2). At the heart of the standard social 
science model, at least as evolutionary psychologists conceive it, is the belief 
held in the social sciences that the human mind is initially a tabula rasa that, 
based on experiences within the environment, forms our cognitive abilities and 
behavioral repertoire. According to Cosmides and other evolutionary 
psychologists, they were fighting to supplant the naive model of human 
psychological functioning that had been popular for at least a century.
Evolutionary psychologists follow closely the standard methods of 
statistics and data analysis traditionally used by psychologists. Evolutionary 
psychologists commonly employed analytic techniques such as analysis of 
variance, bivariate and multiple regression, and t-tests. These and other methods 
provided evolutionary psychologists with the analytic tools they needed to 
conduct their experimental and correlational studies. Similarly, their research 
methods included questionnaires, self-reports, experimental manipulations, and 
naturalistic observations. While some advocates of evolutionary psychology used
22 E. O. Wilson (1998) in his book Consilience also advocated this kind of conceptual integration.
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archeological data, field studies, and fossil records, the psychologists of 
evolutionary psychology did not employ these methods.
Material Practices
One relatively innovative material practice of some evolutionary 
psychologists was the way they conducted experimental procedures on the 
computer. For instance, in a study about physical attractiveness, Victor Johnston 
and Melissa Franklin (1993) developed a computer program that could morph 
facial features in pictures so their participants could “evolve” the faces on the 
computer screen.23 Similar programs were used to measure body type 
preferences by manipulating a body’s waist-to-hip ratio (Singh, 1993). The 
utilization of these types of programs obviates the need of random samples of 
humans to generate the various faces and body types. Instead, computer 
software creates an almost infinite number of samples with various physical 
characteristics. Nevertheless, this procedure does not eliminate the need for 
participants in psychological studies.
Because evolutionary psychologists follow closely the methodology of 
psychologists, they did not introduce many other material practices into the 
discipline. For instance, Cosmides (1989; 1992) used the Wason selection task— 
a task traditionally used for reasoning research—to test her theories about social 
exchange and the cheater detection mechanism. Jeffery Simpson and Stephen 
Gangstead (1990; 1991) developed the Sociosexual Orientation Inventory, which
231 should note, however, that Francis Galton used composite photography, a similar albeit less 
modern procedure, in order to identify features such as criminal types and people suffering from 
various diseases.
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measures the willingness of individuals to engage in sexual behavior in the 
absence of exclusive relationships. But this inventory was used for a relatively 
small number of studies, mostly by the two creators, and was not frequently used 
elsewhere due to its poor reliability. Similarly, other evolutionary psychologists 
created various questionnaires for their research but nothing that would 
constitute a significant material practice that was new to the discipline.
Social Practices
The social practices of evolutionary psychologists are similar in form to the 
social practices of my other two case studies. The social practices of evolutionary 
psychologists take the form of professionalizing their interdisciplinary program 
and the rhetorical strategies they employed to persuade psychologists and the 
public of the viability of evolutionary psychology. In terms of professionalization, 
evolutionary psychologists established journals, created professional societies, 
held conferences, and developed funding resources. In terms of their rhetorical 
strategies, many evolutionary psychologists touted their field as a new paradigm 
for psychology and continued their efforts to disengage from the shadow of 
sociobiology.
Evolutionary psychologists founded The Human Behavior and Evolution 
Society (HBES) on October 29th, 1988 at the University of Michigan. Participants 
at a national conference on Evolution, Psychology, and Psychiatry voted to 
create the organization, decided on a name for the society, elected the first 
officers, and created the society’s constitution. The University of Michigan 
Evolution and Human Behavior Program sponsored the conference. In 1989,
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HBES held its first independent conference in Evanston, Illinois at Northwestern 
University. The evolutionary biologist William D. Hamilton was the society’s first 
president. Interestingly, the keynote speaker for the first conference was E. O. 
Wilson who, as Segerstrale (2000) reported, took them to task for not calling 
HBES the Society for Human Sociobiology. According to Constance Holden 
(1996), who covered the story in Science, Wilson “chastised the group 
for...displaying a ‘failure of nerve’—caving in to critics who still label sociobiology 
as ‘racist and determinist’” (p. 15). Holden reported that HBES members thought 
the new name of the society was more appropriate for their goals. Nicholas 
Blurton-Jones, an anthropologist attending the conference stated, “Sociobiology 
raised too many hackles and got us into too much trouble" (p. 15)24 Establishing 
HBES helped this interdisciplinary program create distance from sociobiology. 
Even though “human behavior” and “evolution” in the HBES name encapsulated 
what sociobiology was all about, these seemed to be less threatening terms.
In 1994, HBES took over the reigns of publishing responsibilities of the 
journal Ethology and Sociobiology, but by 1996 had changed the name of the 
journal to Evolution and Human Behavior. Dusek (2000) describes this change of 
names as strategic. Academics tended to associate “ethology” in the title of the 
journal with Konrad Lorenz and his eugenics beliefs and Nazi sympathies. 
Wilson’s reputed racism made the term “sociobiology” problematic in the title. Not 
only did the new title foster continuity between the society and the journal, but it
24 After the publication of Holden’s brief announcement of the journal change, twelve scientists 
aligned with sociobiology, including notables like Sarah Blaffer Hrdy and Marc Hauser, penned 
their names to a brief report (1996) about the contributions sociobiologists made to such fields as 
women’s studies, art, philosophy, botany, and psychology.
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also assisted in further distancing evolutionary psychology from sociobiology. 
Calling the society HBES and changing the name of their journal seemed to help 
the society’s membership as academics joined the Society from a diverse array 
of scientific and humanities professions including biology, medicine, economics, 
literature, law, and art.
HBES provided opportunities for psychologists to interact with scientists 
from numerous other disciplines outside its own boundaries. Through the 
society’s annual conferences, other scientists exposed psychologists to the 
recent findings in evolution research. These conferences served not only as a 
physical space to hear about new research, but also to extend the 
communication networks of psychologists for potential research collaborations 
and funding opportunities. Additionally, Evolution and Human Behavior provided 
a venue for psychologists to publish research specifically pertaining to 
adaptations in human mind and behavior.
Evolutionary psychologists also engaged in rhetorical strategies beyond 
the ones just discussed. The rhetoric of evolutionary psychologists was a 
powerful and persuasive component in their arsenal. With their discourse came 
the backing of “harder” sciences like biology and a powerful scientific icon: 
Charles Darwin. Evolutionary psychologists and some popular science writers 
were claiming that evolutionary psychology was a new way of thinking about 
psychological phenomena that would usurp the standard social science model 
discussed earlier. There were many claims that evolutionary psychology would 
become the paradigm in psychology. In The Moral Animal, one of the popularized
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accounts of evolutionary psychology, the science writer Robert Wright (1994) 
dramatically expressed this idea:
The new Darwinian social scientists [evolutionary psychologists] are 
fighting a doctrine that has dominated their fields for much of this century: 
the idea that biology doesn’t matter much—that the uniquely malleable 
human mind, together with the unique force of culture, has severed our 
behavior from its evolutionary roots; that there is no inherent human 
nature driving human events, but that, rather, our essential nature is to be 
driven, (p. 5)
Wright continued his discourse by calling evolutionary psychology “revolutionary” 
and set the stage for his readers to believe that evolutionary psychologists have 
struggled, paid their dues, and are now ready to create a paradigm shift in the 
sciences: “In many ways, what is now happening fits Thomas Kuhn’s description 
of a ‘paradigm shift’.. .A group of mainly young scholars have challenged the 
settled worldview of their elders, met with bitter resistance, persevered, and 
begun to flourish” (p. 6).
Psychologists, not just science writers, adopted this strategy in their work. 
For instance, Jeffery Simpson (1995) proclaimed evolutionary psychology as a 
“new paradigm whose time has come.” David Buss (1995) called evolutionary 
psychology a “new paradigm” and a “metatheory” in addition to proposing that 
the field could “dissolve” or “cross” disciplinary boundaries in psychology as long 
as psychologists embraced the adaptationist perspective. Peggy Cerra and 
Robert Kurzban (1995) contended that evolutionary psychology would provide
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bridges between disciplines such as anthropology, economics, literature, and 
neuroscience. By making these claims, advocates of evolutionary psychology 
attempted to place their field on the same footing as other putative paradigm 
shifts such as Copernicus’ heliocentric theory and Einstein’s theory of general 
relativity.
Evolutionary psychologists brought their varied practices into the discipline 
of psychology. How did traditional psychologists react to these practices? What 
types of boundary-work did psychologists use in response to these practices? 
Were evolutionary psychologists and their ideas readily accepted, or did they 
meet resistance from psychologists? The next two sections deal with 
psychologists’ resistances and accommodations to evolutionary psychologists’ 
practices.
Resistances to Evolutionary Psychology
Certain psychologists as well as various philosophers, feminist scholars, 
biologists, and other scientists questioned the validity of the practices of 
evolutionary psychologists during the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, psychologists 
criticizing evolutionary psychology often relied on arguments set forth by 
philosophers and other scientists as ammunition for their boundary-work. But 
evolutionary psychology, due to its relative newness to psychology and its 
interdisciplinary nature, posed problems for those trying to prevent evolutionary 
psychologists from using their theories to explain psychological phenomena.
The philosopher Paul Davies (1996b) articulated the difficulty in resisting 
the tenets of evolutionary psychology when he proposed that “criticizing
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evolutionary psychology is no simple matter. The difficulty is not that evolutionary 
psychology enjoys especial power or plausibility, but rather that it is not yet a 
well-articulated form of inquiry” (p. 559). For instance, there are numerous 
debates within the evolutionary sciences pertaining to the appropriate 
mechanism(s) of evolution (e.g., Gould, 2002; Mayr, 2001; Williams, 1966). Does 
evolution occur strictly by Darwinian natural selection? Or are processes like 
mutations and genetic drift or a combination of all three responsible? 
Furthermore, there are questions about the appropriate level at which evolution 
occurs. Does evolution occur at the level of genes, which many evolutionary 
psychologists argue is the case? Or does evolution occur either at the level of 
individual organisms or at the species level? Accompanying the ambiguities of 
evolutionary theory, as Davies suggested, evolutionary psychology is still a new 
field and as a new field, there are still too few studies demonstrating the reliability 
and validity of its theories.
Dusek (2000) suggested another criticism along these lines. Fie argues 
that evolutionary psychologists are not experts in molecular biology—especially 
the psychologists—but despite this, they still use the “harder” sciences as 
justification for their ideas. It is difficult to acquire a sense of trust and expertise in 
evolutionary psychologists when their lack of training is apparent. Often, when 
others attack their ideas, evolutionary psychologists will resort to calling the 
critic(s) cultural relativists. For instance, in David Buss’ (2003) account of his 
early research into sexual strategies, he described the dominant theories of 
psychology as being comprised of “social learning, socialization, and arbitrary
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social roles—all precursors of social constructionism [italics added]” (p. 219). In 
How the Mind Works, Steven Pinker (1997) frequently attacked the humanities 
and their poststructuralist, deconstructionist, and postmodernist perspectives as 
being extreme views.
One of the main resistances that came from psychologists was that 
evolutionary psychologists’ explanations of psychological mechanism were 
nothing more than “just so stories” (Gannon, 2002; Rose & Rose, 2000; 
Schlinger, 1996). The phrase derives from the Rudyard Kipling book of the same 
name that contained outrageous stories to explain the functionality of things such 
as how leopards got their spots. In an evolutionary context, “just so stories” 
represent post hoc rationales for supposed adaptations. Psychologists used 
arguments developed by Steven Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin (1979) in 
support of their contention. The thrust of Gould and Lewontin’s position is that it 
is difficult to disentangle true adaptations from mere byproducts of the 
evolutionary process. Some behavior or structure may appear at first to be an 
adaptation, but in fact, may be nothing more than a chance mutation. For 
instance, birds’ hollow bone structure at first appears to be an adaptation for 
flight, however biologists have demonstrated that these hollow bones were 
employed first for thermoregulation and the ability to fly is a mere byproduct of 
that evolutionary process.
From this standpoint, evolutionary psychologists’ belief in humans 
possessing multiple psychological mechanisms that arose as adaptations from 
our time in the Pleistocene age proves problematic. As the psychologist Linda
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Gannon (2002) expressed in her critique of evolutionary psychology: “Labeling 
certain traits and behaviors adaptations and others by-products is arbitrary since 
a methodology has not been developed with which to determine if a trait or 
behavior is a direct adaptation of a by-product of other evolved traits” (p. 150). As 
there is no definitive method for identifying adaptations, especially about 
psychological phenomena, it is difficult to believe evolutionary psychologists who 
propose adaptations for psychological phenomena such as social exchange 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992), mate selection (Buss, 1994), language (Pinker & 
Bloom, 1992), dominance hierarchies (Cummins, 1999), and rape (Thornhill & 
Thornhill, 1990). Unlike bones, psychological phenomena leave no fossil records, 
making it difficult to infer present functions from past events.
Accompanying the critique of adaptations, psychologists resisted 
evolutionary psychologists’ adaptationist perspective on another front. Social 
psychologist Shawn Meghan Burn (1996) pointed out that the adaptationist 
perspective fails to consider processes other than evolution (e.g., cultural norms) 
as viable means of assessing experimental outcomes. Burn analyzed 
evolutionary social psychologist Douglas Kenrick and colleagues’ (1990) 
research on earning capacity. Kenrick and his colleagues found that women 
rated men’s earning capacity as higher than men did in searching for potential 
mates. They concluded that their findings provided evidence for an adapted 
difference between men and women. Men seek women who are young and 
attractive because this is an indication of a woman’s fertility. Women seek men 
with large quantities of material resources (i.e., money, power) because this
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ensures support for both the woman and their children. Burn criticized their 
findings because they failed to consider cultural factors. Burn suggested these 
findings “could be due to the fact that both women and men know that women’s 
earning potentials are lower and so they both look to men to be the dominant 
wage earners. It could be due to social norms that communicate to men and 
women that a man’s value is determined in part by his earning power” (p. 27).
Psychologists Alice Eagly and Wendy Wood (1999) proffered a similar 
criticism about evolutionary psychologists’ research results. One of the 
“landmark” studies in evolutionary psychology during the late 1980s was David 
Buss’ (1989b) study of differences in mate preferences. Buss studied mate 
preferences in 37 cultures and questioned more than 10,000 individuals. Similar 
to Kenrick’s results, his research indicated that men on average would look for 
mates with good reproductive potential and women would look for mates with 
good resource potential. He believed that these differences were a product of the 
adapted problems males and females had to solve during the Pleistocene era. 
This is exactly the kind of study evolutionary psychologists’ found attractive. It 
contained a large sample size—for psychological research—and it crossed 
cultural boundaries. This appeared to be strong evidence for a universal human 
nature, at least for mate selection preferences. Eagly and Wood took Buss’ data 
and tested hypotheses from the perspective that gender differences in mate 
selection would be made on the basis of female and male social roles within a 
political and economic structure. Buss’ data confirmed their hypotheses. Eagly 
and Wood suggested that the social role theory could be empirically tested
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because the roles males and females adopt today can be examined, unlike Buss’ 
suppositions about our ancestral environment, which cannot be examined. The 
developmental psychologist Annette Karmiloff-Smith (2000) also questioned the 
validity of evolutionary psychologists’ findings on psychological mechanisms, 
calling it the “Swiss Army knife" approach. Karmiloff-Smith suggested that there 
simply is not enough evidence to state definitively that mechanisms for higher 
cognitive processes exist. Instead, she argued that what evolution did do for our 
brains was allow it to modify continually its structure in response to 
environmental demands, thus making it appear that humans possess 
psychological mechanisms.
Another way that psychologists resisted the introduction of evolutionary 
psychologists’ practices into the discipline pertains to the political ramifications of 
evolutionary psychologists’ research on gender differences. Eagly (1995), for 
instance, claimed that gender differences research conducted by evolutionary 
psychologists may be used “in far less beneficial ways by misogynist forces in 
society” (p. 155). Gender differences research could possibly lead to different 
standards of education for males and females. Another possible ramification of 
believing too much in evolutionary psychologists’ research is that their findings 
seemed to justify the “glass ceiling”—the invisible barrier in businesses and 
organizations that prevent women from attaining high status and high paying jobs.
Resistances to evolutionary psychology came mostly from feminist 
psychologists who believed that culture plays a more important role than 
evolution in explaining psychological phenomena. To a certain extent,
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evolutionary psychologists met minimal resistance when introducing their various 
practices into the discipline. Psychologists directed their resistances towards 
evolutionary psychologists’ research conclusions. But questioning research 
conclusions is a common practice in all fields of psychology. In fact, most 
resistance to evolutionary psychology came from outside the discipline of 
psychology as is seen in critiques by philosophers (e.g., Davies, 1996a; Jerry 
Fodor, 2000), various scientists in the biological sciences (Fausto-Sterling, 1997; 
Gould, 1991), and science journalists (e.g., Tierney, 2002). One possible reason 
for this minimal resistance may be that evolutionary psychologists’ own 
boundary-work was effective enough to distance their field from the controversy 
caused by sociobiology. Evolutionary psychologists did not have to contend with 
the excess baggage of sociobiology as they postured for intellectual space in 
psychology. Another factor may be that evolutionary psychology’s 
interdisciplinary nature helped legitimize the discipline to psychologists. The 
psychologists of evolutionary psychology were proposing theories supposedly 
backed by disciplines in which most psychologists were unfamiliar or in which 
they lacked expertise. Psychologists may not have felt qualified to provide 
sufficient resistance to the program. But this lack of resistance indicates 
something else that is important in the context of boundary-work. It appears that, 
largely, psychologists did not view evolutionary psychologists as pseudo­
scientists like parapsychologists or phrenologists, but rather as legitimate 
scientists whose theories were debatable and contested within the boundaries of
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the discipline. The next questions I try to answer are how and to what extent did 
psychologists accommodate evolutionary psychology?
Accommodations to Evolutionary Psychology 
Evolutionary psychology seemed quite popular within society in the 1990s. 
There were numerous articles in newspapers and magazines (e.g., Ferguson, 
2001, March 19; Pinker, 1997, October; Wright, 1995, August) and a number of 
books written for scientists and the public (e.g., Buss, 1994; Pinker, 1994, 1997; 
Ridley, 1996; Wright, 1994), many of them bestsellers. It seems that, in general, 
the public accepted the claims of evolutionary psychologists. So how did 
psychologists accommodate evolutionary psychology? Despite the resistances I 
just described, psychologists made accommodations in numerous subdisciplines 
in psychology. One of the ways to examine these accommodations is to look at 
the research literature. Did journal editors and review committees allow 
evolutionary psychologists to publish in their journals? What kinds of journals 
published evolutionary accounts of human behavior? Were these accounts 
published in top tier journals with wide readerships or were they relegated to 
fringe journals with small readerships and their own content-specific journal, 
Evolution and Human Behavior?
Evolutionary psychologists’ published in a wide array of top tiered journals 
in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. Journal like American Psychologist, 
Journal for Personality and Social Psychology, Cognition, Behavioral and Brain 
Science, and Human Development are but a few of the top tiered journals to 
publish evolutionary psychologists’ research. The topics of this research covered
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almost every subdiscipline in psychology including cognition (Cosmides & Tooby, 
1996; Gigerenzer& Hug, 1992), biological psychology (Deacon, 1997), human 
development (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2000; Geary & Bjorklund, 2000), personality 
(Buss, 1989a; Shackelford & Larsen, 1997), social psychology (Kenrick, Groth, 
Trost, & Sadalla, 1993), clinical and abnormal psychology (Cosmides & Tooby, 
1999), and the psychology of women (Campbell, 1999). In a similar vein, the 
Annual Review of Psychology, which covers timely issues in more depth than 
traditional journals, featured evolutionary psychology (Buss, 1991),.
Another indicator of psychologists’ accommodations for evolutionary 
psychologists is through pedagogy. Were there instances of psychologists 
incorporating evolutionary psychology into psychology departments, laboratories, 
and the instruction of students? It seems that this was the case. There were a 
number of places to study evolutionary psychology around the country. The 
University of California, Santa Barbara developed a Center for Evolutionary 
Psychology that trained graduate students.25 Florida Atlantic University’s 
psychology department created a graduate program specializing in evolutionary 
psychology. Psychologist Robert Haskell co-founded the New England Institute 
of Cognitive Science and Evolutionary Psychology in Maine. While David Buss 
was at Harvard University and the University of Michigan, he trained graduate 
students in evolutionary psychology.26 The psychology department of the State
251 should note that due to the interdisciplinary nature of evolutionary psychology, these training 
centers were sometimes independent of psychology departments.
26 David Buss now has an evolutionary psychology laboratory at the University of Texas at Austin, 
as does the evolutionary social psychologist Norman Li.
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University of New York, Albany formed the Evolution and Human Behavior 
Laboratory. Additionally, there were an increasing number of textbooks written for 
undergraduate and graduate students pertaining to evolutionary psychology (e.g., 
Badcock, 2000; Buss, 1999; Evans, 2000; Mynatt & Doherty, 1999). 
Accompanying this increase in textbooks, psychologists began teaching an 
increasing number of classes pertaining to evolutionary psychology. Finally, 
some of the top selling introductory textbook authors started covering 
evolutionary psychology (e.g., Gleitman, Fridlund, & Reisberg, 1999; Myers,
2001; Tavris & Wade, 2001) and some introductory textbooks have evolutionary 
themes running throughout the textbook (e.g., Gray, 1999). In his advocacy of 
incorporating evolutionary perspectives into teaching psychology classes Peter 
Gray (1996) contended, “We should devote far more attention than we do to 
evolutionary theory in our psychology courses. Evolutionary theory is the only 
truly integrative theory that psychology can ever have...Evolutionary theory 
should be a central component of the introductory course and an integral part of 
almost every other course” (p. 207). It appears that many psychologists 
responded in the affirmative to Gray’s urgings.
Perhaps the best indicator of psychologists’ accommodations to 
evolutionary psychologists’ practices is contained in the book Sex, Power,
Conflict edited by David Buss and psychologist Neil Malamuth (1996). In the 
book, Buss and Malamuth solicited evolutionary psychologists and feminist 
psychologists to discuss gender differences research. The book contains three 
sections divided in the Hegelian tradition of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The
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first section contains evolutionary perspectives on gender differences. Feminist 
perspectives on gender differences occupy the second section. In the final 
section, authors Felicia Pratto, Barbara Smuts, Malamuth, and Buss respectively 
attempt to combine evolutionary and feminist perspectives to reach some kind of 
common ground on the controversial issue of gender differences. Since feminist 
psychologists were particularly critical of evolutionary psychology, this book 
served as a bridge between the two opposing camps.
In summary, psychologists engaged in a great deal of boundary-work as 
evolutionary psychologists began appearing in the discipline in the 1980s. 
Psychologists questioned the validity of evolutionary approaches to mind and 
behavior by attacking their theoretical models and criticizing their interpretations 
of data. In addition, they enlisted the aid of philosophers and other scientists to 
support their criticisms of evolutionary psychologists. One of the things they did 
not resist was the formation of HBES and the development of the Evolution and 
Human Behavior journal. In terms of accommodations, evolutionary psychology 
seemed to gain in popularity and support from the 1980s to the new millennium. 
Journal editors published their research, book companies’ marketed evolutionary 
psychology textbooks for undergraduate and graduate students, introductory 
textbooks began covering evolutionary psychology as a viable program, 
psychology professors began offering classes in the field, and some feminists 
and evolutionary psychologists reached a delicate compromise. But 
psychologists did not totally accommodate evolutionary psychologists. For 
instance, most psychologists did not make attempts to unify psychology under
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the banner of evolutionary psychology. Instead, the status of evolutionary 
psychology seemed equivalent to the status of other theories like behaviorism 
and cognitive psychology. Including sections on evolutionary psychological 
research in various textbooks did not radically change the books’ overall 
framework. Textbook authors still placed more coverage on traditional 
explanations of topics such as decision-making, relationships, personality traits, 
and psychotherapy. There were no attempts to have evolutionary psychology 
become a division in the American Psychological Association, though this may 
have something to do with its interdisciplinary nature. Finally, I found no accounts 
in the literature where a psychologist trained in one theoretical framework, read 
about evolutionary psychology and subsequently decided to give up their 
research interests and pursue a program of evolutionarily inspired research. 
Undoubtedly, this occurred for a few individuals, but it certainly was not a trend. 
Nevertheless, I cannot say the same thing about students. Many students 
became attracted to evolutionary psychology, whether it was from taking a class, 
reading the literature, or working with a professor, during their undergraduate 
careers.
Can one consider the story of evolutionary psychology a successful tale of 
boundary maneuvering within psychology? From an historical perspective it is 
simply too soon to tell. Given that evolutionary psychology is such a young field, 
there needs to be more time and distance from the subject in order to obtain an 
appropriate perspective.
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CHAPTER IV
COMPUTATIONAL THEORIES OF THE MIND: COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Cognitive science is an amalgamation of scientific disciplines including 
neuroscience, cognitive psychology, computer science, artificial intelligence, 
linguistics, anthropology, and philosophy of mind. Cognitive scientists collaborate 
in this interdisciplinary endeavor in an attempt to comprehend the phenomenon 
of information processing. Beginning in the 1970s, when cognitive science 
developed into a truly interdisciplinary program (see, Leahey, 1987; Watson & 
Evans, 1991), cognitive scientists came to infringe upon the disciplinary 
boundaries of psychology and affected psychologists’ knowledge production 
activities through their conceptual, material, and social practices.
Throughout psychology’s history, various psychologists have used 
cognitive approaches as a way to understand human mind, behavior, and 
emotions. In the late 1800s, German physiologist Hermann Ebbinghaus 
(1885/1913) carried out experiments on his own memory capacity by testing his 
recall of nonsense syllables. Ebbinghaus’ recall results formed the well-known 
forgetting curve that professors today still introduce to students in various 
psychology classes. In The Principles o f Psychology, William James (1890) 
proclaimed psychology “the study of mental life” and characterized its
101
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
phenomena as “feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, and the like” 
(p. 1). In his experimental research, the structuralist E. B. Titchener (1910) 
attempted to discern the underlying components of consciousness. Titchener 
trained participants in his experiments to introspect on what he believed to be the 
foundations of consciousness: sensations, feelings, and images. In the early 
1930s the British psychologist Frederick Bartlett (1932) found that memories 
constitute reconstructions of events rather than real events.
There exists a pervasive myth found in many textbooks of psychology that 
behaviorism “took over” psychology throughout the middle twentieth century, thus 
wiping out any mention of things cognitive (e.g., Galotti, 2004; Robinson-Riegler 
& Robinson-Riegler, 2004). Philosopher Gary Hatfield (2002) summarizes this 
myth stating, “There is a general impression that during the period from 1920 to 
the mid 1950s, behaviorism succeeded in driving cognitive topics and cognitive 
theoretical notions out of experimental psychology in America” (p. 221). Hatfield 
continued his narrative with a more appropriate interpretation: “Although 
behaviorism became strong or even dominant in the period 1920-1960, it by no 
means was able to stamp out the study of cognition...in American psychology” (p. 
221).
In fact, revisionist historians of psychology are now pointing out that there 
were psychologists still employing cognitive approaches in their theoretical and 
experimental practices during this period (e.g., Greenwood, 1999; e.g., Mandler, 
2002). For instance, the neo-behaviorists Edward C. Tolman and Clark L. Hull 
were amenable to postulating “internal states” as long as one expressed these
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states operationally as intervening between external stimuli and behavioral action 
(Greenwood, 1999). In his research on laboratory rats’ ability to maneuver 
around a maze to acquire food and water, Tolman (1948) proposed that, through 
a series of trials, rats develop a “cognitive map” of the maze that allows them to 
more quickly acquire food and water. The ideas on perception of Gestalt 
psychologists like Wolfgang Kohler, Kurt Koffka, and Max Wertheimer, 
immigrating to the U.S. during World War II, were decidedly cognitive in nature 
(see, Sokal, 1984).
Given these example and many others (e.g., Piaget, 1929), it is apparent 
that cognitive perspectives were present from the beginning of psychology’s 
disciplinary history and continued through to the present. Also, these examples 
demonstrate the vacuity of the myth that behaviorism completely wiped out 
cognition as a topic of study in psychology. Psychologists’ familiarity with these 
various cognitive perspectives assisted in the acceptance of the practices of 
cognitive scientists in the early 1970s. Whether or not psychologists espoused a 
cognitive perspective, they were at least acquainted with the study of cognitive 
processes through James, Titchener, Piaget, and others.
It was also during the late 1960s that the development and introduction of 
the subdiscipline of cognitive psychology paved the way for the rest of cognitive 
science in psychology in the 1970s. While cognitive scientists now consider 
cognitive psychologists part of their interdisciplinary program, in the late 1960s 
the many disciplines comprising cognitive science had yet to professionalize and 
institutionalize into a formal interdisciplinary program. Cognitive psychologists—
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who began incorporating ideas from linguistics, computer science, neuroscience, 
and artificial intelligence—helped foster the introduction of cognitive science to 
the discipline of psychology. In the next section, I define cognitive science and 
describe some of the fundamental assumptions associated with this 
interdisciplinary program.
Outline of Cognitive Science
Defining an interdisciplinary program like cognitive science can prove 
problematic for several reasons. One problem is that different disciplines may 
use their own esoteric terminology to define the interdisciplinary program, thus 
leading to confusion among the disciplines. Cognitive psychologists may prefer to 
use terms such as memory and intelligence when defining cognitive science, 
whereas computer scientists may prefer expressions such as data structures and 
computation in their definitions. Another potential problem in coming to some 
agreement about the nature of cognitive science is that the various disciplines 
comprising cognitive science may define it only in terms of their own role in the 
interdisciplinary program. For instance, artificial intelligence researchers may 
define cognitive science as an interdisciplinary field that attempts to develop 
machines or software programs that mimic human information processing 
capabilities. Philosophers of mind may ignore this definition and instead propose 
that cognitive scientists explore the possibility of understanding consciousness or 
of instantiating consciousness in a machine. Finally, it is important to note that 
not all cognitive psychologists, artificial intelligence researchers, computer 
scientists, and linguists consider themselves cognitive scientists. Some carry out
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research without affiliating themselves with this interdisciplinary program. Despite 
these potential difficulties, many cognitive scientists converge on similar 
definitions of their field.
Defining Cognitive Science
Cognitive psychologist Howard Gardner (1985) enthusiastically describes 
cognitive science as “the mind’s new science.” Gardner goes on to define 
cognitive science as an “empirically based effort to answer long standing 
epistemological questions—particularly those concerned with the nature of 
[human] knowledge, its components, its sources, its development, and its 
deployment” (p. 6). In their interviews with twenty eminent cognitive scientists, 
Peter Baumgartner and Sabine Payr (1995) summarize cognitive science as a 
“joint effort of specific disciplines to answer long-standing questions about the 
working of the mind—particularly knowledge, its acquisition, storage, and use in 
intellectual activity” (p. 11). Herbert Simon and Craig Kaplan (1989) characterize 
it as the “study of intelligence and intelligent systems, with particular reference to 
intelligent behavior as computation” (p. 1). In his overview of cognitive science, 
philosopher Owen Flanagan (1991) describes cognitive science as a “well- 
organized committee of disciplines and subdisciplines, all of which claim to have 
something to contribute to our understanding of mentality” (p. 177).27 The 
common element shared by these various definitions is that cognitive scientists 
study how humans and machines process information. In other words, cognitive
27 There are others who believe cognitive science is more of a perspective various disciplines use 
rather than an interdisciplinary program in and of itself (e.g., Hunt, 1989; Scheerer, 1988).
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science is the study of how humans and machines receive, store, retrieve, 
transform, and transmit information (Stillings et al., 1987). This fundamental 
assumption allows the various subdisciplines of cognitive science to 
communicate with one another. A cognitive psychologist, for instance, can use 
this information processing perspective to discuss how humans store information 
in memory in the same way that a computer scientist can talk of storage in a 
computer’s memory.
Cognitive scientist Michael Dawson (1998) proposes viewing the study of 
information processing from three interrelated levels of analysis. The first level of 
study is the computational level. At this level, cognitive scientists ask, “What 
information processing problem is the system solving?”28 After identifying the 
information processing problem, these scientists can then formally describe the 
problem using some form of logical analysis or mathematical modeling. The 
second level of analysis is the algorithmic level. At this level, cognitive scientists 
ask, “What method is the system using to solve this information processing 
problem?” At this level, cognitive scientists attempt to discover the procedure a 
system uses to accomplish some kind of goal. At the heart of this level is the idea 
that information processing involves some kind of algorithm for manipulating 
internal symbols that represent something in the external world. When one views 
a tree outside, there is no one-to-one mapping of the image of the tree in our
28 Note that the term "system” can represent either human or machine information processing.
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brains.29 Instead, there is a manipulation of some kind of symbol system that acts 
as a representation of the tree during information processing. The third level of 
analysis is the implementation level. For this level of analysis cognitive scientists 
ask, “What physical structures are used to implement the algorithm in order to 
solve the problem?” For instance, cognitive scientists may search for the specific 
area(s) or structure(s) in the brain that carry out a particular algorithm for solving 
a problem.
The ways in which cognitive scientists study information processing vary 
due to their interdisciplinary perspective. Some cognitive scientists develop 
theories about cognitive processes divorced from human or animal 
experimentation. Others study animals and humans in order to create theories 
about mental life. Finally, there are those who study the organization and 
computational abilities of intelligent machines (Simon & Kaplan, 1989).
Despite their differing approaches, cognitive scientists rely on several 
methods in order to obtain converging evidence on information processing 
phenomena. They sometimes utilize psychophysical data to identify certain 
abilities and deficits in our ability to recognize and differentiate various stimuli in 
the environment. Reaction time experiments are popular among cognitive 
psychologists for comparing, say, lexical decisions under varying conditions. 
Artificial intelligence researchers and computer scientists develop software 
programs and mathematical models that they believe effectively reproduce 
components of human information processing. One of the more recent and
29 While there is no one-to-one mapping in the brain, external stimuli are projected 
topographically on the visual cortex (see, Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992).
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popular avenues for cognitive science research is brought about by brain imaging 
technology. Neuroscientists use techniques such as computed tomography 
scans (CT scans), positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to identify the brain structures involved in various 
information processing tasks. While each cognitive scientist uses a few of these 
methods, they rely on discoveries from cognitive scientists using other methods 
to develop a complete picture of information processing.
In the following section, I discuss the origins of the cognitive science 
approach to human information processing. Given the vast number of disciplines 
associated with cognitive science, I delimit this history by focusing on the parts of 
its history most germane to psychology.
History of Cognitive Science
Cognitive science has its roots in the work of a number of different fields 
that came to bear on the topic of information processing. Even though cognitive 
science became a professionalized interdisciplinary program in the middle 1970s, 
the foundation of cognitive science came from earlier research. One of the fields 
in the formation of cognitive science was computer science. Of particular 
importance are the connections computer scientists developed between how 
humans and machines process information. In the 1930s, logician Alan Turing 
(1936) developed a thought experiment pertaining to a simple machine—what is 
now known as the Turing Machine—that could perform various kinds of
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computations.30 According to Turing, this machine could carry out any kind of 
well-defined computation as long as it possessed the correct instructions, enough 
time, and enough resources to carry out the computations. The idea of a Turing 
Machine prompted others such as John von Neumann to develop its physical 
manifestation—the digital computer.
In a later paper on computing machines and intelligence, Turing (1950) 
proposed a test, now called the Turing test, to discern if a computing machine 
could display some form of intelligence.31 In the test, a human would converse 
with other humans and a computing machine via some communication device. 
Turing argued that if the human could not tell the difference between the 
computing machine and the other humans’ dialog, this would provide a kind of 
evidence for machine intelligence. Largely inspired by Turing and von Neumann, 
the workings of the digital computer came to be an important metaphor for 
conceptualizing how humans process information throughout the formative years 
of cognitive science.
Contemporaneously, research on neural networks, cybernetics, and 
information theory played a role in the development of cognitive science. 
Neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch and logician Walter Pitts (1943) developed 
the idea of neural networks. They created a mathematical model in which 
individualized “neurons” operate as binary devices—on/off switches—interacting
30 Some point to Charles Babbage as the progenitor of the idea of thinking machines, but 
cognitive psychologist and historian of psychology Christopher Green (2001) argues against this 
interpretation.
31 Note that Turing uses the phrase “computing machine” as there were no computers in the 
modern sense at the time.
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with each other to complete some prescribed function. In the same decade, the 
Canadian psychologist Donald Hebb (1949) developed a hypothesis about how 
neural connections in the brain are strengthened via repeated interactions 
between assemblies of neurons. Neural networks began to serve as viable 
mathematical models for the workings of human neural connections (Bechtel, 
Abrahamsen, & Graham, 1999).
From cybernetics, cognitive scientists borrowed the idea of feedback 
processes. During World War II, scientists used the idea of feedback as a 
method for improving anti-aircraft missiles. Mathematician Norbert Wiener (1948) 
and his colleagues began developing the idea of feedback as a way of 
understanding goal-directed behavior in humans and machines. 
Contemporaneously, the mathematician Claude Shannon (1948, July and 
October) published work on a way to transmit information effectively and 
developed statistical procedures for measuring information flow. As these ideas 
became public, scientists began describing human and machine information 
processing using the notions of feedback and descriptions of the flow of 
information.
With these ideas in place, it fell upon the next generation of researchers to 
build machines that emulated human thought processes. The 1950s proved to be 
a pivotal time for the development of cognitive science as researchers from 
numerous disciplines came to focus on the phenomenon of information 
processing. Scientists also developed some of the first artificial intelligence 
programs. In 1956, Herbert Simon, Allan Newell, and J. Clifford Shaw developed
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the General Logic Theorist and then, in 1959, the General Problem Solver (e.g., 
1958). Basically, both programs could solve simple logic problems and prove 
mathematical theorems by breaking down a problem into sub-goals in an attempt 
to minimize the distance between its present state and some future goal state. 
Newell and Simon compared the program’s performance on problem solving 
tasks with people’s introspective reports of the same tasks and found that the 
program operated in a similar manner to people’s introspective reports. The 
similarity between how the programs and humans solved problems provided 
some evidence for the appropriateness of the analogy between computer and 
human information processes.
It was also in 1956 that mathematicians Marvin Minsky and John 
McCarthy organized a two-month workshop at Dartmouth College that brought 
together a number of researchers, including Newell and Simon, interested in 
artificial intelligence (Gardner, 1985). The two-month workshop allowed 
researchers opportunities to present their research, trade technologies, make 
inroads into the connection between humans and machines, and develop the 
rudiments of the discipline of artificial intelligence.
A conference later that year fostered further inroads into the development 
of cognitive science. Between September 10 and 12, 1956, a number of 
researchers attended the Symposium on Information Theory at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) (Bechtel et al., 1999). Psychologist George Miller 
presented his ideas on short-term memory capacity, Newell and Simon 
demonstrated a proof of a theorem by their General Logic Theorist, Nathan
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Rochester and his colleagues presented a computer model of Hebb’s neuronal 
assemblies, and Noam Chomsky delivered a talk on his transformational 
grammar. Miller (2003) retrospectively described the moment he believes 
cognitive science was created stating, “I date the moment of conception of 
cognitive science as 11 September 1956, the second day of a symposium 
organized by the ‘Special Interest Group in Information Theory’ (p. 142). Miller’s 
declaration is merely a personal belief rather than a statement of fact. There is no 
evidence that during this time scientists tried to develop the ideas presented at 
this conference into some meaningful interdisciplinary program. The MIT 
conference and the one at Dartmouth did however served as a turning point in 
the development of cognitive science because it became apparent to the 
presenters from various disciplines at these events that they shared a common 
view that the mind was an information processor.
Linguistics also came to the forefront in the 1950s. It was not that 
linguistics was a new field. Structural linguists such as Ferdinand de Saussure 
and Leonard Bloomfield studied language, albeit in different ways, throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Rather, linguistics came to the attention 
of many social scientists due to a change in perspective in how to approach the 
study of language. Noam Chomsky (1957) published his theory of 
transformational grammar in Syntactic Structures. In the monograph, Chomsky 
pointed out the inadequacies of relying solely on phrase-structures—breaking 
sentences in components such as noun and verb phrases—for a complete 
understanding of language. In addition to phrase structure, Chomsky advocated
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the need for a transformational grammar—a procedure that changes one 
sentence into another or establishes a relationship between two sentences. 
Chomsky revised these ideas continually throughout the 1960s and 1970s (see 
e.g., Chomsky, 1965, 1972). For instance, he added the ideas of deep and 
surface grammatical structures to his theory. But throughout these revisions, he 
maintained the importance of syntax in understanding any natural language. Also 
important to cognitive science were Chomsky’s ideas on universal grammar. 
Chomsky believed that infants possess an innate propensity for understanding 
any natural language. This propensity implied a modular view of the mind, at 
least for language capabilities. This modular view helped develop another 
connection between humans and the digital computer. Digital computers 
operated in a modular fashion. They could only do certain functions with 
proficiency, such as solving logic puzzles. Implicating modular language 
capacities in humans helped solidify the relationship between humans and 
computers.
During the late 1950s, a number of psychologists began moving away 
from the theoretical position of behaviorism. This was evident in the rise in 
publications pertaining to cognition that came out during the late 1950s and 
1960s (Scheerer, 1988). George Miller (1956) published his well-known paper on 
short-term memory capacity, which he had earlier presented at the symposium at 
MIT. Harvard psychologist Jerome Bruner and colleagues (1956) published A 
Study in Thinking, which departed from behaviorists’ stimulus-response models 
of learning and focused on how humans play an active role in forming concepts.
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Their theories of the strategies people employ to solve problems mimicked those 
from computer programs like the General Logic Theorist (Johnson-Laird, 1988). It 
was also at this time that Leon Festinger (1957) came out with his theory of 
cognitive dissonance. Finally, Chomsky (1959) provided a critical and, some say, 
devastating analysis of behaviorist B. F. Skinner’s (1957) Verbal Behavior. In his 
critique, Chomsky argued that language acquisition could not occur via simple 
associations, reinforcements, or stimulus-response sequences. These theories 
simply do not account for either the inherent creativity in our language production 
or young children’s use of language. Chomsky argued that children’s language 
ability is at odds with Skinner’s behaviorist assumptions. For instance, young 
children use phrases like “I goed to the park.” But adults do not make these kinds 
of grammatical mistakes. Chomsky proposed that it would be extremely unlikely 
for children to speak ungrammatically if simple stimulus-response learning was 
occurring. Chomsky’s critique pointed out one of the limitations of behaviorist 
theory and, similar to the other ideas described above, had a decidedly cognitive 
tone that threatened behaviorism’s popularity in psychology.
The interest in cognition continued into the 1960s. Jean Piaget’s work on 
children’s cognitive development, though developed in the 1920s, caught U. S. 
psychologists’ attention in the 1960s. Miller (1962) published a textbook with a 
decidedly cognitive flavor entitled Psychology, the Science of Mental Life. Finally, 
psychologist Ulric Neisser (1967) introduced a new generation of students to a 
cognitive approach to the study of psychology in his textbook Cognitive 
Psychology.
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The cognitive turn in psychological studies spurred the development of the 
Center for Cognitive Studies at Harvard University in 1960. Psychologists Jerome 
Bruner and George Miller developed the Center under the auspices often years 
of funding from the Carnegie Corporation (Bechtel et at., 1999).32 The Center 
provided opportunities for young scientists to pursue their interests in linguistics, 
attention, memory, language processing, and a host of other topics germane to 
cognitive science. Other schools developed similar institutes in the 1970s such 
as the Institute for Cognitive Science at the University of California, San Diego.
Despite scientists converging towards solving problems about cognition 
and information processing, there was little interdisciplinary flavor to much of 
their work. The theoretical chemist and artificial intelligence researcher 
Christopher Longuet-Higgins (1987) coined the phrase “cognitive science” during 
an address on artificial intelligence in 1973. The phrase caught on among this 
diverse group of scientists and they adopted it as the name of their program. It 
was also during the 1970s that psychologists, computer scientists, linguists, and 
others professionalized and institutionalized cognitive science as an 
interdisciplinary program.
By 1983, a host of colleges and universities around the country had 
established centers for cognitive science including Stanford University, Cornell 
Medical School, the University of Chicago, and Princeton University (Bechtel et 
al., 1999). At Princeton, for instance, Miller and Gil Harman, with funding from the 
James S. McDonnell Foundation, developed the Program for Cognitive Science
32 The Center closed in 1970 after the Carnegie funding ran out.
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and the Laboratory of Cognitive Science (Harman, 1988; Hirst, 1988). From the 
1980s into the 1990s, cognitive science expanded its scope to include 
neuroscientists and philosophers of mind.
The next sections outline the types of conceptual, material, and social 
practices cognitive scientists brought into psychology.
Conceptual Practices 
Cognitive scientists affected the boundaries of psychology through the 
introduction of numerous theoretical and mathematical models of how humans 
process information. During the 1970s and 1980s, the digital computer served as 
the metaphor for conceptualizing how humans process information. Using 
complex objects in the environment as metaphors for our minds is common 
practice in the sciences (Jaynes, 1990). The historian of psychology David Leary 
(1990) argues that metaphors serve a directive function in that different 
metaphors can direct researchers to see different things in the same 
phenomenon. For instance, both Rene Descartes and Sigmund Freud used 
hydraulic metaphors to portray various functions of the mind. In the post-World 
War II era, the digital computer served this metaphorical function. David 
Rumelhart (1998), co-founder of the Institute of Cognitive Science as UCSD, 
exclaimed that the computer “has been a valuable source of metaphors through 
which we have come to understand and appreciate how mental activities might 
arise out of the operations of simple-component processing elements” (p. 207). 
Accompanying this metaphor, terms related to computers and information 
processing such as parallel distributed processing, neural networks, expert
116
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
systems, channel capacity, coding, and connectionism became part of the 
vocabulary of cognitive psychologists and psychologists in general.
With the computer-as-mind metaphor, cognitive scientists created two 
types of models for understanding human information processing (Dawson,
1998). The first, which served as the dominant model during the 1970s, was the 
classical or symbolic model of human information processing. From the classical 
perspective, all of our cognitive abilities occur via a systematic process that is 
similar to the processing carried out by digital computers. The steps in cognitive 
processing occur in serial order, with each step occurring logically before the 
next step in the same way a digital computer carries out tasks. The most well 
known example of the classical model is the Turing Machine described above.
The second model of human information processing is the connectionist 
network, also known as parallel distributed processing networks (e.g., McClelland 
& Rumelhart, 1981). Connectionist models came into prominence during the 
1980s and 1990s. Cognitive scientists who espouse this model of information 
processing believe that the correct way to model our brains is through an 
interconnected network of nodes. There are four defining features of 
connectionist networks (Schneider, 1987). First, all information processing occurs 
as a result of these simple nodes and their interconnections. These nodes can be 
in one of two states at any given time: on (excited) or off (inhibited).33 Second, 
there is an assignment of weighted values for the connections between nodes. 
Knowledge is stored in the weighted connections between nodes. Third, the
33 Some newer models break away from this dichotomy and indicate gradients of excitation for 
these nodes.
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behavior of any particular node in the network is contingent upon the inputs to 
that node and the subsequent transformation of these inputs into new information. 
Information input causes certain nodes to activate and these nodes in turn either 
activate or inhibit other nodes. Lastly, learning involves changing the connections 
between the nodes in the network via feed forward and back propagation 
processes. Frank Rosenblatt’s (1958) one-layer perceptron model is an early 
version of a connectionist network and, more recently, other cognitive scientists 
(e.g., Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) have produced multi-layer perceptron 
models (see Figure 1).
Cognitive psychologists were already using many of the methods used by 
cognitive scientists such as mathematical modeling, measuring reaction times 
and analyzing psychophysical data. It is safe to say that most psychologists were 
familiar with these types of practices as they were appearing in widely read 
psychological journals. One of the difficulties and criticisms leveled at cognitive 
scientists using these methods was that they could not actually examine the 
thinking processes of individuals (Ericsson, 1998). Instead, cognitive scientists 
had to rely on behavioral data to infer what was going on in the unobservable 
brain.
A group of methods that psychologists did have to contend with in the 
1980s and 1990s were brain imaging techniques brought into the discipline from 
neuroscientists. Brain imaging techniques such as fMRI scans, allowed cognitive 
scientists to “look inside the mind” of their participants. These scientists could 
duplicate three dimensional images of the brain and map out the various
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Figure 1. Reconstruction of a multi-layer perceptron with feed forward, partial 
connectivity. The circles represent nodes in the perceptron. The directional 
arrows indicate the direction of information flow and nodal connectivity. The 
perceptron contains three layers with connectivity between successive layers. 
The directional arrows represent weighted connections between nodes. The 
input layer receives information from the environment and transforms this 
information into a representation of this information. Depending on a node’s level 
of excitation or inhibition, it will transmit its information to connected nodes in the 
hidden layer. The hidden layer carries out further processing and then sends this 
information to the output layer. The information in the output layer represents a 
response to the initial information. In a massively parallel model, all nodes in 
every layer connect via bidirectional arrows indicating feed forward and back 
propagation processes.
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structures involved in tasks such as language comprehension, problem-solving, 
and object identification. Another advantage of these techniques was that 
neuroscientists could compare “healthy” brains with those from individuals 
suffering from a particular brain abnormality such as Broca’s aphasia and 
prosopagnosia. These techniques were not only a boon for cognitive scientists 
but they served as a powerful inscription device that promoted their ideas. I 
discuss brain imaging as an inscription device below.
Material Practices 
The primary use of computers as a technological tool in psychology is for 
collecting and analyzing data derived from humans and other species. Software 
programs such as SPSS, SAS, and Minitab are mainstays in modern 
psychological data analysis. These programs allow psychologists to analyze 
quickly and efficiently large amounts of data. Psychologists also use human- 
computer interfaces to conduct research and manipulate variables, as was the 
case with evolutionary psychologists using various software programs to 
manipulate body type and facial feature images.
Cognitive scientists introduced psychologists to a new technological use 
for computers—developing computers and computer programs to emulate 
human thought processes. This is a radical shift from traditional psychological 
research. With the use of computers and computer programs, cognitive scientists 
extended the realm of investigating human mind, behavior, and emotion from 
organic, sentient life to inorganic machines.
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Earlier I mentioned attempts by artificial intelligence researchers to 
develop programs for cognitive processes such as Newell and Simon’s General 
Logic Theorist. Another example is computer scientist Edward Feigenbaum and 
colleagues’ (1971) DENDRAL program, which was used to identify organic 
compounds. As a test of the program’s efficacy, Feigenbaum presented 
DENDRAL with mass spectrograph data on particular organic compounds. 
DENDRAL was to gather data about the molecular structure of these organic 
compounds and then generate a list of all potential organic compounds for the 
given data. DENDRAL was as successful at correctly identifying the organic 
compounds as expert chemists (Gardner, 1985). In 1970, Terry Winograd 
developed a program called SHRDLU. Part of the program was a virtual world in 
which SHRDLU could act. In the “world” were basic, colored geometric shapes in 
various configurations. One of the remarkable aspects of this program was that 
one could type in instructions for SHRDLU to carry out in this virtual world. For 
instance, one could ask SHRDLU something like, “Place the blue triangle on top 
of the red square.” SHRDLU would interpret these written commands and carry 
out the given tasks in this virtual world. The advance from Newel and Simon’s 
work to Winograd’s indicates the notable achievements of artificial intelligence 
researchers in a relatively short time and is an indication that many cognitive 
scientists believed they were on the right track towards understanding human 
information processing.
These programs represent a few of the initial attempts at artificial 
intelligence. But these programs could only perform a few specified tasks quickly
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and efficiently. While these expert systems—programs that can only execute a 
few tasks such as playing chess or proving theorems—performed their tasks well 
and provided insight into a few human problem-solving strategies, they were 
severely limited as representations of human cognition. Humans take on a 
variety of cognitive tasks in parallel and do them with relative ease. Additionally, 
cognitive scientists largely ignored attempts at simulating motivational and 
emotional capacities or the relations between these two and other cognitive 
processes (Simon, 1979).
The challenge then to artificial intelligence researchers was to design a 
program that emulated the versatility and variety of human cognitive abilities in 
addition to motivational and emotional capabilities. One of the more recent and 
advanced forms of artificial intelligence is COG, a form of artificial intelligence 
created at the artificial intelligence laboratories at MIT. COG is being equipped 
with visual, proprioceptive, and other sensory capacities for the purposes of 
understanding our thought, feelings, and behaviors. Rodney Brooks, the 
developer of COG, believes that in order to develop a truly artificial intelligence; 
one must build it with the same physical and mental characteristics of humans. 
COG represents a form of material practice whose use is not to speed up the 
process of data analysis, or make complex calculations easier, or record 
psychological data, but to be something like us.
Social Practices
One of the social practices that helped the relationship between cognitive 
science and psychology was cognitive scientists’ ability to obtain large amounts
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of funding for their projects. In the mid-1970s on through to the mid-1980s, many 
cognitive scientists convinced the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation to contribute 
approximately twenty million dollars to all areas of cognitive science research 
(Gardner, 1985). Cognitive scientists used much of this money to create 
cognitive science research centers at the numerous colleges and universities 
mentioned above. As the Sloan initiatives came to an end, the System 
Development Foundation (SDF) became involved in funding cognitive science 
research, investing twenty-six million dollars from 1982 to 1984 (Bechtel et al.,
1999). The biggest single contribution of the SDF went to the Center for the 
Study of Language and Information at Stanford University. This Center fostered 
research relationships in the areas of linguistics, computer science, and 
reasoning between faculty at Stanford and research organizations such as the 
Palo Alto Research Center (formerly Xerox-Parc). Additional funding during the 
1980s came from various sources such as the Office of Naval Research, the Air 
Force Office of Scientific Research, and the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
(Schneider, 1987). The National Science Foundation, in particular, was important 
to cognitive science research. When the Sloan initiatives and SDF funds stopped, 
the NSF continued to fund these large research centers.
In the 1970s, the following new journals appeared: Cognitive Psychology 
(1970), Cognition (1972), Memory & Cognition (1973), and the Journal of Mental 
Imagery (1977). Cognitive scientists began issuing Cognitive Science: A 
Multidisciplinary Journal of Artificial Intelligence, Psychology, and Language in 
1977. Other journals followed such as Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 1978
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and Cognition and Brain Theory in 1981. Two years later, cognitive scientists 
formed the Cognitive Science Society (CSS). The Society held its first 
conference in 1979 at the University of California, San Diego sponsored by the 
university’s Program in Cognitive Science and funded by the Sloan Foundation.
In 1980, Cognitive Science became the official journal of the CSS and the journal 
broadened its scope to include contributions from developmental psychology, 
philosophy, and cognitive anthropology (Collins, 1980). In 1985, Cognitive 
Science merged with Cognition and Brain Theory, which resulted in more 
contributions by philosophers and neuroscientists (Schunn, Crowley, & Okada, 
1998). By 1997, the subtitle of Cognitive Science changed to “A Multidisciplinary 
Journal of Anthropology, Artificial Intelligence, Education, Linguistics, 
Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology.”
Undergraduate and graduate classes in cognitive science became 
common in colleges and universities. In 1985, Vassar College held a conference 
with approximately fifty colleges and universities concerned with implementing 
cognitive science into the undergraduate curriculum (Gardner, 1985). Michael 
Dawson (1998) estimates that by 1995 colleges and universities developed 
approximately two hundred cognitive science programs around the world. Many 
of these centers and programs acted independently of psychology departments. 
In some cases, cognitive psychologists kept their original disciplinary affiliation 
but began working in cognitive science centers. In other cases, psychology 
departments dissolved to make way for the development of cognitive science 
centers (Hirst, 1988).
124
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Like my other case studies, cognitive scientists claimed their field as a 
revolution or paradigm shift for psychological science. These claims served the 
rhetorical function of persuading others of their expert and authoritative status in 
the field of human mind and behavior. The historian of psychology Thomas 
Leahey (1992) contented that, “Belief in a cognitive revolution is an entrenched 
part of modern psychology’s form of life” (p. 313). Their claims of a revolutionary 
field rode the coattails of the general cognitive and mentalist perspectives that 
had supposedly ousted the behaviorist perspective prevalent in psychology at the 
time. For instance, a statement by a number of cognitive scientists to the 
Research Briefing Panel on Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence claimed 
that cognitive science was “advancing our understanding of the nature of mind 
and the nature of intelligence on a scale that is proving revolutionary” (Estes et 
al., 1983, p. 21). Roger Sperry (1993) proclaimed that “by 1971 it was already 
clear that many psychologists had come to recognize that their discipline was in 
the process of a major paradigm shift, in which behaviorism was being replaced 
by an opposing new mentalism or cognitivism” (p. 881).
Bernard Baars (1986) is perhaps the most articulate individual regarding 
the putative revolutionary nature of these ideas. Baars calls it a “quiet revolution 
in thought” in which “the dominant meta-theory of the previous 50 years 
[behaviorism] was discarded or changed fundamentally, and a new point of view 
began to take shape” (p. 4). Baars breaks the cognitive revolution into three 
stages. A group of scientists characterizes each stage. Those scientists initially 
trained as behaviorists who subsequently changed to cognitivism, Baars
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characterizes as “adapters.” The adapters were able to break away from the 
traditional behaviorist perspective after realizing the anomalies caused by this 
perspective. Examples of Baars’ adapters are the aforementioned George Miller, 
James Jenkins, who studied language acquisition, and George Mandler, whose 
research focused on memory and emotions. The “persuaders” constitute the 
second stage in Baars’ model. The persuaders’ role was to change the 
psychological community’s perspective from behaviorism to cognitivism. Baars 
claims Ulric Neisser as an exemplar of a persuader due to his influential textbook 
on cognitive psychology. The “nucleators” comprise the final stage. The 
nucleators came from outside psychology but provided assistance in bringing 
about the revolution via new techniques and ideas from other disciplines. Baars 
considers individuals like Noam Chomsky, Herbert Simon, and Jerry Fodor, the 
philosopher of mind, as nucleators.
The inclusion of neuroscientists and their brain imaging studies in 
cognitive science provided another social practice to which psychologists had to 
attend. In the Social Science Citation Index from 1980 to 1996 publications of 
brain imaging studies ran into the thousands, increased to almost 350 in 1996, 
and the rate was doubling every 18-24 months (Fox, 1997). Brain imaging 
“powerfully redefines concepts like behavior, nurture, culture and environment” 
(Beaulieu, 2003, p. 563). I mentioned previously that one of the major criticisms 
of the cognitive approach was the need to infer mental events. The introduction 
of brain imaging helped alleviate this critique and created a powerful inscription 
device for cognitive scientists. These images or mappings of the brain redefined
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concepts like “behavior” and “culture” and recast them in biological terms, 
specifically through the ability to view spatial patterns in the brain. Cognitive 
scientists displayed these spatial patterns in their publications, bringing credibility 
to their research. They were able to propose theories about cognitive processes 
such as memory and intelligence in addition to providing a visual display of 
where in the brain these processes took place. Similarly, cognitive scientists 
could create pictorial images of the structural differences between “healthy” and 
“pathological” brains. Brain images formed powerful “visual arguments” about the 
nature of cognitive processes and helped to promote cognitive scientists as 
authorities in the field of cognition (Dumit, 2004). The 1990s reflected the 
popularity and perceived importance of these kinds of brain studies. The 1990s 
were proclaimed the “Decade of the Brain” by President George H. Bush. The 
Library of Congress and the National Institute of Mental Health collaborated to 
bring this message to the public through conferences and other forms of media.
Given these numerous conceptual, material, and social practices, it is 
important to examine psychologists’ reactions to these practices. The next 
section outlines the resistances and accommodations psychologists made to the 
claims of cognitive scientists.
Resistances to Cognitive Science 
Resistances to the practices of cognitive scientists came mainly from 
behaviorists. Their primary contention pertained to cognitive scientists’ focus on 
mental events. As I described earlier, with the exception of radical behaviorists 
(e.g., John B. Watson, B. F. Skinner), most neobehaviorists (e.g., Tolman, Hull)
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did not deny the existence of mental events. Instead, they tended to relegate 
these events as either impossible to study empirically or as intermediary between 
the more important environmental and human action variables. Behaviorists 
found this to be the major weakness of cognitive approaches. The behaviorists 
argued that even if mental events such as concept formation and representations 
of stimuli exist, these events were unobservable. There was no place for the 
study of mental events in a truly scientific psychology.
The most public resistance to cognitive science came from psychologist B. 
F. Skinner, whose behaviorist theory of operant conditioning stood in direct 
opposition to the tenets of cognitive science. Skinner’s resistances make sense 
in light of the boundary-work framework. He created a theory that was 
recognizably antithetical to cognitive science, yet Skinner was arguably the most 
well-known psychologist of the twentieth century (Rutherford, 2000). Skinner 
derived much attention with his operant conditioning research and with this 
attention came epistemic authority and expert status. Skinner developed enough 
expert status that he felt confident to write about issues such as improving 
society and the elimination of free will through operant conditioning and behavior 
modification (e.g., Skinner, 1971, 1976). He had a personal stake in defending 
his intellectual territory, as did those professionals trained in behaviorist doctrine 
for years.
Skinner (1986), for instance, attacked those who espoused a cognitive 
perspective because they “invent internal surrogates, which become the subject 
of their science” (p. 79). Elsewhere, Skinner (1985) outlined five major reasons
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why psychologists should not adopt a cognitive science perspective. First, he 
believed cognitive scientists’ use of the metaphor of storage was inappropriate 
because he believed people did not store representation of experiences in their 
minds. Second, as the above quote illustrates, he felt that speculation of internal 
processes was a mistake, as no one could directly observe these processes. 
Third, Skinner accused cognitive scientists of “emasculating the experimental 
analysis of behavior” with their focus on descriptions of environments instead of 
the actual environment and reports of intentions rather than behaviors. Fourth, he 
believed it a mistake to rely on states of mind as a cause of behavior rather than 
as side effects of the true causes of behavior. Finally, Skinner objected to the 
“relaxing standards of definition and logical thinking,” resulting in a “flood of 
speculation” that was “inimical to science” (p. 300).
Behaviorists had another reason to resist the practices of cognitive 
scientists. Most behaviorists used laboratory animals for their experimentation. 
Essentially, the data they obtained to verify their theories pertaining to human 
behavior were products of animal models. According to historian of science 
Hunter Crowther-Heyck (1999), “The study of rats in T mazes or pigeons in 
Skinner boxes was the paradigmatic experiment. The study of human behavior 
was not wholly neglected by behaviorists...but even when human behavior was 
the subject of study it was generally the ‘animal’ aspects of humanity, rather than 
the ‘higher qualities,’ such as language, that were examined” (p. 47). Cognitive
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scientists, on the other hand, used humans and computers as their data sources, 
but most found little use for nonhuman species in their research.34
Some psychologists also resisted cognitive scientists’ reliance on artificial 
intelligence and the computer metaphor as models for human information 
processing.35 Skinner resisted the use of artificial intelligence, believing it offered 
no new insight into human behavior. In an article explaining why psychology had 
yet to become a science of behavior, Skinner (1987) questioned the need for 
cognitive scientists’ reliance on artificial intelligence stating, “If an artificial 
organism can be designed to do what logicians and mathematicians do, or even 
more than they have ever done, it will be the best evidence we have that intuitive 
mathematical and logical thinking is only following rules, no matter how obscure. 
And following rules is behaving” (p. 784). The cognitive psychologist and 
historian Christopher Green (2001) brought into question the viability of using 
connectionist networks as models for neural processes. He argued that 
individuals applying these networks are vague in terms of what these networks 
supposedly model because “Despite some superficial similarities, the way in 
which connectionist networks are constructed appears to violate some basic 
facts on neural function” (p 104). One possibility for psychologists’ resistances to 
artificial intelligence and computer modeling was the threat posed by these
34 I should note that cognitive ethologists use nonhuman species in their research on animal 
minds (e.g., Bekoff, 1998; Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
35 Many philosophers connected to cognitive science have engaged in the debate on the 
computer metaphor and artificial intelligence (e.g., Dennett, 1998; Hardcastle, 1995; Haugeland, 
1981; Horst, 1996; Searle, 1980). Also see mathematician Roger Penrose’s (1994) Shadows of 
the Mind for an exposition of the different levels of belief (i.e., strong artificial intelligence, weak 
artificial intelligence) in artificial intelligence.
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endeavors. This perceived threat may not be a consequence of psychologists 
giving up some kind of expert status, but rather a more general threat to human 
nature. Humans have always perceived themselves as the pinnacle of intelligent 
life. The resistance to artificial intelligence research may be a reaction to the 
threat that, in principle, something could be as intelligent as humans could.
Another resistance came from those psychologists who felt that 
neuroscience and brain imaging would somehow damage the field. Some felt 
that the increased use of brain imaging technology might lead to erasing the 
“individual” from psychological research (Beaulieu, 2003). Images from PET 
scans, for instance, require averaging and renormalizing data over many 
subjects. These brain images remove the unique structural features of each 
individual’s brain. Given the inherent complexity of the brain, these images may 
provide the wrong impression about brain structure and the localization of 
function. Additionally, demonstrating the location of a particular structure and 
correlating it with a particular function answers the questions of where and what 
but does not get at the question of how people carry out processes such as 
memory and problem solving. Some (e.g., Goertzel, 1995; Paller, 1995) criticized 
the materialist assumptions behind the growing popularity of brain imaging. 
Finally, others were concerned with the increasing reliance on neuroscience for 
explanations of human mind and behavior. For instance, Skinner (1987) believed 
that cognitive scientists may put themselves out of a job due to their reliance on 
neuroscience. He stated, “Once you tell the world that another science will
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explain what your key terms really mean, you must forgive the world if it decides 
that the other science is doing the important work” (p. 784).
Accommodations to Cognitive Science 
There are several instances of psychologists making accommodations for 
cognitive science. One measure of psychologists’ accommodations for cognitive 
science is the number of citations attributed to cognitive science in psychology. 
Were psychologists using the literature of cognitive science more than the 
literature of, say, behaviorism? A citation analysis comparing cognitive 
psychology and behaviorism literature indicates the increasing number of 
citations pertaining to cognitive topics in flagship journals (American Psychologist, 
Annual Review of Psychology, Psychological Bulletin, Psychological Review) 
from 1977 to 1996 as compared with citations of behaviorist topics (Robins, 
Gosling, & Craik, 1999). During this twenty year span, there appeared to be a 
ubiquity of cognitive approaches to understanding a variety of phenomena in 
psychology’s various subdisciplines including social psychology (e.g., Fiske & 
Haslam, 1996), personality (e.g., Matthews, Derryberry, & Siegle, 2000), 
educational psychology (e.g., Glaser, 2000), developmental psychology (e.g., 
Carey, 1990), and clinical psychology (e.g., Stein & Young, 1992). Previously, I 
mentioned the number of journals pertaining to cognition that came out during 
the 1970s such as Cognition, Cognitive Psychology, and Memory & Cognition.
In terms of pedagogical accommodations, cognitive psychology courses 
became part of the curriculum at most colleges and universities. Some 
institutions offered courses, and undergraduate and graduate specializations in
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cognitive science through their psychology departments (e.g., Carnegie Mellon 
University, University of Pittsburgh) instead of in separate centers or institutes. 
Some introductory textbooks began covering cognitive science, albeit sparingly. 
But there was usually ample coverage of cognitive psychology (e.g., Gleitman et 
al., 1999; Gray, 1999). Cognitive psychology textbook authors, of course, 
devoted space to the history of cognitive science, in addition to topics such as 
artificial intelligence, linguistics, and connectionist networks (e.g., Anderson,
2005; Galotti, 2004; Martindale, 1991). Publication began on many textbooks for 
undergraduate and graduates students in cognitive science (e.g., Collins & Smith, 
1988; Johnson-Laird, 1988; Posner, 1993; e.g., Thagard, 1996).36 Along with the 
inclusion of the topic of cognitive science in some psychology textbooks, PET 
images, CT scans, and fMRI brain images served as picture covers for many of 
psychology’s textbooks (Beaulieu, 2002).
Similar to evolutionary psychology there is no division of cognitive science 
within the American Psychological Association, but this may pertain to cognitive 
science’s interdisciplinary nature. Most people aligned with cognitive science can 
be members of the APA’s experimental psychology division (Division 3), the 
Psychonomic Society, the American Psychological Society, and the Association 
for the Scientific Study of Consciousness. So there are a number of professional 
organizations for those who consider themselves cognitive scientists within the 
discipline.
36 While interdisciplinary in nature, most of these cognitive science textbooks primarily focus on 
information processing from a psychological perspective rather than perspectives from linguistics, 
artificial intelligence, computer science, or philosophy of mind.
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Did psychologists accommodate cognitive science enough for one to 
consider cognitive science a scientific revolution or paradigm shift in psychology? 
Certainly, one of the social practices of many cognitive scientists was to 
pronounce the field as such and they introduced a number of conceptual and 
material practices into the field. Examining the status of cognitive science as a 
paradigm, historian of psychology Thomas Leahey (1987) answers in the 
negative stating, “Cognitive scientists believe in a revolution because it provides 
them with an origin myth, an account of their beginnings that helps legitimize 
their practice or science...But there was no revolution...The cognitive revolution 
was an illusion” (p. 456). Murray White’s (1985) analysis of cognitive psychology 
textbooks mentioned in Chapter 2 concurs with Leahey’s assessment. White’s 
analysis indicated little agreement among textbook authors about important ideas 
and concepts within cognitive psychology. The computer-as-mind metaphor 
served as a useful heuristic for developing models of information processing, but 
few psychologists outside the study of cognition use it with any regularity. There 
was also the question of the extent of cognitive scientists’ actual knowledge of 
human mind and behavior. For instance, cognitive scientist Donald Norman 
(1980) admits that he is “struck by how little is known about so much of 
cognition...I have studied memory for years, yet am unable to answer even 
simple questions about the use of memory” (p. 8). In order to remedy this 
deficiency, Norman urged cognitive scientists to incorporate social, cultural, and 
emotional perspectives into their work. Finally, behaviorism, the alleged usurped 
paradigm, never entirely disappeared with the advent of cognitive science.
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Behaviorists still conducted and published stimulus-response and reinforcement 
theory research throughout cognitive scientists’ involvement in psychology. While 
it is safe to say that cognitive science achieved some degree of respect within 
the discipline of psychology between the 1970s and 2000, it did not provide a 
new paradigm for psychology.
In summary, the relationship between the interdisciplinary program of 
cognitive science and the discipline of psychology is still evolving. As computing 
technology advances at an exponential rate, advanced forms of artificial 
intelligence are possible. This leads to the possibility of new, sophisticated 
models of human information processing that may affect the boundaries of 
psychology. As Howard Gardner (1992) suggested, sometime in the future 
cognitive science may absorb most of the topics and personnel in psychology, 
leaving the remaining psychologists just a few issues to deal with such as 
therapy and motivation. Until then, psychologists will need to continue their 
boundary-work efforts of resistance and accommodation with the conceptual, 
material, and social practices of cognitive science.
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CHAPTER V
THE SELF-ORGANIZING MIND: CHAOS THEORY
Of my three case studies, chaos theory is perhaps the most unorthodox 
interdisciplinary program to have prompted psychologists to engage in boundary- 
work in the period between 1970 and 2000. Its connection and relevance to 
psychology is not as apparent as that of evolutionary psychology and cognitive 
science. Evolutionary psychologists conduct research on the adaptive 
mechanisms that helped humans survive and reproduce during the Pleistocene 
age and on how these mechanisms play a role in our cognitive and behavioral 
skills today. Cognitive scientists investigate human and machine information 
processing systems and attempt to develop models of these processes in order 
to gain an understanding of cognitive skills such as memory, language, decision 
making, and problem solving. But “chaos” is an unusual and evocative term that 
conjures up images of disorder and randomness. The Oxford English Dictionary 
(OED) defines chaos in a number of different ways such as a “gaping void, “utter 
confusion and disorder,” and “a confused mass or mixture.” These definitions of 
chaos seem paradoxical to the goals and general interests of psychologists. 
Psychologists are usually concerned with finding regularities in or prescribing 
order to psychological phenomena. For instance, personality psychologists
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attempt to create order in personality typologies by grouping people according to 
categories such as “extroversion,” “conscientiousness,” and “neuroticism.”
Clinical psychologists rely on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (1994) as a taxonomy for the various psychological disorders. 
Physiological psychologists attempt to find order between brain structure and 
brain function. So a theory pertaining to chaotic phenomena appears to be at 
odds with the general philosophical perspective within the discipline of 
psychology. But in 1997, the OED added another definition to its list on chaos, 
one that provides a different viewpoint on this common word: “The behaviour of a 
system which is governed by deterministic laws but is so unpredictable as to 
appear random.” Even though this definition derives from the fields of 
mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology, the idea that deterministic 
behavior is often unpredictable resonates with the complexity and often 
unpredictable nature of human mind and behavior. It is this idea that a small 
number of psychologists found favorable and attempted to use to reinterpret 
numerous psychological phenomena beginning in the middle 1980s.
Outline of Chaos Theory 
Chaos theory is a group of experimental techniques, mathematical tools, 
and theoretical models pertaining to how dissipative, nonlinear dynamic systems 
produce this complex order as they change over time. Many scientists from fields 
such as physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology, ecology, and meteorology 
began developing chaos theory in the middle 1970s to understand chaotic 
behavior in the dynamic systems apparent in their respective fields. In order to
137
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
begin to understand chaos theory’s relationship to psychology it is first necessary 
to provide a brief outline of the theory. While there are numerous mathematical 
accounts of chaos theory (e.g., Arrowsmith & Place, 1990; Hasselblatt & Katok, 
2003; Peitgen, Jurgens, & Saupe, 1992; Schuster, 1984), most of these accounts 
are directed towards scientists and mathematicians possessing knowledge of 
advanced mathematics. I present a conceptual account that I believe does not 
sacrifice the underlying principles of chaos theory.
Dynamic Systems
Simply, chaos or chaotic behavior is a property of dynamic systems. A 
dynamic system is a set of interrelated and interacting components that change 
over time. Dynamic systems can be composed of molecules, billiard balls, 
chemical compounds, electrical circuitry, mechanical parts, living tissue, and a 
host of other substances. Dynamic systems are ubiquitous in the laboratory and 
in nature; therefore, it is relatively easy to generate some examples. For instance, 
something as simple as a cup of hot coffee is a dynamic system. The molecules 
within the beverage interact with each other in complex ways while at the same 
time the coffee’s “behavior” is constrained by the parameters of the coffee mug.
As the coffee in the mug cools, the molecules on the top of the coffee slow and 
proceed to fall to the bottom of the mug. Conversely, the rapidly moving 
molecules at the bottom of the mug push their way to the top. This convection 
cycle continues until the temperature of the coffee reaches an equilibrium state 
equivalent to the temperature of the environment. A more complex example of a 
dynamic system is the process of human ontogenetic development. The process
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of human development from a fertilized egg, through puberty, and into adulthood 
constitutes a complex interaction of innumerable endogenous and exogenous 
variables. Genetic factors, socioeconomic status, life stressors, nutrition, exercise, 
and quality of education change throughout the ontogenetic process often in 
unexpected and surprising ways.
Conservative and Dissipative Dynamic Systems
There are two kinds of dynamic systems: conservative and dissipative 
(Schuster, 1984). Conservative dynamic systems do not lose energy over time, 
whereas dissipative dynamic systems do lose energy over time (Williams, 1997). 
A model of a “forced” pendulum is an example of a conservative dynamic system. 
Some kind of mechanical device pushes the bob of the pendulum, causing it to 
oscillate from one point to the other and, barring the influence of friction, the bob 
does not lose energy. The forced pendulum model is, of course, an idealized 
dynamic system because it ignores the effects of friction. In fact, there are very 
few truly conservative systems in the real world. A “dampened” pendulum—one 
that loses energy as a result of friction—is an example of a dissipative dynamic 
system. As the bob oscillates, it slowly loses or dissipates energy until it comes 
to a complete stop (see Figure 2). Some conservative and all dissipative dynamic 
systems are nonlinear as opposed to linear dynamic systems.
Linear and Nonlinear Systems
Linear dynamic systems are any systems that map onto a straight line 
using the formula y = mx + b. For instance, a plot of the relationship between two
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Figure 2. Hypothetical time series for a “dampened” pendulum.
140
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
idealized time series variables such as years in a company and earnings is a 
linear dynamic system. This system is dynamic because employee earnings 
increase as a function of the number of years of employment. Linear dynamic 
systems, consisting of two or more variables, are often modeled using solvable 
difference or differential equations that describe the behavior of the entire 
system.37 Difference and differential equations may describe the behavior of 
nonlinear dynamic systems as well, but these systems do not plot as a straight 
line and sometimes are not solvable. A simple equation—though not a difference 
or differential equation—for demonstrating a nonlinear dynamic system is 
Equation 1:
xf+i = 1 .9 -x f2 (1)
In this equation, xt is an arbitrary value at time 1 and xt+1 reiterates into the 
equation as a new value for x at time 2. The “forced” pendulum example is a 
relatively simple example of a conservative, nonlinear dynamic system. Plotting 
the position of the forced pendulum as a function of time produces a line of 
consistent peaks and valleys (see Figure 3). Barring any external perturbations, 
one can perfectly predict the position or the state of the pendulum at any given 
time. Other dynamic systems prevent perfect prediction due to their inherent
37 Difference equations are used to model variables that are discrete (i.e., restricted to integer 
values such as time in years), while differential equations are used to model variables that are 
continuous (i.e., values can take on any number such as the case of the swinging pendulum).
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Figure 3. Hypothetical time series of a “forced” pendulum.
142
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
complexity and these are usually dissipative, nonlinear dynamic systems. A 
common cause of this complexity is the number of variables in the system. This 
is the case with human ontogenesis. The complexity arises from the number of 
variables and their interactions, making predictions about the behavior of the 
system difficult if not impossible. For instance, given an infant’s birth weight and 
an almost infinite supply of data about the infant’s current state, it would be 
exceedingly difficult to predict perfectly the height or weight of that infant at age 1 
or 2 and even more unlikely when the infant was 21 years old.
Some, but not all, nonlinear systems exhibit chaotic behavior, that is, 
seemingly random behavior that, depending on the mode of analysis, reveals a 
hidden complex order. The phenomenon of chaotic behavior is only evident in 
dissipative, nonlinear dynamic systems, so the remainder of my discussion 
focuses exclusively on these types of systems.
Chaotic Nonlinear Systems
Dissipative, nonlinear dynamic systems are common in the real world. 
Outside of scientists’ laboratories, it is the case that most systems interact with 
their environments in complex and often unpredictable ways, which leads to 
chaotic behavior. These systems exist at all levels of representation, from the 
molecular level to the planetary level. Chaotic systems exhibit a behavior called 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions, also known as the “butterfly effect” 
(Lorenz, 1963).38 This behavior indicates that a system is sensitive to tiny
38 A common example to illustrate the butterfly effect is the idea that a butterfly flapping its wings 
in Texas, in principle, could cause a tornado in Japan.
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perturbations that could, but do not always, significantly affect the behavior of 
that system. Because it is difficult to measure the initial states of a system with 
absolute certainty, sensitive dependence makes perfect prediction exceedingly 
difficult. Take, for instance, two drops of water that are extremely close together 
at the top of a waterfall. Even though physicists may know the precise equations 
of motion for fluids, and the effects of gravity and friction for these droplets, 
predicting where they will land at the bottom of a waterfall with any degree of 
precision is virtually impossible. One seemingly irrelevant change in the position 
of one of the droplets results in changing the measurement in position of the 
droplet. This change radically affects the outcome of where that particular water 
droplet will land. In fact, even if the droplets began infinitely close to each other, 
the effects of innumerable variables would cause a radical divergence in their 
positions at the bottom of the waterfall. Physicists and engineers have to deal 
with sensitive dependence on initial conditions as they attempt to explain 
phenomena such as turbulence in fluids and aerodynamics.
As a chaotic system changes over time, it reaches bifurcation points that 
indicate potential qualitative changes in the system’s behavior (see Figure 4). 
Through a series of bifurcations, a chaotic system settles into a particular 
configuration of behavior known as an attractor. Attractors come in three 
categories: fixed point, limit cycle, and strange (Abraham & Shaw, 1983). Fixed 
point attractors characterize behaviors that have reached equilibrium. For 
instance, when dropping a tiny iron ball down a funnel, the ball will roll around the
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Figure 4. Bifurcation diagram illustrating the potential qualitative shifts in a given 
system using every parameter for a reiterative equation. For parameter values R 
= 2 through 3, the system exhibits a series of fixed point attractors. At R = 3, the 
system oscillates between two potential states. Before R = 3.5 the system 
bifurcates again and oscillates between 4 potential states. After R = 3.5 the 
system becomes chaotic and never repeats the same value twice. (Adapted from 
a bifurcation diagram courtesy of Clint Sprott, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
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funnel until it reaches its fixed point attractor—the resting state at the bottom of 
the funnel. Limit cycle attractors occur when a system oscillates between two or 
more states. This behavior is evident in the previous example of a forced 
pendulum where the bob of the pendulum comes to rest briefly in one state, then, 
after the pendulum is forced, moves to its second resting state. Strange 
attractors describe a system’s behavior when it settles into a particular behavioral 
configuration that does not change beyond certain parameters. Within these 
parameters, however, the system never repeats the same behavior twice. While 
the system’s behavior may appear random, the system is actually demonstrating 
a complex order. This is one of the behaviors most characteristic of chaotic 
systems and can be found in systems such as weather patterns (Lorenz, 1963), 
solid mechanics (Moon, 1991), circuit boards (Lesurf, 1991), epilepsy 
(Babloyantz & Destexhe, 1986), and heart beat arrhythmias (Glass, Goldberger,
& Courtemanche, 1987).
One way of identifying the type of attractor a system exhibits is through an 
analysis of its phase space portrait. Phase space is a multidimensional graphical 
representation of a system’s behavior over time. The dimensions most often 
illustrated in phase space portraits are the X and Y coordinates and time. Phase 
space portraits work similarly to a traditional Cartesian grid in that a particular 
location in the portrait defines the state of a system. Instead of points in 
Cartesian space, phase space portraits outline the trajectories of systems. For a 
system exhibiting a fixed point attractor like a “dampened” pendulum or an iron 
ball rolling around in a funnel (see Figure 5), the phase space
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X
Figure 5. Phase space portrait of a fixed point attractor. The curved arrows 
indicate trajectory direction. This image corresponds to the time series of the 
“dampened” pendulum in Figure 1.
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trajectory would look like an ever decreasing spiral that would signify the loss of 
energy of the pendulum over time. A phase space portrait of a limit cycle attractor 
such as a forced pendulum would map out to a circle or a series of circles to 
indicate the perpetual and repetitive behavior of the pendulum (see Figure 6).
One half of the circle signifies the pendulum’s trajectory from left to right; the 
other half of the circle signifies the pendulum’s trajectory from right to left.
Strange attractors can take on many different forms in phase space. As I 
mentioned earlier, strange attractors show a complex order. One can tell the 
difference between random behavior and this kind of attractor in that random 
behavior fills the entire phase space portrait whereas strange attractors fill only 
specific portions of phase space. Perhaps the most common strange attractor 
shape is the Lorenz attractor (see Figure 7).
One of the characteristics of strange attractors is that they exhibit fractal 
properties (Mandelbrot, 1967). Fractals are geometric shapes whose spatial 
dimensions are fractions (see Figure 8). Instead of being one-dimensional or two- 
dimensional, fractals have dimensions of, say, 2.3 or 1.5 (Goerner, 1994).
Fractals display self-similarity, meaning a fractal’s geometrical structure at all 
scales of measurement will be similar. The Koch snowflake in Figure 8 
demonstrates this self-similar scaling property. Irrespective of the scale, the 
same shape will be evident: a triangle.
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YX
Figure 6. Phase space portrait of a limit cycle attractor. The curved arrows 
indicate trajectory direction. This image corresponds to the time series of the 
“forced” pendulum in Figure 2.
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YX
Figure 7. Phase space portrait of a strange attractor. This figure represents the 
Lorenz attractor. Note that even though its trajectory is unusual compared with 
the trajectories of the fixed point and limit cycle attractors in Figures 4 and 5, it 
only fills up a certain region of phase space. (Image of Lorenz attractor courtesy 
of Clint Sprott, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
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Figure 8. The Koch snowflake. One creates the Koch snowflake by taking the 
original triangle, reducing its size by one-third, and then placing this reduced 
copy in the middle third of each side of the original triangle, a process called 
affine transformations. In the image above, this iterative process occurs three 
times. (Image courtesy of Clint Sprott, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
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The Koch snowflake is an idealized fractal, but there are abundant examples of 
objects that have fractal properties in nature such as leaves, flowers, broccoli, 
earthquake features, cracks in surfaces like sidewalks, the respiratory system, 
and the nervous system (Peitgen et al., 1992; Williams, 1997). If a strange 
attractor demonstrates fractal properties, its self-similarity suggests an ordered 
pattern and is evidence of chaotic behavior.
Defining Chaos
There are a number of problems with encapsulating chaos theory into an 
easily understood form. As I discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the term 
“chaos” is somewhat misleading because it implies random or stochastic 
behavior even though chaos theorists search for order in the behavior of systems 
within their respective disciplines. Another problem with chaos theory is that 
scientists use it to describe chaotic behavior and to describe nonlinear dynamic 
behavior in general. This leads to ambiguity because not all nonlinear systems 
display chaotic behavior. The term is also problematic because chaos theory is 
resistant to any definitive definition. Confusion arises over chaos theory’s 
definition due to its interdisciplinary scope. Mathematicians want to define it one 
way and physicists another way. The mathematician Ian Stewart (1989) 
discussed the difficulty experienced by the Royal Society of London to define 
chaos theory during a meeting in 1987: “Although everybody present knew what 
they thought ‘chaos’ meant—it was their research field, so they really ought to
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have known—few were willing to offer a precise definition” (p. 17).39 Chaos 
theory is also an umbrella term for a number of interrelated theories and 
concepts that do not sufficiently capture its precise meaning. Other names 
commonly, and sometimes inappropriately, associated with chaos theory include 
complexity theory, self-organization, self-organized criticality, fractal geometry, 
ergodic theory, the edge-of-chaos, and catastrophe theory. Catastrophe theory, 
for instance, is a method for modeling abrupt qualitative shifts—bifurcations—in a 
system’s behavior as a result of small changes in a system’s variables (Brown, 
1995). While dissipative, nonlinear systems exhibit this kind of behavior, it is only 
one of many characteristics of chaos and therefore it is inappropriate to use 
catastrophe theory and chaos theory as equivalent terms.
Despite these difficulties, there are some scientists, mathematicians, and 
philosophers who have proffered definitions of chaos theory that inspired the 
OED definition I provided earlier. In his critical treatise on chaos theory, In The 
Wake of Chaos, the philosopher of science Stephen Kellert (1993) defined chaos 
theory as “the qualitative study on unstable aperiodic behavior in deterministic 
nonlinear dynamical systems” (p.2). The geologists Garnett Williams (1997) 
offered two related definitions: a) the study of “sustained and random-like long­
term evolution that satisfies certain special mathematical criteria and that 
happens in deterministic, nonlinear, dynamical systems” and b) the study of 
“largely unpredictable long-term evolution occurring in a deterministic, nonlinear
39 Stewart dates the meeting as 1986 but according to the Proceedings o f the Royal Society of 
London, the meeting took place between February 4 and 5, 1987 with discussion organized by M. 
V. Berry, I. C. Percival, and N. O. Weiss.
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dynamical system because of sensitivity to initial conditions” (p. 449). According 
to Stewart (1989) the Royal Society succinctly defined it as “stochastic behavior 
in a deterministic system” (p. 17). Considering the similarity of these definitions, it 
appears there is some general agreement on definitions. Nevertheless, the 
ambiguities I outlined above pertaining to the exact nature of this interdisciplinary 
theory were problematic throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. In the next 
section, I provide a brief historical sketch of chaos theory and its uses.
History of Chaos Theory 
The nineteenth century French mathematician Henri Poincare was 
perhaps the first individual to identify and attempt to fully describe chaotic 
behavior mathematically (Barrow-Green, 1997; Diacu & Holmes, 1996). Poincare 
was responding to a nationwide request of scientists made by King Oscar II of 
Sweden to discern if the solar system was stable. To do this, Poincare studied 
the three-body problem of planetary motion, which deals hypothetically with two 
large stationary bodies and one smaller body revolving around the two larger 
bodies. While Poincare was unsuccessful in his attempts to establish if the solar 
system was stable, he identified the complexity inherent in trying to describe the 
behavior of a system with more than two variables (bodies). Poincare discovered 
that miniscule errors in measurement of the smaller bodies’ initial states made 
prediction of its future state problematic—that is, sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions. As the system evolves over time, the trajectory of the smaller body 
becomes complex and difficult to map, a trajectory he appropriately called a 
homoclinic tangle.
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Poincare’s work, however, went largely unnoticed by the scientific and 
mathematical communities. The trajectory of homoclinic tangles was simply too 
complicated to work out by hand for any reasonable length of time. It was not 
until the late 1960s and early 1970s that many scientists from a diverse array of 
fields came to work on similar problems in mathematics and the physical 
sciences (e.g., Lorenz, 1963; Mandelbrot, 1967; May, 1974, 1976). The 
availability of computers assisted greatly in resurrecting Poincare’s work on 
homoclinic tangles. Computers could perform the needed calculations quickly 
and provided visual displays of a system’s complex dynamics, which helped 
scientists and mathematicians visualize how dynamic systems like the three- 
body problem change overtime. The MIT meteorologist Edward Lorenz (1963), 
for example, modeled weather patterns using differential equations on his 
computer and inadvertently rediscovered the aforementioned sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions. He found that seemingly minute rounding errors 
in his computer programs of simulated weather produced radically different 
patterns of weather in the same manner as Poincare’s three-body problem.
Most chaos theorists generally agree that the word “chaos” only became a 
popular term associated with this kind of phenomena after two papers named this 
kind of behavior in systems “chaos.” Robert May (1974), a population biologist 
from Princeton University, published a paper on simple predator-prey models of 
wildlife population growth. May’s work indicated that, depending on parameter 
and initial state values, simple equations that model predatory-prey interactions 
can exhibit stable population values (fixed points), populations that cycle
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between certain values (limit cycles), and chaotic fluctuations of population 
values. Mathematician Tien-Yien Li and physicist James Yorke’s (1975) paper 
“Period Three Implies Chaos” in the American Mathematical Monthly discussed 
similar chaotic behavior using simple equations in a more mathematical style.40 
The take home message of both papers was that simple equations that represent 
processes in nature simulate chaotic behavior. If these equations accurately 
represent processes in nature, then it should not be difficult to find real world 
examples of chaotic phenomena in nature. These papers enjoyed a wide 
readership among scientists from a number of disciplines and the term “chaos” 
caught on as a buzzword for this type of phenomena.
Accompanying the new research developments in chaos during the 1960s 
and 1970s was the emergence of professional meetings on the subject. For 
instance, in 1977 the New York Academy of Sciences recognized chaos theory’s 
impact on the scientific community and sponsored a conference on chaotic 
behavior hosted by mathematician Okan Gurel and physiologist Otto Rossler 
(1979). There were only a few dozen participants at the conference, but they 
included the mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot (see, 1967), who developed the 
idea of fractal geometry, and the aforementioned Robert May and James Yorke. 
The New York Academy of Sciences held a second conference on chaos theory 
two years later. Unlike the first conference, which was relatively small, there were 
hundreds of professionals and graduate students flocking to this one (Gleick,
40 An often overlooked citation from that same year was F. Henin and Ilya Prigogine(1974) paper 
entitled “Entropy, dynamics, and molecular chaos” in the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences.
156
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1987). Chaos theory had caught on as a new way of thinking about various 
phenomena in the physical world and scientists were beginning to clamor for a 
piece of this new research area. Conferences on chaos theory continued 
throughout the 1980s and the topics of presentation became more diverse. For 
instance, the Royal Society of London’s conference in 1987 included papers 
presented by Robert May and colleagues (1987) on chaos in biological 
populations, physiologist Leon Glass and colleagues (1987) on chaotic behavior 
in heartbeats, and physicist Jack Wisdom (1987) on chaos in the solar system. 
Chaos theory was gaining recognition as a legitimate topic of research even if the 
formal definitions about what it was and how to study it were at best ambiguous. 
Chaos theory was moving from the fringe areas of science to the mainstream of 
numerous disciplines.
The late 1970s and early 1980s presented graduate students with 
opportunities to explore phenomena now grouped together under the name 
“chaos.” For example, Doyne Farmer, Robert Shaw, and James Crutchfield, 
graduate students from the University of California, Santa Cruz began 
investigating chaotic behavior in dripping faucets (Crutchfield, Farmer, Packard,
& Shaw, 1986; Shaw, 1984). Graduate student interest prompted universities to 
begin offering classes in nonlinear dynamics, fractal geometry, and chaos theory. 
Similarly, scientists started creating institutes for the study of nonlinear and 
chaotic behavior. The University of Maryland founded the interdisciplinary Chaos 
Group in the middle 1970s. Cornell University started its Chaotic Dynamics 
Laboratory in the late 1970s. In 1980, Los Alamos opened the Center for
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Nonlinear Studies. Others followed suit such as the Santa Fe Institute in 1984 
and the Center for Nonlinear Studies at the University of North Texas in 1994.
With the advent of conferences and places to study, there emerged 
content-specific journals and textbooks pertaining to chaos theory. The journal 
Chaos, from the American Institute of Physics, began publication in 1991. David 
Campbell, a physicist and editor in chief of Chaos, was also the director of the 
Center for Nonlinear Studies at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Technical 
manuals such as Ralph Abraham and Chris Shaw’s (1983) Dynamics: The 
Geometry of Behavior, Robert Devaney’s (1986) An Introduction to Chaotic 
Dynamical Systems, and Benoit Mandelbrot’s (1982) The Fractal Geometry of 
Nature became popular among scientists and students trying to understand the 
ideas and methods of chaos theory.
It was during the middle 1980s that psychologists began seeing the 
possibility of using chaos theory as a way of understanding psychological 
phenomena. Chaos theory found its way into psychology via physiological and 
neuronal investigations in addition to popularized accounts of chaos. 
Physiologists began investigating phenomena such as heart rate variability 
(Goldberger, Bhargava, & West, 1985), physiological control systems (Glass & 
Mackay, 1979; Mackey & Glass, 1977), neurophysiology (Mandell, 1984), and 
brain activity (Babloyantz, Nicolis, & Salazar, 1985). The physiologists analyzed 
physiological time series data obtained from electrocardiogram and 
electroencephalogram output. Researchers in neural networks developed 
nonlinear mathematical models of neural processes (Carpenter & Grossberg,
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1987). It was only a small leap from studying internal processes such as brain 
activity and neural networks to other psychological phenomena.
The 1980s and 1990s also saw the introduction of chaos theory to the lay 
public in the form of popularized books (e.g., Briggs & Peat, 1989; Carpenter & 
Grossberg, 1987; Coveney & Highfield, 1995; Gleick, 1987; Jantsch, 1980; 
Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Stewart, 1989). These popularized accounts 
attempted to bring this esoteric subject to a more general audience. The focus of 
many of these accounts was on the scientists studying chaos rather than on the 
mathematics of chaos theory. The authors of these accounts dramatically 
characterized the individuals studying chaos theory as misunderstood geniuses, 
loners, and rebels that were fighting against the theoretical and philosophical 
dogma inherent in traditional disciplines. For instance in James Gleick’s (1987) 
bestseller, Chaos: Making a New Science, he describes Mitchell Feigenbaum, a 
scientist working in the theoretical division of Los Alamos, this way:
His hair was a ragged mane, sweeping back from his wide brow in the 
style of busts of German composers. His eyes were sudden and 
passionate. When he spoke, always rapidly, he tended to drop articles and 
pronouns in a vaguely European way, even though he was a native of 
Brooklyn. When he worked, he worked obsessively. When he could not 
work, he walked and thought, day or night, and night was best of all. The 
twenty-four hour day seemed too constraining, (p. 2)
These simplified versions were appealing to the general public as well as to 
psychologists. Many psychologists simply lacked the mathematical training
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needed to understand the underpinnings of chaos theory and these accounts 
gave them the illusion of understanding.
Accompanying the glamorized portrayals, these authors hailed chaos 
theory as a new Kuhnian paradigm shift for the sciences that would overthrow 
the putative dominant, reductionistic Newtonian worldview and replace it with a 
theory more conducive to studying holism, change, and complexity. In one of 
these accounts, Fritjof Capra (1996), theoretical physicist, stated, “We are now at 
the beginning of...a fundamental change of worldviews in science and society, a 
change of paradigms as radical as the Copernican revolution” (p. 4). Ralph 
Abraham, a mathematician from the University of California, Santa Cruz, stated 
that chaos theory was “the paradigm shift of paradigm shifts” (from Gleick, 1987). 
Elsewhere, Abraham (1994) called the fervor for this new perspective the “chaos 
revolution” because it had influenced virtually all the physical sciences. In 1989, 
the journal Science devoted a six part series to exploring chaos theory’s uses in 
physiology, epidemiology, meteorology, quantum physics, and population biology. 
The sixth installment in the series discussed the possibility of chaos theory being 
a new paradigm in the sciences. In the discussion, the physicist Joseph Ford 
argued that science was “in the beginning of a major revolution...The whole way 
we see nature will be changed” (in Pool, 1989, p. 26)41 In other media, the 
television show NOVA featured an episode entitled “The Strange New Science of 
Chaos” that was geared towards a general audience and pronounced chaos
41 Others were more skeptical of the merits of chaos theory as a new paradigm. The philosopher 
of science Steven Toulmin contended that while chaos theory brings into question the 
predictability of the world, it has not opened up a new level of behavior for investigation as had 
quantum mechanics and relativity (Pool, 1989).
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theory as a revolution in the sciences (Taylor, 1989). Exemplifying the general 
spread of interest in chaos theory is the best selling novel and subsequent movie 
Jurassic Park in which one of the protagonists was a chaos theorist (Crichton, 
1990). The take-home message of these books appealed to the public and 
psychologists’ “folk knowledge” of the way the world worked and the 
philosophical assumptions scientists used in their research. Essentially, the take- 
home message was this: (1) nature is messy, complex, and often unpredictable, 
(2) nature is unpredictable because it exhibits nonlinear or chaotic behavior, (3) 
systems that display chaotic behavior are constantly evolving and are healthy, 
whereas systems that reach a steady state cease to evolve and perish, (4) the 
reductionism of the Newtonian perspective is inadequate to explain many of 
these “real world” processes, (5) what scientists in a laboratory can demonstrate 
after controlling all extraneous variables is nothing like the complex behavior one 
sees in nature.
With scientists from closely related disciplines such as physiology 
beginning to investigate chaos theory, the glut of popular books on the subject, 
and the rhetoric of a new paradigm coming from individuals in the “hard” 
sciences, some psychologists began to conduct research and write theoretical 
papers on chaos theory’s possible uses for understanding human mind and 
behavior. The reference sections from many works pertaining to chaos theory in 
psychology support my claim that the popular books influenced these 
psychologists (e.g., Blitz, 1992; e.g., Sally Goerner, 1995; Krippner, 1994; Mosca,
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1995; Parry, 1996). In the next section, I describe the kinds of practices 
psychologists incorporated into the discipline that were part of chaos theory.
Conceptual Practices 
Chaos theory provided a wealth of concepts, theories, and methods on 
which psychologists needed to conduct boundary-work between the 1980s and 
2000. Terms such as “fractals,” “bifurcations,” “the butterfly effect,” “phase 
space,” “self-organization,” “auto-catalysis,” and “strange attractors” began to 
appear in psychology’s literature in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Research 
oriented and applied psychologists often used these terms as metaphors for 
describing psychological phenomena. The biopsychologist Frederick Abraham 
(1989), for instance, used the concept of attractors to develop a hypothetical 
model of Jung’s concept of the psyche. Following Jung’s idea that the human 
psyche oscillates, Abraham’s model outlined the various states of the psyche as 
different kinds of attractors. According to Abraham’s model, as the psyche 
focuses on various internal processes (e.g., two conflicting thoughts) and 
external stimuli (e.g., daily stressors), these forces produce bifurcations in the 
psyche that propel it between various attractor states.
Some clinical psychologists and family therapists began viewing humans 
in general and the therapeutic relationship between client and therapist as 
nonlinear dynamic systems (e.g., Chubb, 1990; Gottman, 1991; Lonie, 1991; 
Stevens, 1991). Clinical psychologist Michael Butz (1993), for instance, claimed 
that psychotherapeutic interventions perturb the client qua a nonlinear system
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and it is the therapist’s responsibility to understand that this destabilization is a 
necessary process for client change. Of this process Butz stated
Based on a client’s history the therapist might select a particular time to 
make an interpretive intervention to bring the client’s chaotic state towards 
greater complexity, and yet, at the same time to create new order. On the 
other hand, some interpretations may be used to destabilize previously 
held rigid beliefs that are no longer adaptive to move a client towards a 
more chaotic state, (p. 549)
Butz argued that either of these options promotes “adaptive growth’’ in the client, 
which is the goal of effective treatment in therapy. Family therapist Margaret 
Ward (1995) contended that the family be seen as a nonlinear system that 
exhibits chaotic behavior. She argued that the tenets of chaos theory are a more 
effective way of viewing the family and its interactions than previous models of 
the family. She argued further that the possibility exists that therapists could 
begin to mathematically model family interactions and develop computer 
simulations of family dynamics in much the same way scientists from other 
disciplines were modeling their respective phenomena.
In line with these metaphorical uses, it also became fashionable to 
propose various psychological phenomena as self-organizing systems—an 
inherent property of any chaotic system in which it continually becomes more 
complex via interactions with the environment. Michael Schwalbe (1991) 
proposed the concept of the “se lf as one such self-organizing system within 
humans. He proposed, “By considering the human organism as a...dynamical
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system with inherent capacities for self-organization, we can expand our vision 
and reconnect the body and the natural world to the emergence of self and mind” 
(p. 278). In a related vein, developmental psychologist Marc Lewis (1995) argued 
for a self-organizing process in the relationship between cognition and emotion 
feedback processes. Lewis believed that a central process in personality and 
behavioral development is the complex interaction between stability and chaos in 
the cognition and emotion system. Clinical psychologist Frank Masterpasqua 
(1997) argued that human development is a process of self-organization. This 
process keeps humans changing and growing as they develop. It is through this 
self-organizational process that people stay healthy. People who reach a state of 
equilibrium begin to experience problems such as psychopathology during their 
development because they stop self-organizing. According to Masterpasqua, a 
therapist’s duty is to recognize this process towards psychopathology, distress, 
and disease and help clients move toward “far-from equilibrium” states that will 
foster the self-organizing process.
Other conceptual practices that psychologists borrowed from chaos 
theorists were their methods of analysis. These included methods such as 
attractor reconstruction, nonlinear time series analysis, and catastrophe modeling, 
in addition to measures of chaos such as Lyapunov exponents and Kolmogorov- 
Sinai entropy. Psychologists found two primary uses of chaos theory’s methods. 
First, psychologists’ used differential equations to build mathematical models of 
psychological phenomena. For instance, Stephen Guastello (1981) created a 
catastrophe model for equity in the work place in an attempt to outline various
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types of employee behavior—innovation, motivated performance, absenteeism, 
turnover, strike, riot—and at which point between employee costs and rewards 
would there be qualitative shifts from one behavior to the next. Frederick 
Abraham and colleagues (1990) developed a dynamical model of John Dollard 
and Neal Miller’s approach-avoidance conflict scheme, which indicated that at 
certain parameters approach-avoidance behavior will exhibit fixed, limit cycle, 
and chaotic attractors. Scott Clair (1998) demonstrated that his catastrophe 
theory model of situational pressures was a better predictor of adolescent alcohol 
use than three traditional linear models.
The second use, and by far the more common one, was that psychologists 
used the methods of chaos theory to examine actual data to see if there was any 
evidence of chaotic behavior. Most data psychologists generated that lent itself to 
this kind of analysis were time series data. According to psychologist Keith 
Clayton (1997, July) these new approaches from chaos theory served three 
purposes in the analysis of time series data: (a) distinguishing chaotic from 
random data, (b) discerning if the data are from a deterministic system, and (c) 
assessing the dimensionality of the data. I present a few of the many studies 
pertaining to the search for chaotic behavior in psychological phenomena. For 
instance, Allen Neuringer and Cheryl Voss (1993) analyzed time series data of 
participants attempting to anticipate the next number in the logistics equation— 
an equation that produces chaotic output. The time series data indicated that 
subject responses closely resembled chaotic behavior. Therapist Gary 
Burlingame and colleagues (1995) analyzed times series data of client-therapist
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interactions using the Hill Interaction Matrix (1973) during time-limited 
psychotherapy. They discovered that the time series data contained a fractal 
dimension indicating a complex, nonlinear order.
Material Practices 
The material practices of chaos theorists that prompted psychologists to 
engage in boundary-work were brought about largely by the increasing 
availability and pedagogical utility of computing technology during the 1980s. 
Computers were essential for carrying out the complex calculations necessary for 
detecting and analyzing a system’s chaotic behavior. Not only were computers 
essential for carrying out the calculations, but advances in software development 
were making computer graphics more visually appealing. There were a number 
of software packages offering scientists the opportunity to view chaotic behavior 
visually including Mathematica, Dynamical Software (Schaffer, Truty, & Fuimer,
1988), and Chaos Data Analyzer (Sprott & Rowlands, 1992). These software 
packages afforded psychologists who lacked the mathematical background a 
way to comprehend chaos theory. The understanding came through graphically 
displayed output, simulations of chaotic behavior, and through the analysis 
components of the software. These programs allowed psychologists a way to 
begin exploring possible chaotic behavior in psychological phenomena.
Social Practices
In the late 1980s, individuals interested in the relationship between chaos 
theory and the social sciences began publishing newsletters such as The 
Dynamics Newsletter and The Social Dynamicist. At the time, most scientists
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interested in chaos theory worked in relative isolation, as was the case with the 
graduate students from Santa Cruz and Mitchell Feigenbaum at Los Alamos. It 
was a new field, especially to social sciences like psychology, and the published 
material on chaos could only be found in journals with which most social 
scientists were unfamiliar. These newsletters assisted in alleviating this problem. 
The newsletters helped to facilitate shared communication networks by providing 
psychologists with conference announcements, brief articles, software reviews, 
and contact information from a number of scientific disciplines including physics, 
chemistry, mathematics, and biology.
It was also during this time that conferences related to chaos theory and 
psychology began to appear. In 1987 Walter Freeman, Alan Garfinkel, and Otto 
Roessler presented a workshop on the implications of chaos theory for the study 
of cognitive processes at the International Conference on the Dynamics of 
Sensory and Cognitive Processing by the Brain in West Berlin (Freeman, 1987). 
In 1988, the Beth Israel Medical Center hosted a conference on mathematical 
models, many of which were models derived from chaos theory, for 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy (Abraham, 1988). Other conferences also 
being held during this time included Fractals and Chaos in the Natural and Social 
Sciences held in Miami, Ohio in June of 1989 (Goerner, 1989b) and Chaos and 
its Implications for Psychology held in the same year at the Saybrook Institute in 
San Francisco (Goerner, 1989a).
Places to study chaos theory in psychology began to appear as well. For 
instance, in 1985, Scott Kelso, a psychologist at Florida Atlantic University, and
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Herman Kaken, a theoretical physicist at Stuttgart, established the Center for 
Complex Systems at Kelso’s university (Kelso, 1995). The Center offered training 
in complex systems brain research for undergraduates, graduate students, and 
postdoctoral fellows coming from the natural and behavioral sciences (Kelso,
1989). Funding for the Center came from the National Institute of Health, the 
Office of Naval Research, and the National Science Foundation (Kelso, 1995).
In 1991, psychologists and other scientists formed the Society for Chaos 
Theory in Psychology and the Life Science (SCTPLS) in San Francisco 
(Guastello, 1997). The Society aimed to bring together “researchers, 
theoreticians, and practitioners interested in applying dynamical systems theory, 
far-from equilibrium thermodynamics, self-organization, neural nets, fractals, 
cellular automata, and related forms of chaos, catastrophes, and bifurcations, 
nonlinear dynamics, and complexity theories to psychology and the life sciences” 
(p. 301). Due, in part, to the multiple areas of SCTPLS, members were an 
interdisciplinary group comprised largely of psychologists, neuroscientists, 
computer scientists, mathematicians, and educators. In 1997, the Society 
developed a quarterly journal, Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life 
Sciences. As the title indicates, the journal sought to publish peer-reviewed 
papers pertaining to psychology and other sciences.
The rhetoric of a new paradigm was a common strategy for legitimizing 
the use of chaos theory in psychology. Bolstering these claims was the rhetoric 
about chaos as a new paradigm in the physical sciences. In his inaugural 
address of the first SCTPLS conference Fredrick Abraham (1995), the Society’s
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second president, boldly pronounced: “Within five years, the dynamical vision 
[chaos theory] will be the hegemonical view in psychology” (p. xxvii). 
Psychotherapist Sally Goerner (1995) described chaos theory as a “revolution” 
that would have profound implications for comprehending psychological 
phenomena. Therapist and consciousness researcher Allan Combs (1995) 
proclaimed that “Chaos theory is not simply a set of novel procedures that can be 
imported into the existing establishment of scientific psychology; it in fact 
represents a fundamental revolution [italics added] in viewpoint” (p. 129). The 
psychiatrist Isla Lonie (1995) argued, “Chaos theory will be able to provide a 
paradigm that can permit a greater understanding of [psychodynamic processes] 
especially in that it provides a basis for demanding recognition that Newtonian 
science is unequal to the task” (p. 293). Similar to my other case studies, 
psychologists using chaos theory felt it would be the next “revolution” in both the 
applied and scientific realms of psychology. Given such strong claims, it is 
important to describe psychologists’ reactions to such claims.
Resistances to Chaos Theory 
Surprisingly, psychologists did not engage in much boundary-work with 
the introduction of chaos theory into the discipline. There were only a small 
number of psychologists interested in chaos theory and the work they did 
seemed to be of little importance and relevance to most psychologists’ research. 
Despite the unorthodox nature of the theory, psychologists using it neither 
caused as much political controversy as the evolutionary psychologists nor 
threatened an established theory such as behaviorism like the cognitive
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scientists. Psychologists using chaos theory’s models and methods were on the 
fringes of the discipline and apparently merited little attention, despite their claims 
that chaos theory constituted a paradigm shift for the discipline. Nevertheless, 
some psychologists, even those interested in using chaos theory in psychology, 
resisted some of its uses.
Because chaos theory’s main uses were in the physical sciences, some 
psychologists questioned its relevance for psychology. They argued that while 
chaos theory may provide insight for processes such as transitions to turbulence 
in fluids, chemical reactions, planetary orbits, stock market fluctuations, and a 
host of other physical phenomena, its ability to explain human mind and behavior 
may be beyond its explanatory power. The psychologist Wayne Powell (1995) 
collaborated with Eric Kincanon, a physicist, to warn psychologists of their 
explorations into chaos theory. By collaborating with a physicist, Powell brought 
with him the authority and prestige of a “hard” science to help him patrol 
psychology’s boundaries. While the overall tone of the article was enthusiastic 
about chaos theory’s potential for explaining psychological phenomena, Powell 
and Kincanon made sure to point out that psychologists’ misuse of chaos theory 
was still very apparent. In one of their major points of contention they stated, 
“Although many areas will benefit from the application of chaos theory, 
psychologists must still beware of the misapplication, misunderstanding, and 
poor metaphorical uses of chaos” (p. 504). For instance, they pointed out that in 
psychologist H. A. Skinner’s (1989) article on the potential of chaos theory for 
explaining alcohol addiction, he misuses the idea of sensitive dependence on
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initial conditions. First, Powell and Kincanon argue, Skinner failed to explain how 
the chaos leading to sensitive dependence could be measured with any precision. 
Secondly, Skinner believed that small changes in interventions by therapists 
would have a “dramatic effect” on whether an individual developed an addiction. 
According to Powell and Kincanon, the problem with this supposition is that 
Skinner confused small changes with small measurements. They pointed out that 
it is small measurement errors and not small changes to the addiction system 
that lead to sensitive dependence on initial conditions.
In another attempt at boundary-work with chaos theory, psychologist 
Susan Ayers (1997) questioned whether psychologists’ metaphorical uses of 
chaos theory offered a viable explanatory framework in psychology. Using chaos 
as a metaphorical device was quite common in the published literature, 
especially among psychotherapists (e.g., Butz, 1992; Mosca, 1995), family 
therapists (e.g., Chamberlain, 1995), and the closely related fields of psychiatry 
(e.g., Ehlers, 1995; Globus & Arpaia, 1994) and psychoanalysis (e.g., Levenson, 
1994; Spruiell, 1993). While using metaphor to develop theories and to create 
new perspectives is common in science, there comes a time when the theory 
needs testing. Many psychologists seemed content to use merely the ideas from 
chaos theory as a metaphor. She continued her critique, stating “there are many 
obstacles to the application of chaos to psychology: chaos can be difficult to 
understand, difficult to apply and sometimes even difficult to believe” (p. 392). 
These difficulties were at the heart of psychologists’ resistances to chaos theory. 
Many psychologists simply did not understand chaos theory and this is evident in
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the seemingly cavalier way some of them used concepts like fractals, nonlinearity, 
and bifurcations. But resistances also arose in reaction to psychologists using the 
methods of chaos theory to analyze their data.
Resistances came from those who questioned whether the methods of 
chaos theory could ever adequately explain psychological phenomena.
Measuring static psychological variables with the precision that, say, physicists’ 
measure physical variables is problematic. Describing and defining the 
parameters of dynamic psychological systems further exacerbates precise 
measurement. Exemplifying this type of resistance, mathematical psychologist R. 
Duncan Luce (1995) argued, “The difficulty with this approach is the crudity with 
which the dynamic processes are known. Until they are pinned down in much 
more detail, one cannot view this approach [chaos theory] as more than an 
interesting speculation” (p. 23). Essentially, his argument is that psychologists 
working with nonlinear models cannot work from the bottom-up and derive their 
dynamic variables from basic laws like those in physics. Instead, they have to 
infer dynamic processes from unobservable mechanisms through trial and error. 
Luce pointed to the work of Robert Gregson (e.g., 1988), who develops nonlinear 
models of psychophysical processes, as an example of this trial and error 
process. He ends his critique of nonlinear modeling on a less than enthusiastic 
note: “it is hard to be optimistic about our ability to test these nonlinear models 
effectively” (p. 20).
Paul Rapp (1995), a physiologist studying brain functions at the Medical 
College of Pennsylvania, issued this caveat to psychologists after many years of
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trying to demonstrate chaotic behavior in the brain: “Is there any evidence for 
chaos in the human central nervous system? The body of evidence in support of 
this conclusion continues to decrease as analytic methods improve” (p. 99). 
Similarly, Radford University brain researcher Karl Pribram (1996) discussed the 
difficulty of distinguishing between stochastic and chaotic behavior. Pribram and 
others found that nerve impulses function more characteristically as stochastic 
processes rather than as chaotic processes (Pribram, 1994).
Accommodations to Chaos Theory 
Psychologists did not accommodate chaos theory as much as they did 
evolutionary psychology and cognitive science. Still, psychologists made some 
accommodations for chaos theory. For instance, the SCTPLS triggered interest 
from the American Psychological Association. In 1992, Karl Pribram persuaded 
psychologist Albert Gilgen from the University of Northern Iowa to contact the 
SCTPLS. The purpose of contacting the Society was to see if its members could 
promote chaos theory as a unifying theme for the APA’s theoretical and 
philosophical psychology division (Division 24) annual program (Gilgen, 1995). 
The program helped to promote chaos theory’s use in psychology by exposing a 
large number of psychologists to its tenets. The APA’s interest continued when, 
in 1994, the journal American Psychologist published its first article on chaos 
theory entitled “Chaos, Self-Organization, and Psychology” (Barton, 1994). The 
issue of the journal even included a picture of a fractal on the cover. The article 
was critical of the uses of chaos in psychology, pointing out a number of 
methodological difficulties that needed addressing when using its methods to
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study human psychological processes. Nevertheless, Barton hailed chaos theory 
as a “new paradigm for understanding systems...gaining the attention of 
psychologists from a wide variety of specialty areas” (p. 5). The APA 
demonstrated its continuing interest in chaos theory by publishing an edited 
volume on the relationship of chaos theory to the areas of development, 
psychopathology, and psychotherapy entitled The Psychological Meaning of 
Chaos (Masterpasqua & Perna, 1997).
Another indicator of the acceptance of chaos theory in psychology is 
evident from a citation analysis of the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) 
conducted by Peter Weingart and Sabine Maasen (1997) between the years 
1974 and 1996. Their analysis indicates that the psychological literature 
accounted for the most citations pertaining to chaos theory of all the social 
sciences covered in the SSCI—including economics, business, sociology, and 
education between these years.42 Additional analysis indicates that psychologists 
used chaos theory not only as a metaphorical device, but also as a 
methodological tool and theoretical framework in virtually every subdiscipline 
within psychology (Root, 2002, August). Examples from the psychological 
literature include applications to thought and memory (e.g., Clayton & Frey, 1996; 
e.g., Garson, 1996), intelligence (e.g., Goertzel, 1998), psychophysics (e.g., 
Gregson, 1992), behavioral analysis (e.g., Hoyert, 1992), development (e.g., 
Howe & Rabinowitz, 1994; Metzger, 1997), sensation and perception (e.g., 
Gilden, Schmuckler, & Clayton, 1993), psychotherapy (e.g., Fuhriman &
42 Weingart and Maasen’s original study separated citations in psychology from citations in 
experimental psychology. I combined the two here.
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Burlingame, 1994; Hager, 1992; Paar, 1989, 1992), and industrial organizational 
psychology (e.g., Gregersen & Sailer, 1993; Guastello, 1995).
Despite these accommodations, psychologists did not accept the tenets of 
chaos theory as they did the ones of evolutionary psychology and cognitive 
science. The relative excitement about its potential uses and as a revolutionary 
paradigm quickly waned. As Stephen Guastello (2001) indicated, “The days of 
‘Here’s Chaos!’ have been gone for quite some time” (p. 27). There were only a 
relatively small number of courses taught on chaos theory in psychology and 
those who did offer these courses were usually members of SCTPLS (e.g., Keith 
Clayton, Fred Abraham, and Stephen Guastello). A cursory survey of 
undergraduate and graduate statistics and research textbooks (Aron & Aron, 
1999; Gravetter & Wallnau, 2000; Grimm & Yarnold, 1998, 2000; Howell, 2004; 
Kirk, 1995; Myers & Well, 1995; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996; Winer, Brown, & 
Michels, 1991) indicate that the mathematical modeling strategies and data 
analysis methods of chaos theory did not permeate the pedagogical research 
literature. Unlike evolutionary psychology, no introductory psychology textbooks 
contained sections on chaos theory’s uses in psychology.
Of my three case studies, it appears that by 2000 chaos theory was still on 
the fringe of the discipline and on the verge of fading into disuse altogether. I 
postulate several reasons for chaos theory’s distant relationship to the discipline 
of psychology. Most psychologists never received appropriate training in the 
methods of chaos theory so they never incorporated it into their research. 
Psychological data is often more “noisy” than data from physics, chemistry, and
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biology due to the difficulty psychologists experience when trying to control 
extraneous variables. It is often difficult to separate this noise from truly chaotic 
behavior even with the methods of chaos theory. Generating the appropriate and 
correct amounts of psychological data is difficult, especially considering the 
requirements to search for chaotic processes. Most chaos theorists agree that in 
order to find chaotic behavior in any type of system, one need acquire thousands, 
if not tens of thousands, of data points (Williams, 1997). This proves problematic 
for most psychologists, though physiological data may meet this requirement. 
Finally, as Rapp (1995) suggested, as the methods to measure chaotic behavior 
become more refined, there are questions as to whether psychological 
phenomena really do exhibit chaotic behavior.
Psychologists did not do much boundary-work pertaining to chaos theory. 
Psychologists realized the difficulties of using chaos theory to explain human 
mind and behavior. Some psychologists however, began using dynamic systems 
frameworks and the idea of self-organization to study psychological phenomena 
in fields such as development (e.g., Thelen, 1992; Thelen, Kelso, & Fogel, 1987), 
social psychology (e.g., Vallacher & Nowak, 1994), personality (e.g., Pervin,
2001) and cognition (e.g., van Geert, 2000; van Gelder, 1998). As identifying 
chaotic behavior in psychological data proved problematic, these psychologists 
decided to develop models of psychological phenomena based on the broader 
category of dynamic systems. While they do not ignore the possibility of chaotic 
behavior, they realize that chaotic behavior is only a small subset of possible 
behaviors in dynamic systems. One of the advantages of adopting this approach
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is that one can use both nonlinear and linear models and statistics in their 
investigations. So even if chaos theory dies out completely in psychology, the 
use of dynamic systems theory will keep the idea of complexity and 
unpredictability within the repertoire of psychologists’ practices.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The discipline of U.S. psychology is a complex web of interacting 
subdisciplines. Psychologists from each of these subdisciplines carve out niches 
of power, control, and expertise in particular psychological domains. Social 
psychologists carve out niches in the realm of social interactions, personality 
psychologists control information pertaining to the basic components of the “self,” 
and so on. Psychologists have a stake in keeping their epistemic authority in 
these domains. Society in general perceives psychologists as experts of human 
mind, behavior, and emotion and society elicits their help in many ways. The 
justice system, for instance, relies on psychologists’ expertise in evaluating 
competence and sanity in court cases. Businesses hire psychologists to improve 
worker productivity and evaluate new employees. It is difficult to find an area of 
society in which psychologists or their various conceptual, material, and social 
practices do not come into consideration.
Because of this perceived expertise, society relies on psychologists to 
prescribe appropriate ways of “being” in the world. Psychologists receive 
accolades, rewards, and prestige from their expert status. As I previously 
outlined, psychologists receive funding from various governmental and
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philanthropic sources such as the National Institute of Mental Health and the 
Sloan Foundation. These funds allow psychologists to pursue their areas of 
specialization. The more funding a psychologist receives typically results in 
more rewards (e.g., promotion and tenure) and prestige for the psychologist.
In order to keep this epistemic authority, psychologists engage in 
boundary-work. They patrol their boundaries, constantly scanning the 
disciplinary landscape for possible “cracks in the wall” where undesirables 
may enter. When psychologists find these undesirables, they use their 
authoritative position in society to demonstrate, through intellectual and 
political means, how they are distinct from these undesirables. Psychologists 
will often attack the scientific credibility of these undesirables, calling them 
pseudo-scientists, as they did and still continue to do with parapsychologists 
(e.g., Benjamin & Baker, 2004; Coon, 1992). In other situations, they will 
distance themselves from recognized fraudulent practices as some 
psychologists did after discovering discrepancies in Cyril Burt’s intelligence 
data (e.g., Gieryn & Figert, 1986; Zenderland, 1990). Boundary-work is not 
only a tool for resisting practices; it is also a useful activity for bringing in new 
practices. Psychologists engage in boundary-work to incorporate new 
practices into the discipline, especially if they deem these practices as 
beneficial to their epistemic authority. At first, many psychologists resisted 
Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, but after the growing public interest in Freud’s 
theory, they began associating psychoanalytic theory with their own discipline 
(Hornstein, 1992). Psychologists’ boundary-work is a continual process of
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resistances and accommodations towards objects, technology, ideas, 
metaphors, and theories impinging on their intellectual territory.
Between 1970 and 2000, the interdisciplinary programs of evolutionary 
psychology, cognitive science, and chaos theory impinged upon the 
intellectual territory of psychology. Scientists from each of these disciplines 
brought with them an array of conceptual, material, and social practices that 
forced psychologists to evaluate the boundaries of their discipline. 
Psychologists reacted to the practices of these programs by resisting 
particular dimensions of these scientists’ practices or making 
accommodations for them. Within this thirty year span, psychologists dictated 
the allocation of these practices by what they believed to be useful for 
furthering their epistemic authority and general understanding of 
psychological phenomena.
Evolutionary Psychology
While psychologists have used the evolutionary theories of Lamarck 
and Darwin throughout the discipline’s history, it was not until the 1980s that 
an organized group of scientists calling themselves evolutionary 
psychologists began to bring their conceptual, material, and social practices 
into the discipline. Evolutionary psychologists built their interdisciplinary 
program based on the controversial and politically-charged theory of 
sociobiology developed a decade earlier by the entomologist E. O. Wilson. 
Conducting boundary-work in their own program, evolutionary psychologists 
distanced themselves from sociobiology by focusing solely on the adaptive
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function of the human mind rather than the adaptive social behavior of all 
living organisms. Evolutionary psychologists proposed that cognitive abilities 
such as mate selection and retention, and reasoning in social exchanges 
were adaptations produced during our time in the Pleistocene era as hunter- 
gatherers.
Conceptually, evolutionary psychologists attacked psychologists’ 
standard social science model, considering it an inadequate theoretical 
framework for psychology. Evolutionary psychologists’ argued that humans 
were not born as “blank slates” but instead were born with innate, 
psychological mechanisms designed to solve adaptive problems such as 
those for detecting cheaters in social exchanges. In terms of material 
practices, evolutionary psychologists used software programs that changed 
the physical appearance of human faces and body types for their experiments 
on physical attractiveness. The social practices of evolutionary psychologists 
typify the ways in which organizations become professionalized and 
institutionalized. They developed a professional organization—The Human 
Behavior and Evolution Society—and a professional journal—Evolution and 
Human Behavior. These social practices enhanced evolutionary 
psychologists’ credibility with the public and psychologists. Another social 
practice of evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Buss, 1995; Simpson, 1995) was 
their rhetoric about their theory being a revolution or paradigm shift in 
psychology.
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Psychologists reacted in different ways to evolutionary psychology. 
Some resisted the practices of evolutionary psychologists, some made 
accommodations for these practices, and still others seemed to ignore their 
ideas altogether. I found that some psychologists resisted evolutionary 
psychologists’ advocacy of the adaptationist perspective. Evolutionary 
psychologists relied on evolutionary biologists, anthropologists, and other 
scientists (e.g., George Williams, Robert Trivers) to outline the adaptationist 
perspective. Some psychologists responded by obtaining arguments from 
other scientists (e.g., Gould and Lewontin) to refute the adaptationist 
perspective (Rose & Rose, 2000). Others objected to evolutionary 
psychologists’ reliance on adaptations and not enough on cultural factors in 
the understanding of human cognitive processes (Burn, 1996). Feminist 
psychologists such as Alice Eagly (1995) were concerned with the political 
ramifications of the gender difference findings of many evolutionary 
psychologists.
There is ample evidence that psychologists made accommodations for 
some of evolutionary psychologists’ practices. Many top tier journals such as 
Psychological Review and American Psychologist published evolutionary 
accounts of various psychological phenomena. Evolutionary psychologists’ 
research permeated many subdisciplines in psychology including cognition, 
development, and social psychology. Similarly, a number of introduction to 
psychology textbooks provided sections on evolutionary psychology. Also, 
textbooks for introductory and advanced psychology classes specifically
182
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
written by evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Buss, 1999) came on the market. 
Accompanying the published accounts, a number of schools offered 
undergraduate and graduate courses in evolutionary psychology in addition to 
a few schools offering doctoral students specialization in evolutionary 
psychology. Finally, some evolutionary psychologists and feminist 
psychologists attempted rapprochement in the published literature (Buss & 
Malamuth, 1996).
Cognitive Science
The interdisciplinary program of cognitive science began infringing 
upon psychology’s territory in the 1970s. The formation of cognitive science 
occurred as disciplines such as computer science, artificial intelligence, 
cognitive psychology, and neuroscience converged on the idea of using the 
digital computer as a metaphor for how humans process information. 
Cognitive scientists try to understand human cognitive processes such as 
memory, language, and problem solving, in addition to developing computer 
programs that mimic aspects of these processes.
Conceptually, cognitive scientists brought the computer-as-mind 
metaphor to many psychologists. For some, this metaphor served as a new 
way to view human cognitive activities. This helped shape the language some 
psychologists used to describe human thought, behavior, and emotions. The 
language became oriented towards computer programming and terms such 
as storage, parallel processing, and channel capacity began serving as 
descriptive terms for cognitive processes. With this language came two types
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of models—symbolism and connectionism—that psychologists employed in 
their attempts to understand information processing.
Cognitive scientists’ material practices took the shape of attempting to 
create forms of artificial intelligence. Many psychologists still continue to use 
animal models to explain aspects of human psychological phenomena, but 
developing intelligence out of inorganic material was new and psychologists 
had to be contended with this new practice. While cognitive scientists made 
technological strides from Newall and Simon’s simple General Logic Theorist 
to Brooks’ more sophisticated COG, attempts at recognizable intelligence in 
machines still remain in their infancy.
Cognitive scientists brought many social practices to psychology. First, 
psychologists had to deal with the large amount of funding from governmental 
and private organizations cognitive scientists received for studying cognitive 
processes. Secondly, psychologists’ realizations of the importance and 
possibility of studying mental events for their discipline spawned a number of 
journals specifically tailored to cognitive scientists such as Cognition and 
Cognitive Science. Accompanying the journals, cognitive scientists developed 
the Cognitive Science Society, which allowed scientists from various fields to 
interact and exchange ideas. Third, the undergraduate and graduate 
curriculum changed in many institutions as they began offering introductory 
and advanced classes in cognitive science. Some held classes in cognitive 
science institutions while others held them in psychology departments. Fourth, 
many cognitive scientists believed their approach to cognition was a
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revolution or paradigm shift for psychology (e.g., Sperry, 1988). Finally, 
cognitive scientists, specifically neuroscientists, brought brain imaging 
technology to the discipline. These images served to represent the internal 
structures and functions of the brain, while serving as a persuasive rhetorical 
device. Psychologists now had the technology to peer inside the mind of 
humans and watch the dynamical processes in action.
Resistances to cognitive scientists came mainly from behaviorists. 
Cognitive science threatened the behaviorist perspective that was prominent 
in psychology throughout the early to middle 1900s. Behaviorists found 
cognitive activity superfluous for hypothesizing or impossible to study. A 
science of psychology, so the behaviorists’ argued, comes about only through 
a systematic study of stimuli and responses, and not through postulating 
mental events that act as intermediaries between stimuli and behaviors. I 
outlined a number of Skinner’s (e.g., 1985) objections to cognitive science as 
a putative science. Other resistances came from those psychologists using 
animal models to explain human behavior. They found it difficult to accept the 
notion of using computers and computer programs to study humans. Others 
resisted cognitive scientists’ reliance on brain imaging. Brian imaging, they 
argued, only tells part of the story of cognition. It answers the “where” 
questions but the not the “how” and “why” questions of cognitive processes.
Despite these resistances, some psychologists made accommodations 
for the ideas, theories, and technology of cognitive scientists. According to 
Robins and colleagues (1999), cognitive topics published in flagship journals
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rose from 1977 to 1996. This increase in citations coincides with the wide 
range of applications of cognitive science in psychology’s subdisciplines 
including education, personality, developmental, and clinical psychology. 
Many psychology departments began offering cognitive science courses and 
several textbooks within the discipline provided it with ample coverage. 
Similarly, many cognitive psychology textbooks increased their coverage of 
the neuroscience aspects of cognitive science. With this increased coverage 
came the use of fMRI and PET images as evidence for cognitive processes.
Chaos Theory
Finally, in the mid-1980s some psychologists began considering the 
viability of chaos theory as a way of understanding and analyzing human 
mind, behavior, and emotions. I argued that psychologists became interested 
in chaotic behavior in psychological phenomena as physiologists (e.g., 
Skarda & Freeman, 1987) began exploring its features and as the popular 
science literature flooded with books on chaos theory (e.g., Gleick, 1987). In 
particular, the popularized accounts of chaos theory, with their promises of a 
scientific revolution, fascinated many psychologists. Many early works by 
psychologists referenced either the physiologists or the popular portrayals of 
chaos theory.
In terms of conceptual practices, some psychologists began adopting 
the language of chaos theory to explain various dimensions of human 
psychology. It was common to find terms such as “fractals,” “self­
organization,” and “bifurcations” used metaphorically to explain diverse
186
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
phenomena such as personality development and the psychotherapeutic 
process. Some psychologists also began employing many of the methods 
used by chaos theorists in other disciplines such as catastrophe modeling 
and nonlinear time series analysis.
The computer offered the most salient material practice for chaos 
theory. Some psychologists began using software programs such as Chaos 
Data Analyzer (Sprott & Rowlands, 1992) specifically designed to analyze 
large amounts of data quickly and efficiently. These types of programs helped 
identify chaotic behavior in psychological data. Additionally, they used these 
programs for visualizing the results of their experiments. The phenomena 
these psychologists studied were dynamic and these programs allowed them 
to view the changing nature of the systems under investigation in a much 
more effective way than offered by traditional data analysis.
Socially, psychologists interested in chaos theory began 
communicating through newsletters and conferences established largely for 
other scientists. These communication networks allowed psychologists to 
interact with scientists beyond their discipline and with other psychologists 
interested in chaos theory they might not have otherwise met. Centers to 
study chaotic behavior in psychological systems began to emerge in the 
1990s such as the Center for Complex Systems at Florida Atlantic University. 
In 1991, those interested in the ramification of chaos theory for psychological 
phenomena formed the Society for Chaos Theory in Psychology and the Life 
Sciences. Six years after the Society, they began publication of their
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interdisciplinary journal, Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences. 
As with the other interdisciplinary programs, some psychologists began 
referring to chaos theory as a new paradigm for psychological science (e.g., 
Combs, 1995).
Because employing chaos theory in psychology was a relatively small 
movement, many psychologists ignored its uses. Those psychologists who 
tried to resist its uses in the discipline attacked it on two fronts. First, they 
objected to using chaos theory as a metaphor for psychological phenomena. 
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions, for instance, offered an 
inappropriate metaphor for comments made by therapists to their clients 
because it pertains to measurement rather than changes in conversation. The 
second resistance involved psychologists trying to use the analytic techniques 
of chaos in their research. Chaos theory’s methods were relatively new and 
they were being refined constantly throughout the 1990s. Some psychologists 
believed it to be premature to use such techniques. Others criticized the 
difficulty in measurement of dynamic processes. It was much easier to 
measure phenomenon in physics than it was psychological phenomena. 
Finally, there were those who questioned if any psychological processes truly 
exhibited chaotic behavior.
Despite chaos theory’s fringe status in the discipline, psychologists did 
accept some of the practices inherent in this interdisciplinary program. For 
instance, psychologists elicited assistance from members of the Society to 
develop a program on unifying psychology for the APA in 1992. The APA also
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published a number of journal articles and a book on chaos theory. A number 
of subdisciplines including developmental, cognitive, clinical, and social 
psychology published accounts of chaos theory in their content-specific 
journals. In fact, according to the Social Science Citation Index, psychologists’ 
publications account for the greatest number of citations on chaos theory of 
all the social sciences.
General Themes in Psychologists’ Boundary-Work 
Are there any general themes of psychologists’ boundary-work in 
relation to these three interdisciplinary programs? Even though evolutionary 
psychologists, cognitive scientists, and chaos theorists introduced different 
types of practices into the discipline, they all contributed to changing 
psychology’s boundaries to a certain degree. According to my analysis, 
resistances most often came when psychologists faced new conceptual 
practices. Psychologists resisted evolutionary psychologists’ use of the 
adaptationist perspective, cognitive scientists’ use of the computer-as-mind 
metaphor, and chaos theorists’ chaotic behavior metaphor. Psychologists 
showed different resistances to the analytic methods of each of these 
programs. Evolutionary psychologists use mainly the same technologies for 
analyzing their data; therefore, psychologists did not resist these kinds of 
material practice. Some psychologists did resist cognitive scientists’ reliance 
on computer program modeling as a viable means for understanding 
cognitive processes. Similarly, some psychologists objected to the fact that
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chaos theory’s methods were inadequate for analyzing psychological 
phenomena.
Based on my analysis, it appears that psychologists’ first line of 
defense in their boundary-work activities is to attack their opponents’ 
conceptual practices. Conceptual practices lie at the heart of psychology’s 
disciplinary structure. Psychologists rely on their theories and methods of 
analysis largely to define their discipline. Conceptual practices are the locus 
of psychologists’ expert knowledge. It is not surprising then that psychologists 
resisted the introduction of new concepts, theories, and analytic methods.
The conceptual practices of these three programs threatened many 
psychologists’ roles as experts. Feminist psychologists felt threatened by the 
political ramifications of evolutionary psychologists’ adaptationist perspective. 
Behaviorists felt their goal of a science of behavior challenged by cognitive 
scientists’ contention of a science of information processing. Other 
psychologists faced questions about reductionism and predictability in their 
research programs from chaos theorists who believed in holistic approaches 
to research and an emphasis on understanding over prediction.
Even though the computer served as the primary material practice for 
each of these interdisciplinary programs, psychologists’ resistances to the 
uses of computers were different for each program. Evolutionary 
psychologists’ use of software programs to morph facial features and body 
types did not cause psychologists to engage in much boundary-work. 
Similarly, there was not much resistance to using computers to search for
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chaotic behavior in psychological processes, even though some 
psychologists objected to the validity of chaos theorists’ findings. Cognitive 
scientists’ use of computers in the development of artificial intelligence did 
cause resistance from some psychologists.
Psychologists, of course, were familiar with the many ways of using 
computers to facilitate experiments and analyze data. Since evolutionary 
psychologists and chaos theorists used the computer in these ways, it is not 
surprising that psychologists put little effort into resisting this type of material 
practice. But cognitive scientists’ efforts to develop intelligent machines are a 
qualitatively different use of computer technology. Creating artificial 
intelligence brought up many issues for psychologists, not all of them 
explicitly stated. There are many ethical and philosophical dilemmas to this 
kind of endeavor usually only debated by philosophers. Do we rely solely on 
the Turing test to decide what constitutes an artificial intelligence? If not, what 
other kinds of tests can be used? Should scientists even attempt this feat 
without fully understanding human intelligence? Is it even possible to develop 
some kind of intelligence from inorganic material? While most psychologists 
did not concern themselves with these issues, many who resisted the 
possibility of artificial intelligence felt it necessary to defend their own material 
practices. Animals served as the primary source of data for many of these 
psychologists. The advent of something else taking over as a primary source 
of data in psychology was a threatening possibility.
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Psychologists seemed not to resist many of the social practices of 
these interdisciplinary programs. This may have more to do with practicality 
than anything else. It is one thing to write a scathing book review or 
devastating critique of an opponent’s theory. It is another thing altogether to 
try to stop people with a common interest from organizing. I found no 
instances of psychologists trying to prevent the development of any of the 
interdisciplinary programs’ professional organizations, though this may be due 
to the lack of archival sources on the matter. Similarly, I found no resistances 
to the publication of their flagship journals. I should mention, however, that I 
found no evidence for the large professional organizations in psychology like 
the APA making attempts to develop distinct divisions for these scientists’ 
areas of expertise.
One surprising feature of my analysis is that few psychologists 
attacked these interdisciplinary scientists’ rhetoric of scientific revolutions and 
paradigm shifts. It seems likely that the incursion into psychologists’ 
intellectual territory would prompt them to defend their disciplinary boundaries. 
Each program had individuals claiming revolutionary or paradigm status for 
their science, yet psychologists did not spend time refuting these claims. One 
possible explanation for psychologists’ inactivity is that they found these 
claims preposterous and not worthy of a response. But this solution is 
problematic. Surely, if psychologists spent time resisting the possible gender 
inequality inherent in the adaptationist perspective, they would also spend 
time refuting the claims of a supposed paradigm shift. A second and more
192
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
probable reason for this inactivity is that, since Kuhn’s (1962/1996) The 
Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, terms such as “revolution” and “paradigm” 
have become fairly ubiquitous in science. Scientists tend to use these terms 
seemingly without understanding Kuhn’s message. Scientists often use 
phrases like “method X is a paradigm” or “theory Y is a paradigm” as a way to 
describe some common scientific activity or idea. It is probable that 
psychologists paid no attention to these claims because they were 
accustomed to seeing these terms in their own scientific literature. A third 
possibility is that psychologists’ had minimal exposure to these claims in their 
resistance attempts. Psychologists may not have read as widely in the 
literature as I have and may not have found a significant number of scientists 
claiming their program as a new paradigm. These possibilities do not do this 
topic justice and I suggest future research on the lack of psychologists’ 
boundary-work on these claims.
To a certain extent, psychologists’ resistances were largely ineffective 
because accommodations occurred at every level of practice for all three 
interdisciplinary programs. By 2000, evolutionary psychology was a common 
theoretical framework found in psychology books, journals, conference 
presentation, and the classroom. The same is true of cognitive science, 
though it was just as likely that psychologists migrated out of their 
departments and into cognitive science institutes. While some psychologists 
accepted the ideas of chaos theory, many pulled back from trying to discover
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chaotic behavior and preferred to examine psychological phenomena from 
the larger perspective of dynamic systems.
These accommodations indicate that, overall, psychologists did not 
view these three interdisciplinary programs as pseudosciences or fraudulent 
practices. In this respect, psychologists’ boundary-work for evolutionary 
psychology, cognitive science, and chaos theory was fundamentally different 
from the boundary-work they conducted in the late 1800s with the practices of 
spiritualists and psychic mediums (Coon, 1992). At that time, psychologists 
had to demonstrate to the public how psychology was different from the study 
of psychic phenomena, while at the same time ensuring that the spiritualists 
understood they were not part of the discipline. Instead, the boundary-work 
psychologists conducted in response to these interdisciplinary programs looks 
similar to boundary-work psychologists used with psychoanalysis throughout 
the 1900s (Hornstein, 1992). Initially, psychologists attacked psychoanalysts 
as being unscientific. By the beginning of the 1960s, psychologists began 
adopting ideas from psychoanalysis. Hornstein argues that this adoption 
helped make psychology a “more flexible and broad-based discipline.” I 
believe this to be the end result of psychologists’ accommodations to my 
three interdisciplinary programs. Psychologists were able to open new areas 
of expertise through their associations with these interdisciplinary programs. 
The interdisciplinary programs brought with them expertise from fields like 
evolutionary biology, computer science, physics, and mathematics.
Conceptual practices such as the use of new metaphors and models, material
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practices like new computer programs and data analysis techniques, and 
social practices including increased funding and new professional journals 
helped psychologists develop into a more flexible and broad-based discipline 
between 1970 and 2000.
Interestingly, during this thirty year span the interdisciplinary programs 
began borrowing ideas from each other. I expected to find some overlap 
between cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists because of their 
closely related goal of studying the human mind. Indeed, Cosmides and 
Tooby (1995) argued for evolutionary psychology as a critical link between 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience. I also expected a small degree of 
overlap between cognitive scientists and chaos theorists in psychology.
Earlier, I referenced scientists working on the connection between cognition 
and chaos theory (e.g., Goertzel, 1994). I also mentioned those who pulled 
back from searching for chaotic behavior and shifted their perspective 
towards viewing cognition as a dynamical system (e.g., Thelen & Smith,
1994; van Gelder, 1998). I did not expect to find a relationship between 
evolutionary psychologists and those studying chaotic or dynamic systems 
behavior in psychology. Interestingly, the evolutionary psychologist Douglas 
Kenrick and his colleagues (2001; 2003; 2002) are now exploring the 
relationship between evolutionary adaptations and dynamic systems theory.
The History of Psychology and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
My research attempted to bring the history of psychology and the 
sociology of scientific knowledge together using boundary-work as a
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framework. The choice of psychologists’ boundary-work on the practices of 
scientists from three interdisciplinary programs was both productive and 
problematic. It was productive in the sense that I was able to examine the 
lines of intellectual demarcation that psychologists laid out for three different 
programs. This provided a broad survey with rich sources of information on 
their boundary-work activities in reaction to multiple infringements. I was also 
fortunate because these interdisciplinary programs developed and interacted 
with psychology over a relatively recent period in psychology’s history. This 
made much of the information readily available in published form.
From a historical perspective, it was problematic because these 
programs were relatively new and are still influencing psychologists’ 
boundary-work. In this respect, my story is incomplete. Another difficulty 
came with my brief histories of the interdisciplinary programs. Given their 
recent past, it was difficult to establish proper historical perspective on these 
programs. Many of their practitioners are still active in the field today. I had to 
dispense with archival material because, in this recent period, the documents 
have not yet been deposited.
I believe psychology’s history to be unexplored territory for sociologists 
of scientific knowledge. Most accounts by sociologists of scientific knowledge 
focus on the physical sciences (e.g., Barnes & Shapin, 1979; Pickering, 1984). 
Their focus is strategic because one of their goals is to demonstrate the 
contingent nature of scientific practices. If they can demonstrate the 
contingent nature of scientific practices in the “hard” sciences, it should follow
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that scientific knowledge is constructed rather than discovered in the “softer” 
social sciences. But by ignoring social sciences like psychology, sociologists 
of science miss a number of opportunities to compare the fields of physics, 
chemistry, and biology with those such as sociology, anthropology, and 
psychology. For instance, future research may provide answers to questions 
like, “Do physicists’ conceptual, material, and social practices differ 
fundamentally from psychologists’ practices?” and “What are the similarities 
and differences between the intellectual boundaries of chemists and those of 
psychologists?”.
Finally, I believe psychologists’ boundary-work to be a viable and 
potentially fruitful area of study for historians of psychology. Few historians of 
psychology explicitly use boundary-work in their research. In the middle 
1960s, Robert Young (1966) encouraged historians of psychology to move 
away from Whiggish history and focus on the fine details in psychology’s 
history such as the institute and the laboratory. In the 1990s, Roger Smith 
(1998) argued that the history of psychology was mature enough to start 
looking again at the big picture. I believe it is time to start revising these 
histories through an examination of psychologists’ boundary-work. Boundary- 
work analysis strikes a balance between the big picture and the small details. 
It does this by focusing on the intellectual territory of the discipline as a whole, 
while examining the pockets of controversy that play a role in shaping this 
intellectual territory. At the very least, I believe textbook histories of 
psychology should move away from the “great” men, ideas, and dates
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approach and focus more on how psychologists established, maintained, and 
extended their disciplinary boundaries. All the fascinating stories, the rich 
detail, and the archival research remain the same, but there would be a 
unifying purpose to the historical scholarship. The purpose would be to 
understand how psychologists achieved, kept, and furthered their expert 
status in society throughout the discipline’s history.
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